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ABSTRACT 
This thesis attempts to make original contributions on the empirical impacts of Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) on the market for corporate control from deal initialization to deal 
finalization. I identify a bilateral interaction between an acquirer and a target that affects M&A 
in various ways, rather than the previously identified unilateral impacts from a deal buyer or a 
seller. Using the most chronologically extensive dataset that has been used in the context of 
CSR-M&A literature, I first investigate the impacts of corporate social responsibility on M&A 
likelihood. I find that more M&A deals are initiated for firms with closer CSR proximity 
between an acquirer and a target. The higher the Acquirer-Target CSR Difference (ATCD), the 
lower their M&A likelihood, especially when this CSR implied divergence is large in terms of 
employee relations, environment and product aspects. From these initialized deals, the 
probability of completing a deal is reduced by 8.65% if there is a 10% unit rise in ATCD. These 
results indicate that ATCD is an important determinant of M&A likelihood and deal completion 
likelihood. It indicates that two firms with close CSR scores are more likely to merge together 
given that such similarity brings about familiarity and trust in cultural and managerial aspects 
between them, thereby contributing to lower operating frictions in the deal process. 
I then extend the research framework to M&A premium and wealth creation and provide 
evidence of the existence of a ‘learning effect’. I identify a strong positive link between ATCD 
and acquisition premium, announcement time combined abnormal return of an acquirer and a 
target and 2-year acquirer return. The positive linkage on ATCD and acquisition premium 
indicates that acquiring firms expect more synergies from the transaction with a target that has 
a contrasting CSR image. The willingness on paying a higher premium portrays acquiring 
management’s confidence in more future synergistic gains from the deal. The further positive 
relation between ATCD and announcement time combined abnormal return and acquirer 2-
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year return ascertain the expected synergistic gain, indicating the market’s appreciation and 
positive expectation on a mutual ‘learning effect’.  
The final empirical study explores the impacts of CSR on the M&A method of payment. I find 
a smaller percentage and a decreased likelihood of stock being used as merger currency as 
ATCD increases. A 10% unit increase in between-firm CSR difference lowers the stock 
payment percentage by approximately 5%. A greater fraction of stock is preferred as merger 
currency to show that the seller and the buyer are willing to share future uncertainties and future 
profits since a lower ATCD implies a lower level of ideological difference; this results in 
greater reliability between contracting parties. The potential linkage between the 
aforementioned relations (the negative relation between ATCD and stock payment percentage 
and the positive relation between ATCD and acquisition announcement time returns) are jointly 
consistent with current M&A literature on financing decisions and acquisition returns. 
Overall, results in this thesis suggest that practitioners could extend their vision on utilizing 
CSR engagements as a means of communication, as well as a tool to understanding a 
contracting party in addition to financial indicators. This work would help firms ease out some 
of the possible impediments in a deal process and help preserve the value of what has been 
created and ensure that it continues to grow in the combined entity in the future.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1.Motivation for the thesis 
Over the past ten years, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has increased in importance 
because of the role it plays in current business models. In the current competitive commercial 
environment, an increasing number of firms have started promoting their business through 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) strategies since their shareholders and stakeholders 
expect them to behave in a sustainable and responsible manner. This is reflected in the 2010 
Social Investment Forum’s Report where, during the period between 2003 and 2009, the value 
of socially responsible investment (SRI) funds increased from $2.16 trillion to $3.07 trillion 
(assets under management). Moreover, there was a dramatic rise in the number of private equity 
(PE) signatories joining the PRI1. This number grew from 2 (2008) to over 150 in 2012, 
implying an increased significance being attributed to the integration of social and ethical 
considerations into activities and guidelines. As an example, the KKR Green Portfolio 
Programme demonstrates that better engagements in social/ethical activities can create value 
for both shareholders (an owner of shares in a firm) and stakeholders (a person, group or 
organisation that has interest or concern in an organization).  
Driven by the increased importance of CSR engagements in the field of investment 
management, PwC2 conducted a survey on behalf of PRI from June to October 2012. The 
                                                 
1 PRI stands for ‘The Principles for Responsible Investment’ which were launched by the UN Secretary-General 
at the New York Stock Exchange in April 2006. 
2 PwC is a network of firms in 158 countries with close to 169,000 people who are committed to delivering quality 
in assurance, tax and advisory services. PwC has a market leading Sustainability and Climate Change (S&CC) 
team and has won UK Consultancy of the Year at the Business Green Leaders Awards. PwC also won Corporate 
Livewire’s Global Sustainability Private Equity Advisor of the Year. With a global network of 700 full time 
sustainability professionals and a team of more than 100 specialists in the UK, PwC is a leading advisor on 
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survey focuses on assessing trade buyer’s attitudes towards evaluating CSR related risks and 
opportunities encountered in M&A related activities. The group positions its focus on M&As 
because the M&A process provides insights about how a firm integrates CSR considerations 
into their own investment process and gives some indications as to how CSR impacts a trade 
buyer’s returns. It aims to improve the understanding of the relationship between a firm’s social 
and ethical engagements and value creation as well as management of firm risk. Therefore the 
survey results provide assistance in recognizing how CSR engagements can be material to the 
investment process and returns.  
One of the three key topics in the survey is the integration of environmental, social and 
governance (ESG) factors into M&A price, sale and purchase agreements (SPA). The majority 
of firms (63%) consider that the importance of ESG factors has increased in the market for 
corporate control and three quarters perceive that this trend will continue for the next three 
years. The survey also presents an increasing trend in integrating ESG factors into M&A due 
diligence process though there is yet to be an established standard for the consistent application 
of ESG factors. Most importantly, more than half of the interviewed firms state that their 
willingness to purchasing a firm and the valuation of a deal can both be significantly negatively 
impacted by a poor performance on ESG factors. Conclusions drawn from the 2012 PwC 
survey indicate that there has been a growing awareness of the contribution that CSR 
engagements make to M&A wealth creation and firm risk management.  
The rapid development of corporate social awareness has attracted attention from the academic 
community as well. Topics on impacts of acquirer and target standalone CSR on acquisition 
                                                 
sustainability, climate change and green growth. The team works with clients in both the public and private sectors 
internationally, providing them with policy, strategy, management, reporting and assurance services.   
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wealth effects have been investigated by Deng et al. (2013) and Aktas et al. (2011), however, 
to the best of my knowledge, there is no research focused on the broader process of M&As 
from a bilateral point of view, i.e. from deal initialization to deal finalization.  
Previous research has evaluated the impact of both acquirer CSR and target CSR on wealth 
creation of corporate acquisition events from a unilateral perspective. Signalling theory 
prompts me to explore implications from the difference/spread between the acquirer and the 
target CSR score. This suggests the effectiveness of a firm’s social ethical performance as a 
signal depends not only on the information it conveys, but also on the ability of the receiver to 
interpret that information. In line with signalling models, there is a possibility that the signal 
may not truthfully portray the characteristics of a sender and the information that a sender 
wants to deliver. For instance, investors that keep neutral or support shareholder expense views 
of CSR are less likely to pay a premium for CSR factors. For instance, a CSR aware acquirer 
would show a different attitude than a CSR neutral acquirer towards a good CSR target, in 
terms of due diligence, pre-acquisition negotiation process, and related aspects of an 
acquisition.  
 By affiliation, the effects and associated value of CSR engagements on M&A transactions not 
only depend unilaterally on a firm’s CSR image, but also on how this value is perceived by 
their contracting party. This problem is mitigated when the sender and receiver of the signal 
share a high level of ideological proximity (Crawford and Sobel, 1982), e.g. when they both 
engage at a high level in CSR activities. As such a unilateral focus on either the acquirer’s CSR 
or the target’s CSR when analysing CSR impact on M&As would appear a subjective 
description, since different contacting parties (receivers) perceive different views on the same 
social engagements (signal). Therefore, when analysing CSR impacts on M&A events, it would 
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be more reasonable to utilize a bilateral analysis (ATCD) rather than analysing standalone CSR 
scores (acquirer CSR score or target CSR score). In this regard, work in this area is far from 
conclusive, thereby requiring additional research to understand how the financial market and 
individual investors perceive firms’ adoption of corporate social responsibility in their 
governance. 
As an extension of signalling theory, it is natural to think about what happens next between the 
two parties (the sender and receiver of the signal) after the signal has been received and 
interpreted. Inter-organizational trust is one of the most important things on the list. It is defined 
as ‘a shared psychological state among organizational members comprising willingness to 
accept vulnerability based on positive expectations of an organization’ by Fulmer and Gelfand 
(2012) (Page 1174). Shared characteristics between two organizations including business 
ethics (Kasper-Fuehrer and Ashkanasy, 2001), cultural diversity values (Stahl et al., 2011), 
holding common principles among organizational members (d'Iribarne, 2003) and a common 
business understanding (Kasper-Fuehrer and Ashkanasy, 2001) all contribute to build trust 
between the sender and the receiver of the signal. Moreover, Kasper-Fuehrer and Ashkanasy 
(2001) point out that inter-organizational trust is higher when organizations are able to 
effectively communicate their trustworthiness, e.g. when they both have awareness of CSR. 
Extant literature show fragmental evidence in how inter-organizational trust influences M&As, 
however, there is no systematically conclusion on the regime and magnitude. In this thesis, I 
will attempt to answer the question of how and to what extent inter-organizational trust 
influences the deal process and results. 
In addition to trust, another important proposition is the learning effect that happens naturally 
between two parties. Aktas et al. (2011) investigate changes of acquirers’ social scores and 
 5 
 
ratings following acquisitions. An increase in environmental and social performance following 
the acquisition of a CSR aware target has been documented. It tells a story of the acquirer 
learning from the target’s CSR practice and experience. I will, in this thesis, further explore 
what promotes this learning effect and whether it is value destroying or creating. 
This thesis extends the ideas of signalling theory, while building on mutual trust and learning 
effects between two parties, to research the impact of ATCD on the entire M&A process, from 
deal initialization to deal finalization.  
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1.2.Intended contribution of the thesis 
There is yet little work documenting the investigation of the determinants of M&A probability 
of initiation and completion, premium, method of payment, and wealth effect from the 
perspective of CSR. This thesis attempts to fill up this gap in the literature. Therefore, findings 
in this thesis are of great importance in the area of CSR/ M&A research, as they enhance the 
CSR/ M&A literature by showing the importance of disentangling the various effects that CSR 
implied business strategy and cultural differences have on the market for corporate control. 
When looking at the literature more broadly, two key contributions of this thesis are: (1) it 
extends the M&A literature by investigating a potentially important additional determining 
factor of M&A initiation, completion and wealth effects. This is due to low R-squares in most 
M&A research which thus indicate omitted variables in determining various issues in the field 
of M&As; (2) it extends the literature on the financial effects of CSR by focusing on one of the 
largest corporate finance decisions that a firm will have to make. 
Specifically, this thesis contributes to the academic literature in three unique areas. Firstly, 
unlike previous research that focuses either on the impacts of acquirer CSR on acquisitions or 
target CSR on acquisitions, I adopt the ATCD as my main explanatory variable. This allows 
me to investigate whether social and ethical similarities of both acquirers and targets influence 
their decision in choosing a means of payment, the negotiation process and acquirer and target 
combined returns. Secondly, I extend previous research by encompassing different levels of an 
M&A deal. Previous papers focus on M&A wealth effects, whereas I elaborate the impact of 
between-firm CSR difference on M&A method of payment and combined returns. Therefore, 
my study helps to elucidate the factors that go into determining the choice of M&A payment 
and the drivers of an acquisition’s financial results. Last but not least, to the best of my 
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knowledge, the dataset in my study is the most chronologically extensive dataset that has been 
used in the context of the CSR-M&A literature when the analysis is conducted at the deal level. 
The findings of this paper highlight and improve my understanding of a bilateral relationship 
between CSR engagements and cultural aspects of an acquirer and a target, by examining the 
value creation effects of M&A deals. This research updates existing literature from both M&A 
and CSR points of views. It is the first to conduct an investigation of the effects of corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) on the choice of the M&A payment method and the acquisition 
returns (CARs) of the combined firm. Utilizing the most chronologically extensive dataset that 
has been used in the context of CSR-M&A literature, I find a lower percentage and a decreased 
likelihood of stock being used for merger currency as ATCD increases. A 10% unit increase in 
between-firm CSR difference results in the reduction of stock payment percentage by 
approximately 5%. A higher fraction of stock is preferred as merger currency as it demonstrates 
that both seller and buyer are willing to share future uncertainties and profits since a lower 
ATCD suggests a lower level of ideological difference and thereby results in a higher degree 
of reliability, between contracting parties.  
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1.3.Outline of the thesis 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows.  
Chapter 2 presents a review of the relevant literature and describes its relation to this work.  
Chapter 3 examines the impacts of CSR on M&A likelihood which is the very first and 
necessary stage of an M&A deal. Following the above introduction of CSR engagements and 
their wider implications in Chapter 1, I introduce inter-organizational trust theory as the 
theoretical foundation of this chapter. Closer CSR scores of two contracting entities indicate a 
closer ideological state between them and consequently foster trust. I thereby make the 
conjecture and testable hypothesis: closer ATCD results in higher M&A likelihood. Chapter 3 
serves as the first empirical work in the thesis; in Section 3.3, I describe the details of the KLD 
database that are related to this thesis and the construction of the respective CSR measures. 
Next I provide summary statistics of data. Since Logistic analysis comprises an important part 
of empirical analysis, in order to familiarize readers on the framework of Logistic regressions, 
I explain the discrete choice modelling framework, highlighting its usefulness and 
appropriateness. Empirical results are presented in the order of impacts of ATCD on M&A 
initialization likelihood, compatibility matrix, and completion likelihood. P-score matching 
techniques are utilized to construct a non-deal sample and compare it to deal sample regarding 
CSR engagements. This ‘intuition’ is further verified using Logistic analysis framework. In 
completion likelihood part, both target CSR and ATCD are investigated as an active factor in 
influencing M&As. I conclude this chapter by performing a series of robustness checks on 
industrial effects. 
In Chapter 4, I extend the investigation of CSR and M&As into premium and announcement 
time wealth effects. I conjecture that the market will reward higher ATCD combinations of an 
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acquirer and a target since more synergistic gains are expected from firms’ very contrasting 
CSR images, though these sorts of combinations are more likely to experience a tougher 
integration process. The outline of this chapter is similar to that of chapter 3: after introduction 
and background information, I explain the reasoning of hypotheses development. I continue by 
describing features of data, summary statistics and specification of control variables. Following 
this, I present research models and empirical results. This chapter then proceeds with a 
presentation of the output of the main regressions of ATCD on acquisition premiums and 
announcement time returns. The results of these analyses are particularly revealing for 
academics and practitioners and are discussed. They are also interpreted and connected with 
the limited existing evidence from the CSR-MA literature. 
An appropriate method of payment can help improve investment performance and release 
various signals to the market, hence it is of crucial importance for the benefit of both acquiring 
and selling shareholders. I investigate impacts of ATCD on the acquisition method of payment 
in Chapter 5. The main hypotheses in this chapter build on the findings of Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 4: (1) The higher the ATCD, the lower the likelihood of M&As, and the lower the 
percentage of stock as merger currency as a result of lack of trust; (2) The higher the ATCD, 
the higher the percentage of cash payment and the higher the announcement time return. 
Therefore, instead of standing as a standalone chapter that elucidates a negative association 
between ATCD and usage of stock as merger currency, Chapter 5 continues and completes the 
research of previous two chapters on M&A likelihood, M&A premium and announcement time 
abnormal returns. This chapter begins with a discussion on the acquisition method of payment 
literature as it conveys more information than the payment percentage number itself. The M&A 
deals used in this study are identical to those used in previous chapters apart from the fact that 
I obtain an additional set of method of payment statistics. In the empirical study part, univariate 
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tests, multivariate tests of OLS regressions and Logistic regressions are utilized. The results 
are consistent with the hypotheses. Chapter 5 closes with robustness tests on redefining a 
‘stock-deal’. 
Even though I provide a brief conclusion at the end of each chapter, a more complete discussion 
and overall conclusions can be found in Chapter 6, which also outlines possible avenues for 
future research in CSR-M&As. 
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2. GENERAL LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1.Introduction 
At the introduction section of the literature review, I will provide a spherical overview of the 
issue under examination which is revolving corporate culture and decision making. I will then 
come down to a facet of corporate culture, i.e. corporate social and ethical aspects and 
investigate its impacts on one of the most important corporate decisions – M&As.  
2.1.1. The big picture: Corporate culture and decision making 
When talking about the most successful firms in the world, a discussion of what contributes to 
their success will always include their corporate strategy, their organizational culture, a strong 
and effective management and bright employees. Corporate culture is widely cited as a factor 
underlying corporate success. Why does corporate culture play a pivotal role in influencing the 
success of a firm? Hofstede (1991) points out that culture is ‘the collective programming of the 
mind which distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another’. 
Extending from Hofstede (1991), organizational culture includes shared beliefs and values 
established by the firm’s management and communicated to its employees, ultimately 
influencing employees’ behaviours by shaping their perceptions and understanding. There is 
not a template for ‘best culture’ for all firms to follow and achieve ultimate success. The best 
and most beneficial culture for a firm is the one that meet the needs of the organization – a 
firm’s culture can be viewed as its soul and it should serve and shape its body (structure and 
design of a firm) well. Further to this, extant research does suggest that, if a firm’s culture aims 
to boost its performance and effectiveness, the culture must be a strong one that provides a 
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strategic competitive advantage and reinforces beliefs and values that upheld the firm 
(Schwartz and Davis, 1981). 
Over the past decades, culture has stayed at the central role of strategic research, as though 
strategy drives the focus of a firm and culture influences corporate actions in which a firm’s 
strategy lives or dies. Both academics and practitioners have conducted research into the issues 
of corporate culture and its impacts on various corporate decisions, for example capital 
structure and M&As. Cao and Mauer (2010) have investigated the empirical effects of 
corporate culture on capital structure policy and stated that corporate culture exerts significant 
impacts on capital structure policies. In this study, CEO replacement is employed as a proxy 
for change in corporate culture, an external CEO appointment is deemed as stronger change 
than internal CEO promotion in firm culture. They have identified that ‘the cultural change 
brought by new CEOs has a significant impact on the continuity of the firm’s existing debt 
policy’ and ‘the magnitude and significance of the association between CEO turnovers and the 
subsequent debt policy changes are much stronger for cases with external CEO replacement’.  
Furthermore, a report on ‘Cultural issues in mergers and acquisitions’ by Deloitte Consulting 
Group shows the industry perspective of cultural side on M&As. Culture is considered as 
consisting of ‘the long-standing, largely implicit shared values, beliefs, and assumptions that 
influence behaviour, attitudes, and meaning in a company (or society)’. Various aspects of an 
acquisition can be greatly influenced by cultural difference inherent in two merging entities. 
This includes the decision – making style, leadership style, the ability to change, how people 
work together and beliefs regarding personal ‘success’ (Deloitte, 2009). The decision makers 
of the two contracting parties in a merger are humans (i.e. the CEOs and the board of 
shareholders) that are both driven by their shared culture and individual personalities. 
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Divergence in culture results in potential lack of agreement in the deal process and post-merger 
integration. When the two firms have difference decision making styles, i.e. the acquiring firm 
has a top-down decision making system while the target firm has a bottom-up one, it will take 
longer time to reach consensus and might still result in a failure of making decisions or 
implementing decisions. Firms with different cultures are likely to have different levels of 
tolerance to risk and ability to change. An acquirer who is unwilling to take risk is less likely 
to make changes and be adaptive to a target with different views. Likewise, it is more difficult 
to integrate a target into the acquirer’s system if the target only want to maintain current state 
and meet current goals.  
Apart from influencing corporate decision-makings in various business decisions, there are also 
studies on whether a firm’s performance and effectiveness are impacted by its culture. Kanter 
(1983) established a direct relation between organisational culture and effectiveness by 
demonstrating how firms with progressive HR management outperformed those with less 
progressive systems. Denison and Mishra (1995) employ case studies and survey data to 
investigate if there exists a relation between organizational culture and effectiveness. They find 
a positive relation between certain cultural traits (involvement, consistency, adaptability and 
mission) and corporate performance as well as objective measures, i.e. ROA and sales growth. 
In conclusion, this section describes influences of culture on various corporate decisions, from 
both an academic and industrial point of view. An organization’s culture is implicit and 
reflected in its behaviours, i.e. what has been done and how. It concerns decisions, actions, and 
communication on different levels within and outside a firm and influences corporate decision-
makings in various ways. 
2.1.2. CSR influencing M&A - one of the most important corporate decisions 
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In section 2.1.1, I have introduced literature on establishing a relation between corporate 
culture and corporate decisions, i.e. capital structure policy, M&As etc. I will, in this section, 
focus on the specific issues of the relationship between CSR and M&As.   
As reported in news sources and social media, business activities could be harmful to 
individuals, communities and society in general. Examples of harmful activities include: 
incomplete Health and Safety standards affecting the health and safety of employees and 
customers, and lack of concern for environmental damage etc. While there are many factors 
that contribute to these problems, corporate culture is one of these influents impacting the 
decision-making. It also conveys the message that such firm culture do not explicitly encourage 
and promote ethical decision-making because social and ethical conduct is not simply an 
individual decision that is handed down to employees. Instead, encouragement of CSR conduct 
can reflect institutional culture and is deemed an attribute of the business itself (McCuddy et 
al., 1993). 
Social and ethical (CSR) behaviours are related more to attributes of corporate culture than to 
attributes of individual employees. This is because an individual can only behave ethically 
when the individual see things from an ethical point of view and can recognise ethical issues 
(Chen et al., 1997). Such ethical views are more likely to be gained in a working culture that 
promotes CSR. 
As one of the most dramatic means of corporate restructuring, mergers and acquisitions also 
provide an important means of transferring corporate resources to where they are better utilized 
and thereby removing less efficient and underperforming management. The past century saw 
not only the start-up，development and booming of business activities, but also witnessed the 
collapse and disappearance of firms. This is best illustrated by the ever-changing composition 
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of the Fortune 500, where from 1995 to 2008, there were approximately 2000 firms appearing 
on the list for one period or more, and only 70 out of the original 500 firms were still on that 
list at the year 2008 (aggdata.com, 2008).  
The academic debate concerning the determinants of acquisition motivation, target prediction, 
method of payment, acquirer return and various aspects of M&As has been a long standing and 
controversial one. By far, most studies have focused on investigating impacts of quantitative 
information on M&As, such as corporate financial information (financial statements). 
Although this hard information can be captured and measured relatively easily through a firm’s 
financial statements and paperwork and investigated through the use of rigorous scientific 
methods, it is difficult for them to provide a comprehensive view of the world of M&As. 
Another delicate qualitative but important issue in influencing M&As, are the ethical and social 
concerns that may affect the market. 
Deal initiation is a starting point to look into this. As highlighted by previous research, one of 
the common reasons for M&A failure is cultural difference between an acquirer and its target. 
In order to be successful, the management should conduct due diligence meticulously and 
consider it in making a decision to ‘go ahead’ or ‘abort’. The Cloetta Fazer merger is a 
successful merger from this point of view. In the due diligence stage, each aspect of cultural 
difference was identified and a new and shared corporate culture has been designed and 
implemented in the post – merger integration stage. Current CSR – M&A literature will be 
introduced in section 2.5.  
In order to first understand the M&A market and then further down to CSR impacts on this 
market, this literature review is structured as general literature review for M&A (Section 2.2, 
2.3 and 2.4) and research on M&A – CSR (Section 2.5). Section 2.2 provides a brief 
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introduction to merger and acquisition activities, including general motives for mergers and 
acquisitions, the six merger waves and their causes. Section 2.3 and 2.4 examines the literature 
focusing on wealth creation of M&A activities under the competitive business environment, 
including determinants and patterns of returns and premiums. Section 2.5 will explain the 
current research on CSR – M&A relationship. 
  
 17 
 
2.2.The general overview of M&A activities  
2.2.1. The six merger waves and two explanations 
The occurrence of merger and acquisition activities could be attributed to numerous reasons 
which have been varying with the change of time and the business environment. Documented 
in the existing body of literature, the pursuit of synergy, which is a rather easy-to-understand 
notion according to which the combination of two entities would perform better and create 
more value for shareholders than the two firms operate separately, is the most commonly cited 
prevalent driver of transactions. Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) show that synergy is the 
primary motive in takeovers with positive gains. This is demostrated by two cases in bank 
mergers. By studying a sample of the largest bank mergers, Houston et al. (2001) obtain the 
management estimation of projected cost savings and revenue enhancements, finding that those 
mergers lead to a favourable revaluation of acquirer and target stock price, and the majority of 
the positive revaluation should be attributed to estimated cost savings, i.e. operating synergies, 
rather than the revenue enhancements. DeLong (2003) studied 54 bank mergers announced 
between 1991 and 1995, and pointed out three circumstances where bank mergers would 
improve long term performance. One of them is when the acquirer is less efficient than the 
target, i.e. the acquisition target helps to promote operating synergy and therefore helps the 
improve long term performance. Other motives like business diversification, strategic 
realignment, tax consideration and, increased market share are also prominent M&A motives.  
Despite single M&A deal motivations, it is also meaningful to have a discussion on the 
clustering of M&A activities. Commencing in the late 1890s, we observe 6 multiyear surges 
and downfalls of M&A activities which are motivated by factors ranging from synergies to 
mismanagement: those of the early 1900s, the 1920s, the 1960s, the 1980s, the 1990s and the 
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most recent one beginning in 2003 and that came to an end in late 2007. Two competing 
theories attempt to provide explanations for the clustering of M&A activities, i.e. the six merger 
waves: the neoclassical view and the behavioural view (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008).  
2.2.1.1.The neoclassical view of the six merger waves 
The neoclassical view asserts that the ownership of assets would be naturally driven by the 
profit motive of the acquirers to the place where they could produce the most value (Ahern and 
Weston, 2007). Accordingly, in theory, the acquirer’s shareholder will be better off from such 
value- enhancing transactions. Hence, if regulatory changes, technological changes or any 
other changes render the existing ownership of assets become no longer, M&A activities would 
take place to reallocate the ownership to achieve the best utilization of assets of the combined 
entity (Ron Masulis, 2011). These two factors force growth opportunities and create threats to 
business lines of firms, thereby facilitating M&A activities to take place. Gort (1969), Mitchell 
and Mulherin (1996), Andrade et al. (2001), and Andrade and Stafford (2004) provide evidence 
that firms react to shocks in the operating environment, leading to a higher level of competition 
for resources. The number of industries affected and the extent to which they are affected 
determine the size and the length of the M&A wave. As a response to shocks, firms often 
acquire either all or part of other firms within the industry. 
Strategic realignment is a strategy whereby firms adjust themselves to such changes in the 
external environment (Harford, 2005). For instance, many scholars provide empirical evidence 
that the volume of M&A activities is significantly higher in deregulated industries than in 
regulated ones (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996, Jensen, 1993), simply because artificially 
regulated industries impose barriers to entry or exit and therefore decrease competition 
(Mulherin and Boone, 2000). Moreover, as technological changes create revolutions in an 
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industry or even create new product lines and new industries (Harford, 2005), M&As driven 
by technological changes are regarded as creating new products or industries made possible by 
technological advancements. For example, it is possible for a firm to obtain a target that holds 
a more advanced technological skill, which may be less costly to acquire than to be developed 
by the acquirer itself. 
Moreover, Harford (2005) takes into consideration the macro-level capital liquidity to 
accommodate the necessary transactions. I will explain this capital liquidity factor in the 
following comparative paragraph. 
2.2.1.2.The behavioural view of the six merger waves 
The behavioural view refers to the situation that in an inefficient market, rational managers 
exploit pricing errors and take advantage of it by buying undervalued or less overvalued assets 
using relatively overvalued stock. Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) and Shleifer and 
Vishny (2003) support this point and provide evidence that managers would choose to acquire 
firms whose stock is undervalued or less overvalued if they believe their stock is overvalued. 
In the model proposed by Shleifer and Vishny (2003), they use the neoclassical view to explain 
who acquires whom, the method of payment, valuation consequence of mergers and merger 
waves. They claim that overvalued acquirers will choose stock as payment method in order to 
change their overvalued ‘equity currency’ into undervalued or less overvalued hard assets. As 
such, stock market driven acquisitions are clustered during periods when stock market 
valuation is high per se compared to historical levels. This is well established by the fifth 
merger wave which was clustered in the late 1990s. In line with low interest rates and a rising 
stock market associated with a booming economy, both volume and total deal size of U.S. and 
global M&A deals reached its historical peak.  
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Many studies identify the existence of a positive correlation between market valuations and the 
number of M&A deals (Dong et al., 2006, Andrade et al., 2001, Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2001, 
Daniel et al., 1998); moreover, Dong et al. (2006) and Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) relate 
this phenomenon to Tobin’s Q theory. Tobin’s Q theory suggests that, a firm’s market valuation 
status can be measured by the ratio between the market value and the replacement value of the 
same physical asset (Brainard and Tobin, 1968). If a firm wants to expand its business, it may 
choose to acquire a target firm whose q ratio is less than 1, i.e. whose market value is less than 
the replacement cost of assets, rather than directly buying plant and equipment at their market 
value. Dong et al. (2006) investigate the Q theories for takeovers using pre-offer market 
valuations (P/B, P/V), observing consistent evidence with the Q hypothesis especially in the 
pre-1990 period: bidders are more likely to be highly valued than their targets. This is a 
profitable way for acquirers as they are converting their ‘high - inflated equity’ into ‘deflated 
assets’. Given this profitability, the relationship between a firm’s investment rate (probability 
of conducting M&A activities) and its Q ratio is positive (Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002).  
To compare the two theories, Harford (2005) examined whether the aggregate clustering of 
M&A transactions should be attributed to the neoclassical view or the behavioural view. As 
the first academic paper to distinguish the two motives, he takes into consideration the macro-
level capital liquidity to accommodate the necessary transactions. He provides evidence to 
support the view that certain kinds of industry shocks in connection with capital liquidity cause 
the clustering of M&A transactions, and that the latter is not due to market timing as per the 
behavioural view (Harford, 2005). This means that only shocks themselves are less possible to 
facilitate merger waves without sufficient liquidity of capital to finance the transactions. 
Moreover, a certain low cost of capital would induce a boom of M&A deals, even in the 
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absence of industry shocks. To conclude, Harford (2005) confirms the availability of capital 
liquidity as an extremely significant factor in facilitating a merger wave. 
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2.3.Acquiring firms’ return 
 Over the past 40 years, there has been a mountain of research regarding the profitability of 
M&As. However, it is still not clear to answer whether M&As are value- enhancing or not to 
acquiring shareholders. The answer seems to depend on various firm and deal characteristics, 
such as acquiring firm size (Moeller et al., 2004).  
A majority of the existing literature suggests that, at best, acquiring shareholders do not lose 
around the announcement date; in many cases, mergers and acquisitions are harmful to an 
acquirer’s wealth, i.e. represent a negative net present value investment. Moeller et al. (2005) 
report that acquiring firm shareholders suffer a 12 percent loss per dollar on average around 
the acquisition date, over the four years between 1998 and 2001, the aggregate loss amount 
being close to $240 billion. This is not a special case due to the Internet bubble, the 1980s 
witnessed a total loss of $7 billion as well (Moeller et al., 2005). Grubb and Lamb (2000) 
describe this puzzling phenomenon as ‘The sobering reality is that only about 20 percent of all 
mergers really succeed. Most mergers typically erode shareholder wealth… the code, hard 
reality that most mergers fail to achieve any real financial returns… very high rate of merger 
failure… rampant merger failure.’ Ron Masulis (2011) attribute this commonly reported 
unprofitability to equity signalling and revelation biases and further examine the acquirer return 
based on the exclusion of these two endogenous reasons. In their case, takeovers are confirmed 
to be beneficial to acquiring shareholders in the form of synergistic gains. 
With regards to the measurement of shareholder gains or losses, Zola and Meier (2008) study 
88 empirical studies between 1970 and 2006, finding the usage of 12 approaches to measure 
the wealth creation or damage of the merger of acquiring shareholders. A majority of those 
studies focus on investigating premerger returns, employing the event study methodology, 
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while 28 percent of them focus on post-merger returns, utilizing long - term accounting 
measures. The most popular approach is to examine abnormal stock returns around the 
announcement date of both acquirer and target; this is Dodd and Warner (1983)’s event study 
methodology and is adopted by most studies. 
In this part, I will present an overview of the effects of various characteristics on acquirer 
returns from the existing literature. 
2.3.1. Listing status of target 
Moeller et al. (2005), Fuller et al. (2002), Ang and Kohers (2001) and Chang (1998) suggest 
that U.S. acquirers who acquire private targets or subsidiaries of public firms often enjoy 
positive abnormal return, ranging from 1.5- 2.6 percent. For U.K. acquirers, it is also true that 
private targets and subsidiaries are more likely to bring positive excess returns to acquirers 
(Draper and Paudyal, 2006). In the analysis on 17 western European counties conducted by 
Faccio et al. (2006), it is suggested that acquirers of publicly traded firms suffer a significantly 
negative abnormal return of 0.38 percent between 1996 and 2001, while acquirers of private 
firms and subsidiaries earn a statistically significant abnormal return of 1.48 percent. Faccio et 
al. (2006) also point out that the impact of listing status persists through time and across 
countries and even after controlling for several variables 
As a conflicting hypothesis, a publicly listed target allows bidders to detect if there is any 
misvaluation and can take advantage if there is any. Since normally a firm will choose the most 
profitable way to expand, a misvalued target will award the acquirer the opportunity to gain in 
theory. However, why do we see different results in empirical studies?  
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There are six explanations attempting to explain why unlisted targets are associated with 
positive abnormal returns and listed ones are not. First, Chang (1998) proposed the monitoring 
benefits that states that the creation of large new blockholders from stock payments will 
provide a better monitoring on the combined entity’s management, which will enhance the 
wealth of the combined entity in the future. Second, liquidity discount, examined by Fuller et 
al. (2002), indicates that an unlisted target is less possible and profitable to be sold in secondary 
market compared with listed ones; therefore, it is reasonable for private firms or unlisted 
subsidiaries to compensate the acquirer for this lack of liquidity. Third, Hansen and Lott (1996) 
suggest the diversification discount in explaining higher returns when purchasing private firms; 
this is tested by Fuller et al. (2002) by employing 539 unique acquirers making over 3000 bids, 
and they only find statistically weak evidence in supporting this hypothesis. Fourth, owners of 
private firms often use M&A as an exit strategy for retirement purposes or to pursue other 
interests, therefore, they are inclined to agree to a lower selling price of the firm (Poulsen and 
Stegemoller, 2007, Officer, 2007, Faccio and Masulis, 2005). Fifth, the lower selling price may 
be attributed to the owners’ naivety. Unlisted assets are more difficult to value, especially 
intangible assets and off-balance sheet liabilities, if the owner lacks financial knowledge, or 
has a unique preference of the bidder; they may therefore accept a relatively lower price than 
the actual value of assets(Capron and Shen, 2007). The sixth reason is competition and the so-
called Winner’s curse. Intuitively, it is not elusive that a listed target is more likely to see 
multiple bids in the bidding process as it is easier to have access to information of listed firms 
(Bradley et al., 1988, Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989). Given the highly competitive bidding process 
of listed targets, Capen et al. (1971) points out that the winner is likely to be the bidder who 
most overestimates the value of the target firm. 
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As a result of these reasons, acquirers of unlisted firms are very likely to receive a discount on 
the actual value of targets, which allows them to accrue more abnormal return compared to 
buying listed firms. 
2.3.2. Method of payment 
Method of payment is well documented as a determinant in explaining acquiring shareholder 
returns.  
During the largest merger wave in the late 1990s, a positive correlation between stock price 
level and M&A activities had been observed. A majority of deals in the fifth merger wave 
chose equity as the mode of payment, and most of these equities are richly priced compared to 
their historical price. In an inefficient market, assets often deviate from their underlying 
economic value, as it was the case during the Internet bubble in the late 1990s, in which period 
the stock market valuation was very high. Under this circumstance, overvalued firms are very 
likely to undertake M&As in order to take advantage of their overvalued equities, while 
undervalued firms or relatively less overvalued firms are more likely to become M&A targets 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). Acquiring firms are motivated by the opportunity to use 
overvalued assets as M&A currency to exchange for undervalued or less overvalued hard assets, 
as long as the acquirer is more highly valued than targets (Dong et al., 2006). This phenomenon 
brings us to the point that overvalued bidders tend to use stock as method of payment as long 
as the targets’ equity is less overvalued (Ang and Cheng, 2003). 
For public targets, both method of payment itself and the signalling effect it brings will 
influence acquirer returns. If a manager believes their stock price is overvalued, he will choose 
to issue stock to finance the transaction; under the situation of information asymmetries, the 
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firm will profit from such stock issuance (Myers and Majluf, 1984). However, over time, 
investors learn from the market and attempt to react to such stock issuance by selling their 
stock which will result in a fall of stock price. Applying this concept to M&A market, we would 
observe a share price fall of acquiring firm right after the deal announcement because it signals 
the message that the acquiring firm is overvalued to the market. Therefore, some firms tend to 
choose cash as method of payment to signal their value to the market (Myers and Majluf, 1984), 
simply because investors treat stock-financed firms as overvalued ones (Shleifer and Vishny, 
2003, Esty and Megginson, 2003, Heron and Lie, 2002, Linn and Switzer, 2001, Walker, 2000).  
Another cause for the share price fall of acquirers around announcement is that the acquirer’s 
announcement period gain associated with stock payment usually disappears within three to 
five years (Black et al., 2007, Agrawal et al., 1999, Rau and Vermaelen, 1998, Loughran and 
Vijh, 1997), implying that shareholders will realize the best profit only if they sell their shares 
at the announcement time. Moeller et al. (2007) also find consistent evidence to support the 
equity signalling theory, showing that abnormal returns to acquirers are negatively related with 
stock offers but something not true for cash offers 
Regarding long- term returns, the existing literature before 2009 tends to support a continuous 
underperformance of acquirers, however, recent studies turn out produce opposite results. 
Dating back to the late 1990s, by adopting both the event- time portfolio approach and calendar-
time portfolio approach, similar results are established, i.e. that acquirers with stock payment 
realize negative long- term abnormal returns between 1978 and 2003 (Loughran and Vijh, 1997, 
Rau and Vermaelen, 1998, Mitchell and Stafford, 2000). Combined with the negative 
announcement period return, stock acquirers appear to document negative returns both upon 
announcement and over longer horizons. By excluding endogenously failed acquisitions, e.g. 
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those with a subsequent fall of overpriced equity, Savor and Lu (2009) find that successful 
stock-financed acquirers suffer significantly negative returns, failed acquirers suffer more, and 
the exact number increases with the widening of the time horizon (1, 2, 3 years). This finding 
shows that stock acquisitions benefit long-term shareholders. The authors attribute this 
phenomenon to acquirers’ successfully converting overpriced shares to real assets, which is 
consistent with the market timing hypothesis.  
Following Savor and Lu (2009), Ron Masulis (2011) include a longer observation period 
between bid announcement and bid failure announcement; this is different from Savor and Lu 
(2009) who assume the absence of synergistic gains. They report takeovers as a value- 
enhancing transaction to acquirers, accruing a substantial return on capital of 21% utilizing a 
60- day initial bid announcement window and a 100- day period following the termination 
announcement. Two findings support this conclusion. Firstly, the combined value of acquirer 
and target fall following a failed acquisition announcement, leading to negative abnormal 
returns for both. Secondly, there appears a positive relationship between acquirer and target 
returns, meaning that acquirers share an important portion of gains with their targets. 
For private targets, stock payment often exhibits positive abnormal returns, while cash payment 
is likely to lead to zero abnormal returns (Chang, 1998). In that paper, Chang (1998) proposes 
three hypotheses in explaining the wealth effects of stock payment. They are the limited 
competition hypothesis, the monitoring hypothesis, and the information hypothesis. The 
positive abnormal return associated with stock payment in private target deals are attributed 
mainly to the creation of large blockholders who will provide better monitoring of the 
management of the combined entity and result in a better performance. Despite monitoring 
benefits, Fuller et al. (2002) confirm that tax benefits also explain larger gains when employing 
 28 
 
stock as payment method. If structured properly, e.g. choose stock as the method of payment, 
the capital gain obtained by the target shareholders is deferred until they sell their shares; in 
this case, normally the target will give the acquirer a tax discount. This discount on the 
purchasing price decreases the probability of overpayment and thus enables the acquirer to gain 
more with the payment of stock for a private target. On the contrary, if the transaction is not 
tax free, the target will require a higher purchase price to compensate for the tax liability (Ayers 
et al., 2003). 
Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) suggest that if there is uncertainty on the bidder’s value, the bidder 
should make cash offer, and if there is uncertainty on target’s value, bidder should make stock 
bids because stock bids can spread the risk of overpayment. 
2.3.3. Acquirer size, target size and post-merger integration, and relative size 
By comparing average announcement period abnormal returns and equally weighted abnormal 
announcement returns, Moeller et al. (2004) identify the existence of size effect in acquirer 
announcement returns that is approximately two percentage points higher for small acquirers. 
This size effect is statistically robust in the 1980s and 1990s, regardless of the form of financing 
and the listing status of the target. They attribute the size effect to managerial hubris which 
explains why large firms pay higher acquisition premiums and thereby report negative synergy 
gains in the transaction. Moeller et al. (2005) support this result with new evidence by 
employing a sample between 1980 and 2001, again finding that large firms destroy shareholder 
value with 1.55 percent lower announcement period abnormal returns than comparable 
transactions made by small firms.  
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Gorton et al. (2009) also demonstrate the negative relationship between acquirer size and 
announcement period abnormal return. He explains it in two ways. First, managers use M&A 
to avoid losing private benefits and they are taking advantage of the consequence of such 
‘defensive acquisitions’. Since managerial bonuses and compensations are frequently related 
to the size of the deal, managers are thus motivated to benefit themselves from large size deals. 
Moreover, the existence of agency conflicts tends to exacerbate this phenomenon. Second, the 
so-called ‘positioning acquisitions’ are undertaken by firms in order to make themselves more 
attractive as takeover targets to obtain a better price. Given the fact that a firm which possesses 
a larger market share will enjoy a stronger pricing power and market power, and thus has better 
negotiating position as a target, ‘positioning’ acquirers make large deals to re- position 
themselves to obtain a better position. Therefore they distinguish themselves from peers by the 
relatively monopoly position and become a unique takeover target with no substitute firms. 
Moreover, Ghosh (2001) find that compared with pre- acquisition market share levels, market 
shares of merging firms increase by more than 30%, and there is a positive relationship between 
abnormal returns and market share around announcement. He also finds that with the increase 
of market share, there are increases in the acquirers’ long run profitability. This improved 
profitability also helps to attract more bidders. 
On the other hand, target absolute size and target relative size also play a role in influencing 
acquirer returns. Hackbarth and Morellec (2008) suggest that a larger target size or relative size 
to the acquirer (the larger the deal) will result in a lower post- merger stock price of acquiring 
firms. Conversely, small size targets tend to provide positive abnormal returns to acquirers. An 
example is the high-tech industry; firms in that industry tend to acquire relatively small 
businesses to fill the gaps in their product lines. Frick and Torres (2002) report an average 39 
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percent annual total return of high-tech firms who acquire targets that are roughly 1 percent of 
their market value.  
There are several reasons for the negative abnormal returns when target size is large or target 
relative size is large. A lower post-merger stock price of acquiring firms associated with larger 
target size, suggests it is more difficult to integrate a larger firm into the acquirer’s business. 
To reconcile potential conflicts inherent in acquiring firms and target firms is costly and 
difficult, especially when a large size target has its own complete company culture and business 
strategy. Operational as well as financial performance of the combined entity is therefore 
negatively affected. Here it also confirms that post- merger integration caused by either hubris 
or large target size is a convincing reason for M&A failure (Hackbarth and Morellec, 2008). 
Moreover, as mentioned above, the larger the target or the larger the target is relative to the 
acquirer, the stronger the target’s negotiating position and ability to extract gains from the 
acquirer. To some extent, target size is positively correlated with its market power and 
negatively correlated with its substitutability. The acquirer has to pay a higher price for the 
uniqueness and affiliated attractive market power of the target. Also, a larger size firm is more 
likely a firm with mature and well- developed skills in that industry which is also valuable for 
the acquirer. 
Fuller et al. (2002) extend the size effect to examine the effect when partitioning target firms 
into public and private. They examine 539 U.S. acquirers making 3135 bids between 1990 and 
2000, utilizing an event type methodology to obtain announcement abnormal returns. Targets 
are divided into four groups based on their relative size that is defined by target market value 
divided by acquirer market value (less than 5 percent, 5 percent to 9.99 percent, 10 percent to 
19.99 percent and more than 20 percent). For private firms and subsidiaries, results exhibit 
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differences compared with results of public targets. There is a statistically significant increasing 
trend of abnormal returns associated with increasing relative size regardless of method of 
payment, which contradicts the results from public targets. They provide similar explanations 
for the negative abnormal returns for large public targets, and attribute the difference of private 
and subsidiary targets to the existence of fundamental differences of the division of gains from 
listed and unlisted targets, i.e. partially a liquidity effect. Since unlisted firms cannot be sold 
and bought as easily as listed ones, this lack of liquidity makes private target deals less valuable 
and less attractive. Further, as ownership is often more concentrated in privately owned firms, 
in stock acquisitions, a larger size private target will eventually enable the creation of a large 
blockholder in the combined entity that will provide monitoring on managerial aspects. This is 
consistent with the monitoring benefits mentioned in Section 2.1. 
2.3.4. Capital structure of acquirer 
Past literature provides intuitions of the relationship between capital structure and companies’ 
acquisition propensity.  
By using data of large mergers that happened during 1962-1982, 389 acquisitions of all types 
over the period 1982-1986, and 173 acquisitions over the period 1978-1990, Maloney et al. 
(1993) investigated the influence of leverage on decision making, through looking at the 
relationship between announcement period acquirer returns and the leverage of the acquirer. 
Their results are in support of the idea that leverage enhances decision making, i.e. higher 
leverage results in better corporate investment decision making. This positive relation between 
leverage and acquirer announcement returns should not be interpreted as a reflection that an 
increase of leverage equals increase of returns. To further interpret this relationship, they 
compare and contrast two competing explanatory theories, the debt-monitoring hypothesis 
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(benefits of high leverage) and the financial slack theory (benefits of low leverage). The debt-
monitoring hypothesis could largely explain this positive relation between leverage and 
acquirer announcement return. The point is, agency problems exist and debt markets reduce 
managerial discretion. Agency costs are therefore mitigated because of disciplined 
management. 
Besides relative capital structure (compared with others) and its impacts on M&A activities, 
we should also notice the interdependence of corporate leverage deficit (derivation from a 
firm’s own target capital structure) and the corporate acquisition behaviour. In the presence of 
financial frictions, companies often deviate from their optimal (target) capital structures (Leary 
and Roberts, 2005, Frank and Goyal, 2009). Firms having leverages above their optimal (target) 
levels are normally deemed overleveraged while those with leverages below their optimal 
levels, are called underleveraged. Harford et al. (2009) provide evidence on whether firms have 
target capital structures. They define the leverage deviation as the actual debt ratio minus its 
predicted debt ratio. They study 1188 takeovers between 1981 and 2000 in which the target 
firm is at least 20% of the bidder’s size. Their analysis shed light on how their deviations from 
target capital structure affect their choice of method of payment when involved in financing an 
acquisition and their capital structure adjustment following the acquisition. Uysal (2011) also 
shows that leverage deviations from firms’ own optimal capital structure influence the 
acquisition propensity. He goes beyond Harford et al. (2009) by examining the role of leverage 
deficit in a firm’s ability to make acquisitions and in its acquisition choices. He employs more 
recent data from 1990 to 2007 to estimate the target debt ratio, defining leverage deficit as the 
difference between actual leverage and predicted leverage. A two- step estimation procedure 
is utilized to examine the role of leverage deficit on acquisition choices. In the first step, the 
target leverage ratio is estimated by running annual regressions of leverage ratios on the main 
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determinants of capital structure considered in prior studies. In the second step, regressions are 
performed to examine whether the deviation from the predicted target capital structure affects 
a firm’s acquisition decisions. This study provides novel evidence on the interdependence of 
financing and investment decisions: a firm’s leverage deficit affects both its ability to make 
acquisitions and the quality of its acquisitions. Specifically, overleverage is an impediment to 
pursuing acquisition opportunities, but overleveraged acquirers undertake more value-
enhancing acquisitions 
Leverages might be correlated with growth opportunities and stock overvaluation as well, 
which influence payment methods in acquisitions, thereby influencing acquirer returns (Martin, 
1996, Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). 
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2.4.Acquisition premium and Target firm’s return 
Compared with acquirer returns, the majority of the literature is more optimistic about targets’ 
returns. It is reported that total shareholder gain around the announcement date is significantly 
positive, and most of the gains accrue to target shareholders (Dodd and Ruback, 1977, Jarrell 
et al., 1988, Andrade et al., 2001, Fuller et al., 2002, Bauguess et al., 2009). In other words, 
M&A deals are very likely to accrue positive return to target shareholders in both successful 
and unsuccessful deals. 
2.4.1. Successful deals 
Several theories provide explanation for this positive return phenomenon for successful deals. 
The most convincing and straightforward one is the increasingly fierce competition in the 
bidding process; Bhagat et al. (2005) report a steadily upward trend of tender offer abnormal 
returns over time, which provides supportive evidence for acquirers’ offering a substantial 
premium to pre-empt other potential bidders and the possibility of revising the initial offer price 
to win the deal. Secondly, increasing takeover defense of targets and antitakeover provisions 
of acquirers contribute to the overpayment of premiums. For example, as the most famous form 
of antitakeover mechanism, the adoption of poison pills will result in a significant increase of 
bid prices (Heron and Lie, 2006). Masulis et al. (2007) proposed the anti- takeover value 
destruction hypothesis, showing that firms protected by anti- takeover provisions are more 
likely to participate in value- destroying acquisitions, e.g. overpayment, since they are less 
likely to be disciplined for taking such actions by others, i.e. being acquired. 
2.4.2. Unsuccessful deals 
With regards to unsuccessful deals, i.e. the bids are not accepted and eventually withdrawn, 
target shareholders are also very likely to realize significant returns around the deal 
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announcement (Masulis et al., 2007). However, much of the returns reflected in share price 
increase will disappear if there are no other bidders. It has been documented that the immediate 
increase in return around the announcement dissipates in one year’s time in an unsuccessful 
bid (Akhigbe et al., 2000, Asquith, 1983, Bradley et al., 1988, Sullivan et al., 1994). 
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2.5.CSR – M&A story 
From the above literature review with regards to motivations, wealth effects and other aspects 
of M&As, we understand that M&As, as one of the most important corporate investment 
decisions, have attracted thousands of research over the past 40 years. However, few of them 
have initiated any investigation from the perspective of social and ethical aspects. The study of 
the linkage between CSR and M&As help us in answering the question of whether CSR is 
value enhancing to a firm, and in understanding the importance of CSR in the business 
environment through M&As. By far, there are two researches published on investigating the 
linkage between CSR and M&As from an acquiring firm’s perspective and target firm 
perspective respectively.  
 
2.5.1. Target CSR impacts on M&A returns 
Aktas et al. (2011) identified a positive relation between acquirer announcement time returns 
and the level of the target’s Intangible Value Assessment (IVA) ratings in his paper titled ‘Do 
financial markets care about SRI? Evidence from mergers and acquisitions’. IVA rating 
provides a measure of a firm’s ability to cope with social and environmental risks. They have 
proposed that Social Responsible Investment (SRI) is value enhancing as ‘acquiring a socially 
responsible firm could be a signal, sent by the acquirer, about willingness to learn from the 
target on how to increase or maintain social and environmental screening and manage social 
and environmental risks’ and SRI is value destroying as ‘positive announcement returns imply 
that the acquirer may reverse the value destroying SRI activities of the target’. They proved 
that the value enhancing hypothesis is right and a further learning hypothesis to explain this as 
‘positive announcement returns imply that the acquirer learns from the target’s SRI practices’. 
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A dataset of 106 deals over an 11-year period from January 1, 1997 to December 31, 2007 is 
utilized for this research. Both the acquirer and the target are listed firms, the status of M&A 
deal is completed, the deal size is above $1 million and the target is fully owned by the acquirer 
after the transaction. Each deal is matched to IVA ratings for both acquirer and target. This 
filter has reduced the sample size from 6230 to 129 deals. Event study approach is then used 
to calculate announcement period returns for each deal. Multivariate regression is applied with 
announcement time return as dependent variables, target IVA ratings and various control 
variables as independent variable. Results show that an increase in the target IVA rating by 1 
unit leads to an increase in the acquirer’s cumulative abnormal return (CAR) by 0.9%. 
Economically, this corresponds to a change in abnormal returns of $0.9 million in market value 
for each $100 million equity owned by an acquirer. 
They study the evolution of the acquirer’s rating after the deal to assess whether the acquirer 
learning hypothesis is at play in the sample. A positive association is identified between the 
changes in acquirer rating following the deal decision and the rating spread between the 
acquirer and its target. This result supports the acquirer learning hypothesis from the target’s 
SRI practise and experiences and SRI benefits shareholders. 
2.5.2. Acquirer CSR impacts on M&A returns 
Another paper with regards to CSR – M&A, titled ‘Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Stakeholder Value Maximization: Evidence from Mergers’ by Deng et al. (2013), investigates 
whether CSR creates value for acquiring firm shareholders through studying acquirers with 
different ratings from KLD Research & Analytics (KLD). They conclude that ‘acquirers’ 
social performance is an important determinant of merger performance and the probability of 
its completion, and support the stakeholder value maximization view of stakeholder theory’. 
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Specifically, high CSR acquirers realize ‘higher merger announcement returns, higher 
announcement returns on the value-weighted portfolio of the acquirer and the target, and 
larger increases in post-merger long-term operating performance’ and the deal takes less time 
to finish and are more likely to complete than low CSR acquirers. 
They utilize a much larger dataset compared to Aktas et al. (2011). The sample consists of 
1556 completed U.S. mergers with acquiring firm’s KLD ratings available from 1992 to 2007. 
Target CSR ratings are not necessary as the focus is on studying acquiring firm impacts on 
acquisition returns. From multivariate analyses, they find strong evidence to support a positive 
relation between the acquiring firm’s CSR and merger returns (acquiring firm announcement 
time returns, the announcement returns on the value-weighted portfolio of the acquirer and the 
target, and post-merger operating performance and long-term stock returns). 
However, though the results are statistically significant, they did not control for target CSR 
ratings in their research framework. The reader may argue that, higher CSR acquirers realise 
higher returns since they are acquiring a high CSR target as Aktas et al. (2011) suggests a 
positive relation between target CSR rating and acquiring returns.  
In this thesis, I will incorporate both acquirer and target CSR ratings in analysis to study.  
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2.6.Conclusion 
In this very competitive business environment, a firm has easily been eliminated through 
corporate restructuring activities, e.g. merger, acquisition, bankruptcy. Among them, mergers 
and acquisitions represent an important change agent. There are numerous motives of M&A 
activities. Among them, the pursuit of operating and financial synergies is the most common 
rationale. Diversification, on the face of it, is a strategy of spreading risk among more product 
lines, however, it is also used as a means to establish managerial entrenchment. In a 
diversification deal, managers gain more power in corporate governance. This further 
encourages us to explore the role of corporate governance in influencing acquirer returns. 
Strategic realignment refers to firm’s adjustment to the changes in their external business 
environment, e.g. regulatory change, technological innovation etc. Regarding the six merger 
waves, most studies attribute them to the neoclassical explanation, which asserts that industry 
shocks help channel resources to their best use, assuming the market can provide sufficient 
liquidity to support the financing of deals.  
Overall, studies show that, around the announcement period, M&A activities pay off for target 
firms and at best accrue zero abnormal returns to acquirers. For a longer period, e.g. three to 
five years, there is no unanimous consensus regarding shareholder wealth effects because it is 
subject to many uncertainties. As shown, acquirer abnormal returns are affected by numerous 
reasons, the most important ones being the method of payment, type of acquirer, size of 
acquirer and target, and CEO of the acquirer. Acquirers of unlisted targets (private firms and 
subsidiaries of listed firms) realize significantly higher abnormal returns than acquirers of 
acquiring public targets. Cash payment is usually more profitable in the U.S. and for private 
targets, while stock payment is good for European acquirers, public targets and when there is 
uncertainty of the targets’ value. Moreover, from a behavioral point of view, the CEO of an 
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acquiring firm plays an increasingly important role in influencing the acquirer’s returns. With 
regards to target returns, the established consensus is that M&A targets realize positive 
abnormal returns around the deal announcement for both successful and unsuccessful deals. 
The most consistent explanation for this phenomenon is the natural competition inherent in the 
market for corporate control. 
A trend among existing literature is that, in more recent studies, there tends to be more emphasis 
on CEOs’ behavioural aspects and its influence on the fundamental characteristics of a firm, 
such as capital structure, q ratio and so on. This behavioural aspect mainly refers to the inherent 
agency problem which seems impossible to be removed from established management 
bureaucracy and hierarchy. The influence of agency problems per se on influencing the 
decision- making process of an M&A’s transaction is complicated, but it is only the tip of the 
iceberg. Rather, the chain reaction caused by agency problems in the operations and financial 
processes of a firm is especially noteworthy. For instance, agency problems are a partial 
determinant of Tobin’s Q which is subsequently directly correlated with a firm’s investment 
rate. The board of shareholders does realize the harmfulness brought by this principle and agent 
conflicts and attempt to resolve it by aligning management’s interests with shareholders’ 
through equity bonus and compensation. This in turn relates the M&A mechanism and M&A 
wealth effects to the corporate governance mechanism. 
For the direction of further research on CSR - M&A, Aktas et al. (2011) suggest that, ‘using a 
broader sample of M&A deals, it would be interesting to complement the short-term event study 
with an analysis of acquirer’s long-term financial and operational performance’. In this thesis, 
I will improve the size of sample by stretching the sample period to 20 years, i.e. January 1, 
1992 to December 31, 2012. I will also investigate both short term returns and longer term 
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returns for the acquiring firm. All these extensions will help to elaborate the CSR – M&A 
linkage.   
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3. THE IMPACT OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY ON M&A 
LIKELIHOOD 
3.1.Introduction 
Previous discussions on the perceived importance of CSR practice pose the question of if and 
how ATCD influences various aspects of the market for corporate control. The answer to this 
question is important for understanding how corporate social ethical engagements impact 
acquirer-target mutual trust, and as a result directly influence M&A likelihood. In practice, a 
third of the interviewed firms, in the 2012 PwC survey, favour CSR engagements as a 
reputation and brand-adding factor, while the remaining two thirds of the interviewees deem 
CSR disadvantage and an impediment for the willingness to do a deal.  
Since CSR reflects the moral character of a firm, a CSR aware firm delivers their commitment 
to behave honestly (Rode, 2010) and avoids opportunism in future operations, thereby reducing 
the monitoring costs of the contracting parties. Furthermore, trustworthiness, as implied by 
CSR engagements, helps to maximize shareholder value in a consistent manner. This is 
summarized in a simple statement ‘good deeds earn chits’ (Godfrey, 2005). Connected to this, 
positive moral capital is generated among communities and stakeholders by corporate social 
and ethical engagements. This moral capital contributes to shareholder wealth by ‘providing 
shareholders with insurance-like protection for a firm’s relationship-based intangible 
assets’(Godfrey, 2005). Consider the examples of loan rates settings; Kim et al. (2014) show 
the importance of a borrower’s ethical behaviour in the banks’ consideration of loosening 
financing conditions when there is similarity of lenders and borrowers along their ethical 
domain.  
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I conjecture that M&A likelihood is influenced by CSR engagements as the latter are crucial 
in signalling a firm’s trustworthiness and building a positive firm image (Jones, 1995, Bews 
and Rossouw, 2002, Fulmer and Gelfand, 2012). As a result of a more trustworthy firm’s image 
and increased informational transparency, a firm with good CSR enjoys increased trust from 
its business partners (Kim et al., 2014). However, as I discussed in the thesis motivation part 
(section 1.1), the effectiveness of a firm’s social ethical performance as a signal depends not 
only on the information it conveys, but also on the ability of the receiver to interpret this 
information. It becomes more reasonable to employ absolute ATCD as a variable when 
examining CSR impacts on the market for corporate control, rather than looking at standalone 
value of a deal buyer or seller. The key variable ‘ATCD’ reports the absolute CSR difference 
between an acquirer and its target in terms of corporate social responsibility; however, it does 
not distinguish between the two possible scenarios (an acquirer is less socially responsible than 
its target and an acquirer behaves better regarding social aspects).  
Therefore, broadly, we posit that ATCD and its associated implications, e.g. trustworthiness, 
play an important role in the market for corporate control. I now proceed to specify these 
possible influences on acquisitions. As pointed out in the PwC survey, the ease of post-
acquisition integration of corporate social factors, i.e. standardizing management control, 
policies, procedures and operating systems, is regarded as a key factor in influencing the 
willingness to do a deal and possibly the result of the deal. ‘A large number of interviewed 
firms mention that the cost and difficulty of bringing a target firm up to the trade buyer’s 
standards with regards to managing ESG factors is a significant consideration in the deal 
process. A number of companies stated that their willingness to do the deal would be seriously 
impacted if the potential risks and costs are unclear, and if it appears to be too difficult or 
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expensive to bring the target company up to their own internal standards on ESG factors3’. For 
instance, when there is a significant CSR difference between an acquirer and a target, their 
willingness to participate in a deal would be impacted.  
However, the awareness of the corporate cultural aspects represented by CSR may not be as 
clearly defined during due diligence in comparison to financial status and business lines. Any 
divergences in culture may not be immediately obvious and take some time to materialize post-
integration of the two firms. As a result, even in cases when a target is financially attractive or 
complements the acquirer’s business strategy, a deal may be withdrawn throughout the pre-
acquisition negotiation process when potentially irreconcilable divergences become apparent.  
  
                                                 
3 Extracted from Trade Buyers Survey Results: The integration of environmental, social and governance issues in 
mergers and acquisitions transactions. For the full version please see http://www.unpri.org/wp-
content/uploads/PRI_PWC_Report_FINAL.pdf 
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3.2.Background and development of hypotheses 
3.2.1. Inter-organizational trust 
Although a number of quantitative measures have a confirmed correlation with the outcome of 
M&A decisions, quantitative (hard) information is still lacking with regards to uncovering the 
viability of corporate acquisition decisions. For this reason, it has been becoming increasingly 
common to consider a firm’s qualitative (soft) attributes (as defined by Kim et al., 2014)) when 
examining corporate acquisition behaviours, such as corporate governance, CEO behaviour 
and inter-organizational trustworthiness.  
The importance of inter-organizational trust in proposing an acquisition raises the question as 
to what factors promote and contribute to inter-organizational trust. According to Fulmer and 
Gelfand (2012), inter-organizational trust is defined as ‘a shared psychological state among 
organizational members comprising willingness to accept vulnerability based on positive 
expectations of an organization’ (Page 1174). Shared characteristics between two 
organizations include business ethics (Kasper-Fuehrer and Ashkanasy, 2001), cultural diversity 
values (Stahl et al., 2011), holding common principles among organizational members 
(d'Iribarne, 2003) and a common business understanding (Kasper-Fuehrer and Ashkanasy, 
2001). In addition to those shared characteristics, Kasper-Fuehrer and Ashkanasy (2001) 
propose that inter-organizational trust is higher when organizations are able to effectively 
communicate their trustworthiness, e.g. when they have a close corporate culture and 
management style in social and ethical engagements that will facilitate communication flow.  
Dekker and Van den Abbeele (2010) suggest that organizations are likely to choose an alliance 
partner based on inter-organizational trust and are less likely to search for alternative partners 
of lower trust levels. Their research has been extended to the market for corporate control, 
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which indicates that a higher level of inter-organizational trust results in a higher level of 
willingness to cooperate (Stahl et al., 2011), and continued increased collaboration (Jensen, 
2003, Malhotra and Lumineau, 2011). In addition to the impact of inter-organizational trust on 
choosing a contracting party and willingness to cooperate, it may also have a notable influence 
on post-acquisition integration. Stahl et al. (2011) propose that the selling firm’s trust in the 
buying firm is higher when the post-acquisition integration takes a shorter period of time to 
complete and the change in job security and rewards is positive. It is also associated with 
decreased negotiation costs and conflicts (Zaheer et al., 1998) and reduced transaction costs 
(Dyer and Chu, 2003, Gulati and Nickerson, 2008). The theory of inter-organizational trust is 
further related to syndicated loan rates by (Kim et al., 2014). They find evidence that borrowers’ 
ethical behaviour leads lending banks to loosen financing conditions when setting loan rates 
when there is similarity of lenders and borrowers along their ethical domain (Kim et al., 2014). 
In summary, the extant literature provides evidence on inter-organizational trust positively 
influencing decisions on choosing a contracting/ alliance partner because the deal process will 
be easier with such trustworthiness and familiarity between the two contracting parties. A 
higher level of similarity in corporate social and ethical engagements will result in a higher 
level of inter-organizational trust as it is one of the most important and strongest indicators in 
signalling corporate culture.  
3.2.2. Hypotheses 
Motivated by the previous background information and the three strands of research literature 
(M&A, CSR and inter-organizational trust), the general hypothesis is that acquirer-target CSR 
proximity influences inter-organizational trust, and thereby impacts: (1) M&A initialization 
likelihood, (2) M&A compatibility and (3) M&A completion likelihood. 
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My major hypothesis stems from the notable survey results in the 2012 PwC survey. In 
particular, a greater number of interviewed firms showed their reluctance in dealing with a firm 
that behaves differently in social and ethical terms (i.e. holds different ethical values) because 
they are more inclined to refuse a deal with potential difficulties and higher costs in the post-
acquisition integration stage. By considering the effect of CSR difference on M&As, my 
hypothesis suggests that M&As are more likely to take place when an acquirer and its target 
have comparable CSR levels. A greater number of M&A deals are initiated for firms with 
closer CSR proximity between an acquirer and a target. Initiated deals are more likely to be 
completed when ATCD is small.  
In order to have a greater understanding of the underlying factors determining M&A likelihood 
(both initialization and completion), I propose that acquirer-target cultural proximity, as 
implied by ATCD, plays an active role in influencing M&A likelihood. In my research 
framework, I conjecture that target CSR and ATCD will both influence the deal completion 
likelihood in addition to the acquirer’s CSR (Deng et al., 2013). Thus, my major hypotheses 
are: 
Hypothesis I: 
Higher ATCD leads to lower M&A likelihood.  
Hypothesis II: 
Higher ATCD leads to lower likelihood of M&A deal completion. 
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3.3.The KLD database and CSR measure 
In this section, I will describe the characteristics of the MSCI KLD (Kinder, Lydenberg, and 
Domini Inc.) STATS database and explain why it is considered to be the most useful and 
reliable source of corporate social data for empirical research. I will also describe how I use 
the raw corporate social scores obtained from the KLD social database to quantify a firm’s 
CSR. For simplicity purposes, I will reference the database as KLD from here on. 
As this research focuses on the impacts of CSR on a number of aspects of the market for 
corporate control, I will finally address the measurement of the absolute CSR difference 
between the two contracting parties, i.e. the acquirer and the target. 
3.3.1. The KLD database 
When investigating CSR impacts on various aspects of M&As, it is crucial to ensure that the 
measurement of corporate social responsibility (CSR) is solid and reliable, to prevent 
questionable empirical results relating to M&As and CSR. However, generating a 
comprehensive proxy for corporate social responsibility is challenging for two explicit reasons: 
1) The full spectrum of CSR is broad, as there are many aspects to consider (referred to as 
dimensions of CSR). Within each dimension, there are also a number of related proxy 
reasons. 
2) The qualitative, rather than quantitative nature of CSR makes it challenging to consistently 
quantify and measure CSR proxy variables. This problem is exacerbated by the lack of 
consensus in the current literature. 
As defined by Turban and Greening (1997), CSR is ‘a construct that emphasizes a company’s 
responsibilities to multiple stakeholders, such as employees and the community at large, in 
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addition to its traditional responsibilities to economic shareholders’. Therefore, a 
comprehensive expression of CSR and a full coverage of its scope, involves capturing a wide 
range of social and environmental impacts caused by business operations (Gond and Crane, 
2010) in a single numerical value. Despite the difficulty of finding multiple metrics to fully 
cover its scope, the development of a quantitative measurement of these metrics is also a 
daunting task (Gond and Crane, 2010, Rowley and Berman, 2000). 
KLD STATS is a statistical tool for analysing trends in social and environmental performance 
in the KLD database. It provides annual snapshots of publicly traded U.S. (and a small number 
of Canadian) firms’ environmental, social and governance performance as rated by KLD 
Research & Analytics, Inc. Annual ratings are utilized in this research, however the database 
updates strength or concern ratings on a continuous process (not only once a year). The ratings 
cover multiple indicators describing seven qualitative issue areas: community, corporate 
governance, diversity, employee relations, environment, human rights and product (Figure 3.a). 
All ratings are coded as binary variables, with 1 representing the presence of a particular 
strength/ concern rating and 0 representing its absence. For instance, in the environmental issue, 
“beneficial products and services” is rated as 1 if the company derives substantial revenues 
from innovative remediation products, environmental services, or products that promote the 
efficient use of energy, or it has developed innovative products with environmental benefits, 
otherwise the rating for this category is 0. The same rating method applies to the concern 
category, “hazardous waste” which is considered a concern with a rating of 1 if the company's 
liabilities for hazardous waste sites exceed $50 million, or the company has recently paid 
substantial fines or civil penalties for waste management violations (Figure 3.b). Furthermore, 
KLD rates six controversial ethical and business issues as concerns, i.e. alcohol, gambling, 
tobacco, firearms, military and nuclear power (Figure 3.c).  
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The data is retrieved from a variety of sources, including internal information such as annual 
reports and direct communication with the company management, and external public 
documents, such as government or NGO information and reports in the media. Commencing 
in 1991, the KLD social database provides tabulated data containing approximately 650 
companies from the FTSE KLD 400 Social Index and S&P 500 with one record for each 
company. There have been two expansions in the coverage of KLD STATS, the first 
introducing the 1000 largest, U.S. publicly traded firms in terms of market capitalization in 
2001 and the second beginning in 2003, enlarging that coverage to the largest 3000 U.S. 
publicly traded firms by market capitalization.  
Though KLD remains the leading position in providing data in assessing corporate social 
performance (Waddock 2003) of large listed U.S. firms, it is biased towards firms with a large 
market capitalization. We should recognize the fact that its coverage on only publicly traded 
large U.S. firms itself is a limitation and the research results based on KLD should not be 
extended to firms outside of the scope of KLD. Strictly speaking, it also suggests that the 
research results in this study only stand for the sample that covered by KLD and won’t apply 
to small – cap firms that don’t follow CSR.  
However, in practice, there are many private firms that also make efforts and investments in 
corporate social activities, i.e. supporting local communities, encourage diversity of employees. 
There are no unanimous consensus yet on whether private firms who behave positively with 
regard to corporate social and ethical aspects earn a better performance. 
As the most commonly cited database for CSR research, KLD database covers the widest range 
of U.S. publicly traded firms for the longest time period (since 1991). In addition, it provides 
access to U.S. firms’ corporate social responsibility ratings within seven qualitative issue areas, 
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which makes it the most comprehensive social database for empirical research. As my research 
focuses on U.S. acquisitions between 1992 and 2012, KLD social database is considered to be 
the most appropriate source for corporate social indicators, though several studies in the 
literature criticized the measures used in empirical studies (including the KLD database) as not 
fully grounded in the theoretical development of CSR, and using a fixed set of measures 
presupposing a “one-size-fits-all” approach of CSR for different industries (Rowley and 
Berman, 2000, Mattingly and Berman, 2006, Gond and Crane, 2010). In the consideration of 
the complexities in quantifying CSR, the KLD database is still deemed “the de facto research 
standard at this moment” and “the best currently available to scholars” (Waddock, 2003). As a 
result, in this research, the KLD database is utilized as the source for corporate social 
responsibility.
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Figure 3.a: KLD Social Database Seven Qualitative Issue Areas-Strengths including their assessed subcategories 
 
Community 
Strengths
Generous giving
Innovative 
giving
Non-US 
charitable giving
Support for 
housing
Support for 
education
Indigenous 
peoples relations
Volunteer 
programs
Other strength
Corporate 
Governance 
Strengths
Limited 
compensation
Ownership 
strength
Transparency 
strength
Political 
accountability 
strength
Other strength
Diversity 
Strengths
CEO
Promotion
Board of 
directors
Family benefits
Women/minority 
contracting
Employment of 
the disabled
Gay & Lesbian 
policies
Other strength
Environment 
Strengths
Beneficial 
products and 
services
Pollution 
prevention
Recycling
Alternative fuels
Communications
Property, plant, 
and equipment
Management 
systems
Other strength
Employment 
Strengths
Union relations 
strengths
No-layoff policy
Cash profit 
sharing
Involvement
Strong 
retirement 
benefits
Health and 
safety strength
Other strength
Human 
Rights 
Strengths
Positive record 
in South Africa
Indigenous 
peoples 
relations 
strength
Labor rights 
strength
Other strength
Product 
Strengths
Quality
R&D 
innovation
Benefits to 
economically 
disadvantaged
Other strength
 53 
 
Figure 3.b: KLD Social Database Seven Qualitative Issue Areas-Concerns 
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Figure 3.c: KLD Social Database Six Controversial Issue Areas 
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3.3.2. The CSR measurement 
In this research, I use the raw corporate social responsibility scores from the KLD database to 
develop the proxy of corporate engagement in CSR activities for each individual acquirer and 
target. The use of raw CSR scores from the KLD database allows me to include all the universal 
dimensions that are considered of interest in Section 3.1.1. As currently, the KLD database is 
the most widely used and comprehensive information source for CSR research (Waddock, 
2003), and also proves convenient for establishing a comprehensive linear weighted average 
CSR score for each firm.  
In this section, I will explain how I use raw CSR scores of the described CSR indicators to 
compute the overall CSR measurement for a firm. It is more difficult to measure soft attributes 
of a firm in a quantitative manner since there is no consensus in how to quantify these soft 
attributes. It is different from measuring corporate financial performance (quantitative), e.g. 
return on assets, since the former is not clearly defined and not readily available and the latter 
is about extracting key numbers from financial statements and performing calculations. To the 
best of my knowledge, the dataset I created for this research is the most chronologically 
extensive dataset that has been used in the context of the CSR-M&A literature when the 
analysis is conducted at the deal level. 
Following Oikonomou et al. (2012) and Hillman and Keim (2001), five out of seven 
dimensions of CSR are extracted from the KLD social database as those five dimensions have 
a direct linkage with specific, primary stakeholder groups. Therefore the overall CSR score 
may concentrate on the most important representative facets of corporate social responsibility. 
In this sense, the whole set of controversial business issues are disregarded since they are 
representative of corporate action that Hillman and Keim (2001) deem “social issues 
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participation”. Moreover, to fully capitalize on the lengthiness of the dataset, as well as for the 
sake of consistency and comparability with previous research, only the omnipresent indicators 
of those selected five qualitative business issue dimensions are utilized. As a result of this 
selection and utilization process, the individual indicators that are included in this research are 
displayed in Figure 3.d. 
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Figure 3.d: Omnipresent indicators of qualitative CSR issue areas of interest 
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After carefully selecting the most related qualitative issue area and CSR indicators, I quantify 
strengths and concerns for each selected qualitative issue areas (five in total). In order to 
extrapolate the greatest possible information from that score, firstly I find the mean value of 
each individual indicator within a specific qualitative issue area, for both strength and concern 
respectively (Eqn. 3.1). Therefore, the general formula for calculating any individual 
qualitative issue component for a particular firm is: 
COMP =  
1
N
 ∗ ∑ Respective Indicators′ratingsni=1                                                                   (3.1) 
where N is the number of indicators that are relevant to the particular issue area. As an example, 
the formula for calculating the “Environment strength” score is: 
ENVS =
Beneficial products and services + pollution prevention
+recycling + alternative fuels + other strength
5
 
Following the above procedure, I obtain the strength and concern scores for five qualitative 
issue areas, which provides valuable information on a firm’s detailed CSR facets. To conduct 
my research on the impact of CSR on the market for corporate control, I will proceed to obtain 
a recapitulative measurement of corporate social responsibility as Deng et al. (2013) have done. 
In order to create the “Aggregate Strengths” and “Aggregate Concerns” measures for a 
particular firm, I have used the method outlined by Oikonomou et al. (2012). The sum of each 
respective individual strengths/concerns indicator obtained in the previous procedure is divided 
by five (Eqn. 3.2 and 3.3 respectively).  
The formula for calculating the “Aggregate Strengths” measure is: 
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AGGS =
1
5
∗ (COMS + DIVS + EMPS + ENVS + PSQS)                                                        (3.2) 
where COMS stands for the Community strengths component, DIVS stands for Diversity 
strengths, EMPS stands for Employment strengths, ENS stands for Environment strengths and 
PSQS for Product Safety and Quality strengths. 
Analogously for “Aggregate Concerns”: 
AGGC =
1
5
∗ (COMC + DIVC + EMPC + ENVC + PSQC)                                                     (3.3) 
with the notation being equivalent to the one of equation (3.2). 
I assume that each qualitative issue carries the same weight, i.e. each qualitative issue is equally 
weighted and taken arithmetic average when calculating “Aggregate Strengths” and 
“Aggregate Concerns”. For example, environmental contributions are regarded as equally 
important as product safety and quality. This is done in accordance with the work of Hillman 
and Keim (2001), Oikonomou et al. (2012) and Deng et al. (2013) and is due to the lack of 
conceptual work concerning the quantification of each indicator that has importance among the 
various facets of CSR. Therefore it is a practical compromise to assign equal importance to 
CSR dimensions when constructing aggregated strengths/concerns measures. The logic of 
equal weighted various CSR indicators for constructing individual strengths/concerns is 
analogous.   
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In practice, it make little sense to assign the same weight to environmental aspect when it comes 
to assess financial institutes and oil firms, however, there is not a database so far that gives 
CSR ratings that based on sectors. 
As CSR is fundamentally multidimensional in nature, all CSR dimensions have to be taken into 
consideration when considering assigning an overall CSR score to a firm. It will be considered 
objective and not fair to manually choose one dimension to represent a firm’s overall CSR 
image, i.e. a firm might act well in terms of community dimension but not being responsible 
for the environment. In this case, it will be difficult for the rating agent to ‘pick’ environment 
dimension and say the firm is a bad CSR firm. In the same vein, it will be difficult to assign 
different weights to community and environment. Therefore the equally weighted approach is 
considered moderate in calculating a fair and consistent CSR score for more than one firm. 
Following the CSR measure construction of Deng et al. (2013), my last reformulation of the 
CSR measure is to take the difference between AGGS and AGGC which leaves the ‘remaining 
good CSR score’. Thus, for a particular firm, its overall corporate social responsibility 
performance is expressed by: 
CSR = AGGS − AGGC                                                                                                                        (3.4)  
The core idea of my research is centred on the impact of between-firm CSR difference on 
various aspects of M&As; therefore measuring the corporate social responsibility difference 
becomes essential upon obtaining the CSR measure for individual acquirers and targets. A 
firm’s engagement in CSR activities reflects its corporate soft attributes as well as corporate 
culture. From the previous construction process of the CSR measure for a particular firm, the 
constructed CSR measure conveys substantial valuable information about various 
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characteristics of a firm. A number of studies show that individual firms who share similar 
ethical values enjoy higher levels of mutual trust, which results in increased communication 
flows, commitment, cooperation and willingness to support the partner (Kim et al., 2014). By 
studying the difference between the borrower’s and the lender’s ethical behaviour, Kim et al. 
(2014) point out that “borrower’s ethical behaviour leads lending banks to loosen financing 
conditions when setting loan rates when there is similarity of lender s and borrowers along 
their ethical domain”. I take the CSR difference in accordance with Kim et al. (2014): 
Between − firm CSR difference
(CSR distance)
= |Acquirer CSR − Target CSR|                                    (3.5) 
The between-firm CSR difference is an absolute value i.e. a positive number that is equal to or 
greater than zero. 
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3.4.Data, sample selection and summary statistics 
3.4.1. Data and sample selection 
The initial sample of M&A deals comes from Thomson Financial SDC and consists of both 
completed and withdrawn deals between 1992 and 2012. The final sample includes all deals 
that meet the following selection criteria:  
(1) Acquirers and targets are both publicly traded firms in the U.S. or Canada for the reason 
that KLD STATS provides annual snapshots of publicly traded U.S. (only a few 
Canadian) firm’s environmental, social and governance performance rated by KLD 
Research & Analytics, Inc.,  
(2) Deal value is at least $1 million,  
(3) the acquirer owns less than 10% of target shares prior to the acquisition announcement 
and more than 50% after the transaction,  
(4) Deal type does not include spin-offs, recapitalizations, self-tender offers, repurchases, 
minority stake purchases, acquisitions of remaining interest, exchange offers or 
privatizations,  
(5) Both acquirers and targets are covered by the KLD Research & Analytics, Inc. (KLD) 
STATS database,  
(6) Both acquirers’ and targets’ data is available from the Centre for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) as well as Standard & Poor’s Compustat North America database.  
These restrictions are standard in the extant M&A literature (Fuller et al., 2002, Harford, 2005, 
Deng et al., 2013), and result in a final sample of 842 acquisitions. 
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3.4.2. Sample distribution 
In Table 3.1, I present the distribution of my sample M&As according to acquirer industry and 
year. The total number of acquisitions in each year increases more or less consistently amid the 
1992-1998 surges, the time during which the fifth merger wave takes place. It then decreases 
significantly before rebounding in 2003, the year where the most recent merger wave begins. 
This level-off in activity amid the 2001-2002 recession was associated with a significant decline 
of acquisitions in the manufacturing industry and the Transportation, Communications & 
Utilities industries, possibly as a result of the collapse of the ‘dotcom bubble’. The acquisition 
market started recovering in 2003 and since then has approached its highest activity levels.  
During the financial crisis commencing in 2007, the number of acquisition deals in my sample 
experiences a steady peak and trough, though less substantial than during the previous 2004-
2007 period. Starting in 2003, KLD enlarges its coverage to the largest 3000 U.S. publicly 
traded firms by market capitalization; this explains the inflated number of M&A deals. My 
sample has been enlarged from 2004 onward since the extension in KLD database leads to an 
improved coverage of M&A acquirers and targets. Most of the acquirers are in manufacturing 
(38.36%), financial industry (23.28%) and service industry (14.13%). In summary, the dataset 
in this research provides a good coverage of all the basic industries. 
Due to KLD’s coverage on mostly U.S.  publicly traded firms, out of the 842 deals in the sample, 
there are 828 (98.3%) acquirers from the U.S. and 816 (96.9%) deals with both acquirers and 
targets from the U.S..
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Table 3.1: Sample distribution by Year and Industry 
The sample consists of 842 completed and withdrawn the U.S. and Canadian M&A deals between 1992 and 2012. The initial sample of 
M&A deals comes from Thomson Financial SDC and consists of both completed and withdrawn deals between 1992 and 2012. The 
final sample includes all deals that meet the following selection criteria: (1) acquirers and targets are both publicly traded firms in the 
U.S. or Canada, (2) the deal value is at least $1 million, (3) the acquirer owns less than 10% of target shares prior to the acquisition 
announcement and more than 50% after the transaction, (4) deal type does not include spin-offs, recapitalizations, self-tender offers, 
repurchases, minority stake purchases, acquisitions of remaining interest, exchange offers or privatizations, (5) both acquirers and 
targets are covered by the KLD Research & Analytics, Inc. (KLD) STATS database, (6) both acquirers’ and targets’ data are available 
from the Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) as well as Standard & Poor’s Compustat North America database. 
Acquirer 
Industry 
(First two 
digits of the 
SIC code) 
Agriculture, 
Forestry, 
&Fisheries 
(01-09) 
Mineral 
Industries & 
Construction  
(10-17) 
Manufacturing  
(20-39) 
Transportation, 
Communications 
& Utilities  
(40-49) 
Wholesale 
Trade & 
Retail 
Trade 
(50-59) 
Financial 
Industry      
(60-69) 
Service 
Industries 
(70-89) Total 
1992   1  1 1  3 
1993  1 1 3    5 
1994   5 3  1 1 10 
1995   5 1  4 1 11 
1996  2 4 7   1 14 
1997  1 5 4  7  17 
1998  3 10 3 2 11 1 30 
1999  3 11 12  2  28 
2000 1 1 8 3  5 1 19 
2001  2 6   4  12 
2002   4 2 1 1  8 
2003  1 5 1  5 4 16 
2004  6 25 4 3 35 19 92 
2005  5 37 10 4 15 8 79 
2006 1 9 34 8 7 26 21 106 
2007  7 32 4 11 28 17 99 
2008  7 23 9 4 8 15 66 
2009  5 27 4 1 7 7 51 
2010  5 37 7 3 10 13 75 
2011  4 17 6 2 12 6 47 
2012  2 26 5 3 14 4 54 
Total 2 64 323 96 42 196 119 842 
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3.4.3. Measure of CSR difference and summary statistics 
As has previously been stated, the core ideas of this chapter are centred on the impact of ATCD 
on M&As’ completion likelihood. Therefore, measuring the corporate social responsibility 
difference becomes essential upon obtaining the CSR measure for individual acquirers and 
targets. A firm’s engagements in CSR activities reflects its corporate soft attributes e.g. 
corporate culture since CSR measures conveys substantial valuable information about various 
characteristics of a firm. A number of studies show that individual firms which share similar 
ethical values enjoy higher levels of mutual trust, which results in increased communication 
flows, commitment, cooperation and willingness to support the partner (Kim et al., 2014). Kim 
et al. (2014) defines the CSR difference between a borrower and a lender as a measure of how 
trust affects the setting of loan rates. In this vein, I measure the ideological difference between 
the two parties by defining ATCD in accordance with Kim et al. (2014): 
Acquirer − target CSR difference = |Acquirer CSR − Target CSR| 
Thus ATCD is always a positive number that is equal to or greater than zero since I take the 
absolute value of the difference between acquirer CSR and target CSR. 
The sample of acquisitions is partitioned into two subsamples (Large and Small) based on the 
sample median of the algebraic ATCD (not the absolute difference). Table 2 provides summary 
statistics for the full sample and two subsamples, and tests the impact of changing key variables 
on each subsample. Definitions of each of the variables in Table 2 are provided in the Appendix. 
Several features are worth noting:  
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(1) Acquirers in the large CSR difference group show a significantly higher Return on 
Asset ratio than acquirers in the small CSR difference group. 
(2) Compared to acquirers in the subsample with a lower algebraic ATCD, the market 
capitalization of those acquirers who buy a target with very different CSR behaviour is 
statistically higher (this holds for targets as well, which could suggest that both 
acquirers and targets with a larger market capitalization are inclined to be paired with 
a contracting party that behaves differently in CSR terms). 
(3) The relative deal size is smaller when there is a larger difference of CSR between an 
acquirer and a target (this phenomenon signals that firms are less inclined to invest 
in/merge with a contracting party with larger cultural/ ethical difference in view of the 
greater future uncertainties and risks involved when cooperating with each other). 
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics 
The sample consists of 842 completed and withdrawn U.S. and Canadian M&A deals between 1992 and 2012. The initial sample of 
M&A deals comes from Thomson Financial SDC and consists of both completed and withdrawn deals between 1992 and 2012. This 
sample is partitioned into two subsamples (Large ATCD and Small ATCD) based on the sample median of the variable between-firm 
CSR difference. This table provides summary statistics for the full sample and those two subsamples, as well as tests of difference of 
key variables between large and small ATCD subsamples. For calculations of each variable, please refer to Appendix A: Variable 
Definitions. 
Variable 
Full Sample 
(N=842) 
Subsample of Large 
CSR Distance: A 
(N=422) 
Subsample of Small 
CSR Distance: B 
(N=420) 
Test of Difference 
(A-B) 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
CSR difference measure                 
CSR Difference 0.088 0.063 0.146 0.118 0.030 0.029 0.116*** 0.089*** 
                 
Acquirer Characteristics                 
CSR -0.025 -0.033 -0.011 -0.026 -0.038 -0.033 0.027*** 0.007 
Collateral 0.236 0.141 0.241 0.140 0.231 0.142 0.009 -0.002 
Financial leverage 0.257 0.223 0.254 0.218 0.261 0.231 -0.007 -0.014 
ROA 0.047 0.044 0.054 0.050 0.040 0.037 0.014** 0.013*** 
Market cap 8.830 8.704 9.158 9.180 8.503 8.330 0.656*** 0.851*** 
Market to book 3.510 2.435 3.422 2.533 3.598 2.332 -0.176 0.201* 
Runup -1.236 -0.362 -1.164 -0.367 -1.315 -0.355 0.152 -0.013 
Acquirer information 
asymmetry 0.018 0.016 0.017 0.015 0.018 0.016  -0.002** -0.001 
Hightec (dummy) 0.444 0.000 0.467 0.000 0.421 0.000 0.045 0.000 
                  
Target Characteristics                 
CSR -0.044 -0.042 -0.046 -0.056 -0.042 -0.036 -0.004  -0.052** 
Collateral 0.247 0.133 0.237 0.137 0.258 0.131 -0.020 0.006 
Financial leverage 0.281 0.227 0.272 0.209 0.289 0.242 -0.017  -0.033** 
ROA 0.010 0.027 0.011 0.029 0.009 0.025 0.002 0.005 
Market cap 7.076 6.967 7.183 7.055 6.968 6.855 0.215** 0.200 
Market to book 2.689 2.116 2.491 2.143 2.890 2.097 -0.398 0.046 
Target information 
asymmetry 0.024 0.021 0.024 0.021 0.024 0.021 0.000 0.000 
Hightec (dummy) 0.444 0.000 0.479 0.000 0.410 0.000 0.069** 0.000** 
                  
Deal Characteristics                 
Deal relative size 0.280 0.242 0.267 0.214 0.294 0.270  -0.027*  -0.056** 
Intra-industry (dummy) 0.545 1.000 0.526 1.000 0.564 1.000 -0.038 0.000 
Hostile (dummy) 0.045 0.000 0.045 0.000 0.045 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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3.4.4. Specification of main variables and the correlation matrix  
3.4.4.1.Main variables 
To better understand the cross-sectional variation of ATCD on various aspects of the market 
for corporate control, I conduct multivariate regressions using ATCD as the main explanatory 
variable. When investigating my major hypothesis on the impact of CSR difference on merger 
completion likelihood, I control for acquirer CSR since Deng et al. (2013) identify a positive 
relation between acquirer CSR and merger completion likelihood, though they do not go into 
detail. 
I also control for a number of important variables to account for the effects of well-known 
influential factors on an M&A deal’s initiation and completion likelihood. Palepu (1986) 
suggests that inefficient management will lead to an increased likelihood of being acquired 
since the market for corporate control provides a mechanism to discipline those managers who 
fail to maximize a firm’s market value. Accordingly, I include ROE and ROA to capture 
management efficiency (Dong et al., 2006). Apart from replacing an incompetent managerial 
team, Hasbrouck (1985) suggests that a takeover bid of a low Tobin Q firm is an attempt to 
acquire valuable resources at a cost below that of a de novo investment. As long as q is less 
than 1, which means that market value is less than the replacement cost, any agent desiring to 
enter the industry would prefer acquisition over a de novo investment. Both ROE and Tobin Q 
demonstrate that a better managerial competency, as well as a more outstanding operating 
performance, facilitate M&A completion. 
In order to account for the fact that high leverage will lead to a decreased likelihood of 
acquisition (since there are far fewer financial resources available), I control for the target’s 
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financial leverage (Palepu, 1986). Despite, his results showing an ambiguous impact from the 
variable financial leverage, it serves as a proxy for a firm’s financial reserves, collateral, and is 
identified to be positively associated with the M&A completion likelihood (Palepu, 1986). I 
include both financial leverage and collateral in my study. 
Dong et al. (2006) find that higher target valuation is in association with a less combative offer, 
in terms of a lower probability of hostility, a lower probability of tender offer and a higher 
probability of offer success. Price-to-book ratio is employed in their research, whereas I use 
market-to-book ratio4, an information asymmetry variable (Moeller et al., 2007, Officer et al., 
2009) and runup variable. Information asymmetry is defined as the idiosyncratic volatility of 
the stock. It is computed as the standard deviation of the residuals from the Fama-French Three-
factor (excess of the risk-free rate) (FF 3-Factor) model of daily returns within 250 trading days 
preceding the acquisition announcement day. Runup refers to buy and hold abnormal returns 
(BHAR) of the stock over the 60 days preceding the acquisition announcement day. 
Research shows that the size of a target firm will be negatively related to the likelihood of 
acquisitions (Rodrigues and Stevenson, 2013); therefore I include target size, deal relative size 
and relative size into regressions in order to control for the size effect (Moeller et al., 2004, 
Alexandridis et al., 2013). I measure relative size by using a ratio of target total assets over 
acquirer total assets (Moeller et al., 2004). Following on from Barnes (1990), I include the 
intra-industry dummy to control for industry effects. The intra-industry dummy equals 1 if the 
primary with 3-digit acquirer’s SIC code coincides the 3-digit target’s SIC code.  
                                                 
4 Market to book ratio is used in this study rather than price to book for two reasons: (1) M/B ratio is the standard 
ratio for measuring a firm’s relative valuation position (i.e. undervalued, and overvalued) in M&A research 
((Moeller et al., 2004, Alexandridis et al., 2013, Travlos, 1987); (2) data availability on  M/B ratio is more 
complete than on P/B ratio. 
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3.4.4.2.The correlation matrix 
Before moving forward to the regression analysis stage, in Table 3, I present a correlation 
matrix of all dependent and independent variables to demonstrate that the correlation between 
any two variables is within the threshold level.  
Ordinary least square regression model is probably the most frequently used research method 
by most economists. Researchers have extensively studied and documented the properties and 
limitations of it, and problems with the model could be non-normality, heteroscedasticity, serial 
correlation etc.. By realizing the strictness of the model, an admiration for its robustness under 
departures from many assumptions has been grown. One area is the requirement that 
explanatory variables should be truly independent of one another. Researchers have also 
developed proper treatment of the models classical problems in two separate stages: detection 
and correction (Farrar & Glauber, 1967).  
I group correlation coefficients by less than 30%, 30%-50% and above 50%. When correlation 
coefficient between a pair of variable reaches 50%, the pair is not included in a regression 
model to avoid potential collinearity problem. In order to detect any collinearity problem and 
provide reassurance, I use Belsey et al. (1980)’s test methodology in SAS for detecting any 
collinearity problem. 
There are 8 pairs of correlation coefficients that exceed 30%, but are below 50%. They are: 
acquirer collateral-acquirer financial leverage (31.9%), acquirer financial leverage-target 
collateral (33.0%), acquirer market capitalization-acquirer information asymmetry (-40.4%), 
acquirer market capitalization-deal relative size (-48.9%), acquirer information asymmetry-
target information asymmetry (48.9%), target ROA-target information asymmetry (-34.8%), 
target market capitalization-target market capitalization (-37.2%), target market capitalization-
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deal relative size (30.8%). There is one pair’s correlation coefficient that above is 50% namely 
acquirer collateral-target collateral (80.8%).  
Table 3.1 includes all main variables that I will use throughout all three chapters. However, I 
will still present the correlation matrix for further chapters as new variables regarding returns 
(Chapter 4) and method of payment (Chapter 5) will be added. Therefore, the readers can see 
how new variables correlate to existing variables in Table 3.1. 
I do not include pairs of high correlation coefficient (over 50%) in one regression framework 
in order to avoid any multicollinearity issues. However, for medium highly correlated pairs 
such as acquirer collateral-acquirer financial leverage, I include them in one regression as they 
both reflect key financial characteristics of a firm and this is a common approach in the 
literature (Deng et al., 2013; Chang, 1998). 
In order to further ensure there are no multicollinearity issues, following Belsley et al. (1980), 
I conduct collinearity diagnostics for each analysis in this chapter to detect any potential 
multicollinearity problems and ensure the accurateness of this research. I apply their methods 
in SAS (COLLIN function) when conducting each regression analysis as outlined by Freund 
and Littell (1986). Essentially, this method is about calculating ‘the condition indices’ in SAS 
using COLLIN function. Belsey et al. (1980) suggest that, when this number is around 10, 
weak dependencies might be starting to affect the regression estimates. When this number is 
larger than 100, the estimates might have a fair amount of numerical error. In my regressions, 
the condition indices are well below 10 (the maximum number is 9.38), which implies 
multicollinearity is not a problem. 
 
 72 
 
Table 3.3: Pearson correlation coefficients 
This correlation matrix aims to demonstrate Pearson correlation coefficients between any two variables in my sample. There are 8 pairs of correlation coefficients that exceed 30%, but are below 50%. They are acquirer collateral-acquirer financial 
leverage (31.9%), acquirer financial leverage-target collateral (33.0%), acquirer market capitalization-acquirer information asymmetry  (-40.4%), acquirer market capitalization-deal relative size (-48.9%), acquirer information asymmetry-target 
information asymmetry  (48.9%), target ROA-target information asymmetry (-34.8%), target market capitalization-target market capitalization (-37.2%), target market capitalization-deal relative size (30.8%). There is one pair’s correlation 
coefficient that is above 50% namely acquirer collateral-target collateral (80.8%). I do not include highly correlated variables in one regression. 
 
  ATCD 
A_ 
Collateral 
A_ 
Financial 
leverage 
A_ 
ROA 
A_ 
Market cap 
A_ 
Market to 
book 
A_ 
Runup 
Acquirer 
information 
asymmetry 
T_ 
Collateral 
T_ 
Financial 
leverage T_ROA 
T_ 
Market cap 
T_ 
Market to 
book 
Target 
information 
asymmetry 
Deal 
relative 
size 
Intra-
industry 
(dummy) 
Hostile 
(dummy) 
CSR Distance 1.000                                 
A_ 
Collateral -0.033 1.000                               
A_ 
Financial leverage -0.061 0.319 1.000                             
A_ROA 0.116 -0.010 -0.258 1.000                           
A_ 
Market cap 0.278 -0.066 -0.164 0.278 1.000                         
A_ 
Market to book 0.002 -0.057 0.086 0.197 0.136 1.000                       
A_Runup 0.005 0.010 -0.073 0.079 0.043 0.054 1.000                     
Acquirer 
information 
asymmetry -0.129 0.044 0.068 -0.258 -0.404 0.020 -0.034 1.000                   
T_ 
Collateral -0.067 0.808 0.330 0.003 -0.109 -0.072 0.024 0.054 1.000                 
T_ 
Financial leverage 0.003 0.245 0.246 -0.028 0.046 -0.013 0.005 -0.006 0.379 1.000               
T_ROA 0.001 0.021 0.017 0.127 0.026 0.035 -0.019 -0.228 0.059 -0.181 1.000             
T_ 
Market cap 0.051 0.142 0.060 0.071 0.458 0.048 0.063 -0.103 0.164 -0.181 0.202 1.000           
T_ 
Market to book -0.083 -0.021 0.002 0.042 0.072 0.111 0.019 -0.023 0.013 -0.038 0.111 0.129 1.000         
Target 
information 
asymmetry -0.001 -0.059 -0.070 -0.088 -0.070 0.016 -0.008 0.489 -0.117 0.032 -0.348 -0.372 -0.036 1.000       
Deal relative size -0.141 0.217 0.214 -0.173 -0.489 -0.076 0.013 0.249 0.247 0.021 0.138 0.308 0.031 -0.168 1.000     
Intra-industry 
(dummy) -0.106 0.142 0.059 -0.029 -0.120 -0.002 -0.046 0.097 0.138 0.049 -0.104 0.027 -0.080 0.002 0.123 1.000   
Hostile (dummy) -0.052 0.087 0.031 0.007 -0.002 0.035 0.018 0.002 0.081 -0.008 0.022 0.115 0.004 -0.047 0.091 0.026 1.000 
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3.5.Methodology 
3.5.1. The discrete choice modelling framework 
In order to measure the likelihood and magnitude of ATCD impacts on M&A likelihood in this 
chapter and method of payment in following chapter, I apply the logistic model following 
Palepu (1986) who applies the logit method on takeover prediction. By utilizing logit 
regressions, it allows me to report whether ATCD plays a role in affecting the likelihood of 
M&A initialization or completion as well as the magnitude based on a series of acquirer, target 
and deal characteristics. The logistic regression overcomes the rigidities of the linear 
probability model in the presence of a dichotomous state problem. As shown in Figure 3.f, the 
logit transformation maps probability (Pi) ranging between 0 and 1 to log odds (Ln(
Pi
1−Pi
)) 
ranging from negative infinity to positive infinity; this removes the challenge of modelling a 
variable that has restricted range, such as M&A completion (1) or acquisition failure (0).  
The first step transformation from probability (Pi) to odds (
Pi
1−Pi
) is a monotonic transformation, 
i.e. the greater the probability, the greater the odds and vice versa. For example, the probability 
of success of an event is 0.6, and therefore the probability of failure is 0.4. The odds of success 
are defined as the ratio of the probability of success over the probability of failure. It is 3/2 in 
above example (calculated as 0.6/0.4). 
The second step log transformation from odds to log of odds is again a monotonic relation, 
suggesting that the log odds increases as the odds increases or vice versa. 
The model is defined by equations (3.6)-(3.8).  
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Pi = E(Y = 1׀Xi) =
1
1+e−Zi
                                                                                                     (3.6) 
where Zi = β0 + β1X1i + ⋯ + βkXki         
Li = ln (
Pi
1−Pi
) = Zi = β0 + β1X1i + ⋯ + βkXki                                                                  (3.7)                                             
Equation (3.7) is a mathematical transformation of Equation (3.6), by applying a natural 
logarithmic function on both sides of Equation (3.6). It presents the existence of a linear relation 
between the log odds ratio  Li and right-hand side independent variables.  
∂Pi
∂Xi
= βiPi(1 − Pi)                                                                                                                  (3.8)                                                                                                
Equation (3.8) measures the change in the probability of the event as a consequence of a small 
change in the independent variables, Xi, i=1,2…, k.  
Mathematically, when the probability of the event is high or low, a large change in the 
explanatory variables is required to change the classification of the observation since the 
incremental impact of a change in an explanatory variable on the likelihood of the event will 
be compressed. Hence, if a deal is clearly classified as completed or withdrawn, a large change 
in the explanatory variables is required to change its classification. 
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Figure 3.e: Logit regression maps 
The upper plot is derived from Probability (𝑷𝒊) to Odds (
𝑷𝒊
𝟏−𝑷𝒊
) and the lower plot is derived from Odds (
𝑷𝒊
𝟏−𝑷𝒊
) to Log 
odds (Ln(
𝑷𝒊
𝟏−𝑷𝒊
))
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I specify two logistic regression models to study ATCD impacts on M&A likelihood of 
initialization and completion (Model I and Model II), the rationales for the inclusion of each 
of the variables having already been specified in section 3.4.4. I will explain here the rationale 
of the combinations of control variables for each model: 
Model I: Impact of ATCD on M&A initialization likelihood  
𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠 (𝑀&𝐴 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽2𝑇𝐶𝑂𝐿𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐿 +
𝛽3𝑇𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑀𝐾𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑃 + 𝛽5𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽6𝑇𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄 + 𝛽7𝑇𝑀𝑇𝐵 + 𝛽8𝑇𝐷𝐼𝑉 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                 
where CSRDIFF refers to ATCD, TCOLLATERAL refers to target collateral, TLEVERAGE 
refers to target financial leverage, TMKTCAP refers to target market capitalization, TROA 
refers to target return on asset ratio, TTOBINQ refers to target Tobin-q ratio, TMTB refers to 
target market to book ratio, TDIV refers to target dividend payout ratio. 
When predicting the initialization likelihood of a deal, it is more about analysing the 
characteristics of the target as like an acquirer’s selection process of targets, i.e. is it the target 
that of interests of an acquirer. For this reason, I control for various target characteristics as 
well as ATCD. This is also the approach utilized by Palepu (1986). 
Model II: Impact of ATCD on M&A completion likelihood  
𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑠 (𝑀&𝐴 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽2𝐴𝐶𝑆𝑅 + 𝛽3𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸 +
𝛽4𝑅𝐸𝐿𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑅𝐸𝐿𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽6𝐴𝑀𝐵 + 𝛽7𝐴𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽8𝐴𝑀𝐾𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑃 + 𝛽9𝐴𝑅𝑈𝑁𝑈𝑃 +
𝛽10𝐴𝐼𝐴 + 𝛽11𝑇𝐼𝐴 + 𝛽12𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐷 + 𝛽13𝐻𝑂𝑆𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                              ``` 
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where CSRDIFF refers to ATCD, ACSR refers to acquirer CSR, ALEVERAGE refers to 
acquirer leverage, RELSIZE refers to the ratio of target size over acquirer size, DRELSIZE 
refers to deal relative size, AMB refers to acquirer market to book ratio, AROA refers to 
acquirer return on asset ratio, AMKTCAP refers to acquirer market capitalization, ARUNUP 
refers to buy and hold abnormal return (BHAR) of the acquirer stock over 60 days preceding 
the acquisition announcement day, AIA and TIA refer to acquirer information asymmetry and 
target information asymmetry respectively, INTRAIND is the intra-industry dummy and 
HOSTILE refers to hostile deal dummy. 
When it comes to estimating ATCD impacts on the M&A completion likelihood, I control for 
both acquirer and deal characteristics as acquiring firms are the dominating power at that stage. 
As long as a target has been chosen, the acquirer will reach out to the potential target and the 
deal enters the negotiation stage. The outcome from this stage largely depends on the acquirer’s 
characteristics since a target’s characteristics are already on the table. For example, the 
acquiring firm’s financial status could directly influence the amount of proceeds and the 
method of payment. The deal could end up with being withdrawn if this amount or the payment 
method does not satisfy the target. TIA (target information asymmetry) is included as the only 
controlling target characteristic because it signals the transparency of the target’s stock price 
which will influence various decisions from the acquirer.   
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3.6.Results and Discussion 
In this section, I will analyse the impacts of ATCD on the M&A initialization likelihood, 
acquirer-target compatibility and M&A completion likelihood. I identify a negative linkage 
between ATCD and the likelihood that a deal is initialized. Among these initialized deals, I 
observe that high CSR acquirers are more likely to pair with high CSR targets while poor CSR 
acquirers are more likely to pair with a poor CSR target. Moreover, the closer the acquirer-
target CSR score, the more likely it is that the deal will be completed.  
3.6.1. M&A likelihood: deal and non-deal sample 
To demonstrate that CSR is an active factor that influences the decision making process during 
an M&A, I create a non-deal sample, where no M&A deals have been initiated, and compare 
it to a deal sample, in which the M&A process has been started. The non-deal sample is 
constructed by matching a comparable non-acquired firm to each event firm. With regards to 
obtaining the non-deal sample, I first create a shortlist from the KLD database by excluding all 
firms that have been involved in M&A deals between 1992 and 2012 (either in the role of an 
acquirer or a target). I then aim to obtain a p-score for each acquirer and target in both the deal 
sample and the non-deal sample. One of the methods used in this area of research involves 
employing a small number of firm characteristics to perform the matching procedure. In this 
study, I use a propensity score matching method. The characteristics taken into consideration 
are: market capitalization, financial leverage, Tobin Q and ROE ratio as I consider them to be 
the most important generic aspects of a firm’s identity. Each acquirer and target from the deal-
sample are then paired with a non-deal firm from the KLD shortlist which has closest p-score. 
Thus, we have a pair of firms that are very similar in terms of most key characteristics but may 
be dissimilar when it comes to CSR aspects. Industry is not controlled in this case as all non-
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acquired firms are randomly selected depending only on their financial (accounting) data. We 
will smoothen industrial impacts in the robustness test section. 
I break down corporate CSR engagements to six dimensions as specified by KLD: community, 
diversity, employee relation, environment, product and corporate governance. This breakdown 
elucidates how M&A likelihood is influenced by CSR engagements. Table 3.4 reports tests of 
difference between deal sample and non-deal sample firms, and shows that, for each dimension, 
the absolute CSR differences of non-deal samples are generally larger than those of deal 
samples. This difference is statistically significant for employee relations, environment and 
product dimensions. In general, it shows that actual deal pairs have a closer ethical proximity 
compared to artificially constructed non-deal pairs. Even when the CSR difference is 
insignificant, it is interesting that the non-deal sample always has a higher CSR difference. 
This means that, the CSR difference between the deal and non-deal samples are always positive. 
When considering the example of Pfizer's failure in acquiring AstraZeneca these factors can be 
used to explain the failure; more specifically it is worth nothing Pfizer's failure to establish an 
agreement with AstraZeneca regarding  employee relations after the proposed merger. 
Moreover, considering the average ATCD across the full sample (0.088 with medium 0.063), 
a difference of 0.037 between deal sample and non-deal sample firms is considered bearing a 
very strong economic magnitude. Even if it comes down to 0.007 for the overall CSR difference, 
it still indicates an economically significant difference.   
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Table 3.4: Test of difference: M&A sample and p-score matched non-deal sample 
The sample consists of 842 U.S. acquisitions and 662 p-score matched non-deal pairs between 1992 and 2012. I obtain the 
initial sample of 842 acquisitions from Thomson Financial's Security Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum database. The non-
deal sample is constructed by matching a comparable non-acquired firm to each event firm. With regards to obtaining the non-
deal sample, I first create a shortlist from the KLD database by excluding all firms that have been involved in M&A deals 
between 1992 and 2012 (either in the role of an acquirer or a target). I then obtain a p-score for each acquirer and target in both 
the deal samples and the non-deal samples using a propensity score matching method. The characteristics taken into 
consideration are: market capitalization, financial leverage, Tobin Q and ROE ratio. Each acquirer and target from the deal-
sample are then paired with a non-deal firm from the KLD shortlist which has closest p-score. For companies where financial 
information was missing, deals to which they match were removed from the sample, to prevent biasing the results.  
CSR measures are further classified in their six dimensions to record any specific CSR impact on M&A deal completion 
likelihood. They are Community, Diversity, Employee relations, Environment, Product and Corporate governance. The 
symbols *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
CSR 
difference 
Community Diversity 
Employee 
relation 
Environment Product 
Corporate 
governance 
Deal sample (1) 0.088 0.104 0.280 0.157 0.090 0.133 0.164 
Non-deal sample (2) 
(Propensity score 
matched) 
0.095 0.117 0.281 0.178 0.127 0.164 0.171 
Diff (2)-(1) 0.007 0.012 0.001 0.021** 0.037*** 0.031*** 0.007 
T-value 1.550 1.340 0.110 2.310 4.140 2.810 0.760 
No. of observations 662 662 662 662 662 662 662 
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Observing a significant and consistently positive CSR difference between the deal and the non-
deal samples, it indicates that a deal is less likely to be initiated with a larger CSR difference 
between an acquirer and a potential target. I investigate the hypotheses further in this section 
by utilizing a logit regression. This will help in providing more insights in the economic 
magnitude of ATCD impacts on the M&A initialization likelihood. 
Table 3.5 constructs two univariate logit regressions. Dependent variables are 1 if there is an 
M&A deal (deal sample) and 0 for a matched pair (non-deal sample). Regression results are 
consistent with Hypothesis I: the higher the ATCD in general, the lower the M&A deal 
initialization likelihood. Simply put, there is a negative relation between ATCD and the M&A 
initialization likelihood. A 10% unit increase in ATCD will result in a 3.67% decrease in 
initializing an M&A deal. This relation is statistically strong for the factors employee relations 
and environment that are two of the most important components of a firm’s public image. As 
a result of a 10% unit increase in the acquirer-target difference in employee relations and 
environment, there will be a 2.62% and 2.81% decrease in the M&A initialization likelihood 
respectively. For example, a common problem after deal completion is the effect of redundancy 
on employee relations. Therefore, a deal is less likely to be initialized if a deal buyer and its 
seller have drastically different solutions to these problems. Divergence in dealing with 
employee relations further implies culture differences between two firms which is regarded as 
an impediment in dealing with a target firm. Regarding the environment dimension, it’s one of 
the most important ways that announces a firm’s engagements with social and ethical aspects 
(e.g. Unilever is committed to fighting deforestation). It is expected that ATCDs in employee 
relations and environment dimension are both negatively related to initializing a deal.  
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Table 3.5 shows the regressions on the impacts of ATCD (CSR dimensions) on M&A 
likelihood. In addition to the main explanatory variable ATCD and its six dimensions when 
breaking it down, I also control for the main influential variables that are mentioned in literature 
concerning takeover target prediction. Pseudo R-squares are at satisfactory levels compared to 
literature (i.e. 0.077 and 0.105), which suggests the set of control variables provides a 
reasonable explanatory power to the M&A likelihood.  The signs of control variables are in 
line with the predicted signs as in the literature. I find that the size of a firm (market 
capitalization) is significantly negatively related to the likelihood of acquisition. This is based 
on the premise that there are several size-related ‘transaction costs’ associated with acquiring 
a firm. Also it includes higher costs to integrate a larger firm into the acquirer. Costs are likely 
to increase with the target size and hence the number of potential bidders for a firm is likely to 
decrease with size. Firms with more collateral are less likely to initiate a deal while a higher 
financial leverage contributes to the likelihood of acquisition. In my sample, undervaluation of 
a firm (Market-to-book) leads to an increased likelihood of acquisition. High payout ratios will 
result in a decreased likelihood of acquisition as shown by an insignificantly negative relation 
between these two.   
I do not control for industry variables due to the nature of my sample construction; the non-
deal sample is constructed by matching each deal firm with a non-deal firm with the closest 
propensity score. As no deals in the non-deal sample are actually happening in reality but firms 
in this sample have the closest financial features with firms in deal sample. It’s not reasonable 
to have a ‘real’ intra-industry variable for the deal sample and a ‘hypothetical’ one for the non-
deal sample (it’s hypothetical since the ‘deal’ is not happening). Moreover, I apply no 
restrictions on industry when constructing the non-deal sample; firms are allocated from 
random industries. The total number of cross-industry deals in the ‘fictional’ pair sample is 
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comparable with that of the deal sample (40%). Hence, considering the uniqueness of this 
sample (which consists of both the deal sample and the non-deal sample), there is no need to 
control for intra-industry effects.  
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Table 3.5: Impacts of ATCD (CSR dimensions) on M&A likelihood 
The sample consists of 842 U.S. acquisitions and 662 p-score matched non-deal pairs between 1992 and 2012. I obtain the 
initial sample of 842 acquisitions from Thomson Financial's Security Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum database. The non-
deal sample is constructed by matching a comparable non-acquiring firm to each event firm. With regards to obtaining the 
non-deal sample, I first created a shortlist from the KLD database by excluding all firms that have been involved in M&A 
deals between 1992 and 2012 (either in the role of an acquirer or a target). I then obtained a p-score for each acquirer and 
target in both the deal sample and the non-deal sample using a propensity score matching method. The characteristics taken 
into consideration are: market capitalization, financial leverage, Tobin Q and ROE ratio. Each acquirer and target from the 
deal-sample are then paired with a non-deal firm from the KLD shortlist which has closest p-score. For companies where 
financial information was missing, deals to which they were matched were removed from the sample, to prevent biasing the 
results.  
CSR measures are further classified as in six dimensions as to record any specific CSR impact on M&A deal completion 
likelihood. They are Community, Diversity, Employee relations, Environment, Product and Corporate governance. All 
variables are defined in the Appendix. The symbols *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively.  
 
Impact of ATCD (CSR dimensions) on M&A happening likelihood  (Logit) 
 (1) 
Marginal effect 
(1): 
dy/dx 
(2) 
Marginal effect 
(2): 
dy/dx 
     
CSR difference measure (absolute):     
ATCD 
-1.680** 
(4.833) 
-0.367   
Community   
0.786* 
(3.320) 
0.177 
Diversity   
-0.334 
(1.454) 
-0.083 
Employee Relations   
-1.100*** 
(6.662) 
-0.262 
Environment   
-1.191*** 
(7.333) 
-0.281 
Product   
-0.492 
(1.995) 
-0.122 
Corporate Governance   
0.092 
(0.049) 
0.022 
     
Target Characteristics:     
Collateral 
-1.226*** 
(18.426) 
-0.287 
-1.168*** 
(15.856) 
-0.276 
Financial leverage 
1.756*** 
(18.823) 
0.322 
1.870*** 
(21.092) 
0.333 
Market cap 
-0.100** 
(4.353) 
-0.025 
-0.086* 
(2.821) 
-0.021 
ROA 
0.532 
(2.104) 
0.125 
0.441 
(1.386) 
0.104 
Tobin Q 
-0.038 
(1.815) 
-0.009 
-0.035 
(1.631) 
-0.009 
Market to book 
-0.008 
(0.740) 
-0.002 
-0.011 
(1.288) 
-0.003 
Dividend payout ratio 
-0.008 
(0.017) 
-0.002 
-0.008 
(0.014) 
-0.002 
     
Sample size 886  883  
Pseudo R-square 0.077  0.105  
Log likelihood -611.958  -609.655  
  
 85 
 
 
In summary, results suggest that ATCD should be considered as an active variable in 
influencing takeover target prediction and the M&A deal likelihood. When considering the 
potential of a firm being a takeover target, apart from analysing hard quantitative attributes of 
a firm, it is also worthwhile to consider the soft qualitative attributes. When it comes down to 
corporate social aspects, while the big picture (such as corporate culture and business strategies) 
is essential, the details in depth (i.e. employee relations and environment) are also worth taking 
into consideration. This is because a firm’s behaviour in social and ethical terms reflects its 
culture as well as its business strategies and two firms who have very different ideas in these 
two areas will take more effort to coordinate. It remains unclear whether this kind of 
coordination will bring value to the acquiring and combined firm or not.   
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3.6.2. Acquirer-target compatibility matrix analysis 
To capture an initial and intuitive association between CSR and the M&A completion 
likelihood, I assess the relation between CSR proximity and initiation of a deal before analysing 
the logistic regression.  
In Table 3.6, I report the compatibility matrix of acquirers and targets according to their CSR 
scores’ relative position in the full sample, with both completed and withdrawn deals included. 
Acquirers are sorted into tertiles, acquirers that fall into the upper tertile are defined as ‘high 
CSR acquirer’, the middle tertile acquirers are ‘medium CSR acquirer’ and the lower tertile 
acquirers are ‘low CSR acquirer’. Targets are categorized into ‘high CSR target’, ‘medium 
CSR target’ and ‘low CSR target’ analogously.  
Each acquirer tertile is then further partitioned depending on the targets’ respective score. For 
example: High acquirer becomes: 
High acquirer – High target 
High acquirer – Medium target 
High acquirer – Low target 
This produces a total of nine subsamples describing all deal types in terms of acquirer and target 
CSR score. 
In Table 3.6, the value in each column shows the total number of initiated M&A deals, 
including both completed and withdrawn deals for that subsample. The matrix shows that: more 
M&A deals are initiated for firms with higher CSR proximity between an acquirer and a target; 
and acquisitions are most likely to happen between an acquirer and a target at comparable CSR 
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levels (41.568%) 5 , i.e. ‘high CSR acquirer-high CSR target’ (14.371%), ‘medium CSR 
acquirer-medium CSR target’ (12.827%) and ‘low CSR acquirer-low CSR target’ (15.321%).  
The second most likely scenario is that acquisitions take place at one level difference between 
an acquirer and a target (40.380%), i.e. ‘high CSR acquirer-medium CSR target’ (10.333%), 
‘medium CSR acquirer-high CSR target’ (10.689%), ‘medium CSR acquirer-low CSR target’ 
(9.857%)  and ‘low CSR acquirer-medium CSR target’ (9.501%). The least likely case is that 
a high CSR acquirer merges with a low CSR target (8.670%) or a low CSR acquirer buys a 
high CSR target (8.432%). The first two scenarios dominate over 80% of total initiated M&A 
deals, while the remaining 20% of deals take place between an acquirer and a target at two-
level CSR difference. The findings are measured to ensure their economical and statistical 
significance, describing that more M&A deals are initiated between an acquirer and a target 
with higher level of CSR proximity. These findings are further validated by comparable results 
when the sample is analogously partitioned into quintiles.  
Using an identical subsampling rationale in Table 3.6, I calculate the percentage of completed 
deals for each of the Table 3.6 columns in Table 3.7. The highest completion percentage falls 
in ‘high CSR acquirer-high CSR target’ subgroup. ‘Low CSR acquirer-low CSR target’ 
combination has the lowest completion rate. In general, Table 3.7 reveals a positive association 
between acquirer CSR score and completion of a deal. The finding is consistent with Deng et 
al. (2013)’s identification of an independent variable ‘acquirer CSR score’, which is introduced 
in later logistic regressions.   
                                                 
5 This is calculated as the total number of deals where the acquirer’s CSR is comparable with the target’s CSR as 
a percentage of the total number of deals in the sample, i.e. (121+108+129)/842=41.568% 
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Table 3.6: Compatibility matrix analysis for deal completion likelihood according to CSR score tertiles 
The acquirers are sorted into 3 subgroups according to the order of acquirer CSR scores, acquirers that fall into the first (top) 
tertile are defined as ‘high CSR acquirer’, the second (medium) tertile acquirers are ‘medium CSR acquirer’ and the third 
(bottom) tertile acquirers are ‘low CSR acquirer’. Targets are categorized into ‘high CSR target’, ‘medium CSR target’ and 
‘low CSR target’ analogously. The ‘high CSR acquirer’ group is then partitioned into three subsamples according to target 
CSR scores, i.e. ‘high CSR acquirer-high CSR target’, ‘high CSR acquirer-medium CSR target’ and ‘high CSR acquirer-low 
CSR target’. ‘Medium CSR acquirer’ and ‘low CSR acquirer’ are partitioned comparably, which enables me to obtain 9 
subsamples indicating various acquirer-target combinations based on CSR score. The number in each column shows the total 
number of initiated M&A deals, including both completed and withdrawn deals. The matrix shows that more M&A deals are 
initiated for firms with higher CSR proximity between an acquirer and a target. 
 
    Target 
Total     High Medium Low 
Acquirer 
High 121 87 73 281 
Medium 90 108 83 281 
Low 71 80 129 280 
Total 282 275 285 842 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.7: Completion percentage according to CSR score tertiles 
 
Analogously the subsampling technique in Table 6, in Table 7, I calculate the percentage of completed deals for each of the 
columns in Table 6. The highest completion percentage falls in ‘high CSR acquirer-high CSR target’ subgroup. ‘Low CSR 
acquirer-low CSR target’ combination has the lowest completion rate. In general, Table 7 exhibits a positive association 
between acquirer CSR score and completion of a deal. 
 
    Target 
    High Medium Low 
Acquirer 
High 92.562% 91.954% 87.671% 
Medium 92.222% 84.259% 81.928% 
Low 80.282% 87.500% 76.744% 
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3.6.3. ATCD and the completion likelihood of M&A deals 
In the previous section, I demonstrated that over 40% of the completed M&A deals are between 
pairs of acquirers and targets with comparable CSR scores. In order to answer the question of 
the magnitude of this association, I proceed by investigating the impact of the between-firm 
CSR difference on M&A completion using multivariate logistic regressions.  
The dependent variable, ‘completion’, is considered to have a value of 1 if a deal is completed 
and 0 otherwise. In Table 3.8, the main independent variable is between-firm CSR difference, 
which measures the absolute ideological difference on CSR engagements between an acquirer 
and a target. All statistically significant estimated coefficients in regression specifications (1)-
(9) present us with a negative sign, suggesting an overall statistically negative relation between 
ATCD and M&A completion likelihood for the full sample and two subsamples. The levels of 
pseudo R-squares are at around 10% which is consistent with the CSR and M&A literature 
(Billett and Qian, 2008, Deng et al., 2013). Regression models (3), (6) and (9) provide the best 
explanatory power for the full sample and the two subsamples based on the log likelihood ratio. 
To measure the effect of ATCD on the M&A completion likelihood, I compute the marginal 
effects by taking the natural log of one plus the mean of each independent variable for 
regression specifications (3), (6) and (9). 
In univariate regressions of ATCD on the deal completion likelihood, I observe an 
insignificantly negative relation over the full sample, a positive and insignificant relation for 
the subsample where acquirer CSR is higher than target CSR and a significantly negative 
relation for the subsample where acquirer CSR is less than target CSR. The significantly 
negative relation in regression specification (7) indicates that the higher the acquirer-target 
divergence in terms of CSR, the lower the likelihood of deal completion, when the acquirer’s 
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CSR is worse than the target’s CSR. This could be an indication that a target with a good CSR 
score is reluctant to be controlled by an acquirer who pays less attention to CSR, or an acquirer 
who does not value social engagements is less likely invest in CSR. The former is less likely to 
be true since a disciplinary acquisition is usually depicted as a hostile deal but in my sample 
there are few hostile deals. The latter conjecture supports my previous view on acquirers’ 
preference having a more significant effect on the deal completion process. 
After controlling for the aforementioned influential deal- and firm-characteristics, the data 
shows a significantly negative relation between ATCD and deal completion likelihood for the 
full sample and the sample where the acquirer’s CSR is better than the target’s CSR; this 
relation is insignificant for the subsample where the acquirer fares worse in terms of CSR.  
Economically, a 10% unit increase in CSR difference will lower the M&A completion 
likelihood by 8.65% for the full sample. Practically, this suggests that an increase in ATCD 
(10%) will result in a decrease in the deal completion likelihood by 8.65%. This becomes more 
pronounced for the subsample where the acquirer’s CSR is greater than the target’s CSR, as 
demonstrated by an increased ratio of 9.06%. Again, this could be attributed to a low CSR 
acquirer not considering CSR an advantage of the target or because a high CSR target does not 
trust an acquirer who is performing poorly in social and ethical aspects.  
An additional variable to that may have an effect on deal completion is the acquirer CSR (Deng 
et al., 2013). For the full sample and the subsample where the acquirer is paying more attention 
to CSR than the target, ATCD and acquirer’s CSR both significantly influence the probability 
of deal completion, with a negative and positive change respectively. Furthermore, when 
measuring the magnitude of their impacts, ATCD has a larger coefficient which is more 
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significant than acquirer CSR score. This finding extends the findings of prior literature on 
influential factors of the M&As deal completion.  
To explain which CSR dimensions influence the merger completion likelihood, I further break 
down CSR engagements into six dimensions as specified by KLD. In Table 3.9, I regress the 
merger completion likelihood on six major CSR dimensions and other acquirer and deal 
characteristics as specified. Among various CSR issues, employee relations are found to be the 
most influential for the merger completion likelihood. Coefficient signs are all negative for all 
dimensions except for community, which indicates a negative relation between differences in 
acquirer-target CSR dimensions and deal completion likelihood. 
From the above findings, I conclude that greater CSR affinity increases the likelihood of 
initiating a merger and the chances of a successful merger or acquisition. A closer perception 
of CSR behaviours implies closer corporate culture. As defined by Sathe (1985), culture is ‘the 
set of important assumptions (often unstated) that members of a community share in common’. 
A firm’s culture is unique and shaped by its shareholders and stakeholders’ history and 
experiences (Schein, 1985). It influences an organization at different levels, from top 
management to junior employees; it also affects numerous aspects of an organization, such as 
rules of conduct, leadership styles, administrative procedures and perceptions of the 
environment (Lorsch, 1986; Donaldson and Lorsch, 1983; Bhagat and McQuaid, 1982; 
Schwartz and Davis, 1981). With regard to the CSR aspect, this could be understood as a firm 
will not be socially and ethically responsible if its shareholders and stakeholders hold the view 
that ‘CSR is costly and does not add value to the firm’. More broadly speaking, CSR-implied 
firm culture affects all aspects of the way that the firm operates and interacts with other 
firms/organisations.  
 92 
 
As firm culture exists in all levels and all aspects of a firm, it is difficult to change and modify. 
Its full potency shows when two cultures are brought into close contact and when conflicts 
happen, e.g. a merger between two firms with different cultures. For instance, it will be difficult 
to execute a deal between an acquiring firm which does not consider the environment and a 
target that invests part of its revenues in sustainability-related ways. The divergence on CSR 
aspects between the acquirer and the target will show up at the negotiation stage when planning 
a combined firm strategy and this divergence is likely to become greater as it is culturally rooted. 
Therefore, two firms with close CSR indicating a close and shared belief in culture are more 
likely to merge, given such familiarity reduce future risks and uncertainties. This ‘familiarity 
breeds investment’ concept has been documented by Huberman (2001) as ‘People simply prefer 
to invest in the familiar’. He found that the geographical distribution of the Regional Bell 
Operating Companies shows the propensity to be home based, though it conflicts the 
‘diversification rule’ of portfolio theory. It indicates investors’ preference for less risky 
investments, which, in this study, is acquiring a target with similar CSR behaviours.  
To look at one particular aspect of CSR, there exists a strong positive relations between 
employee relation ATCD and merger completion likelihood. Similar style of management will 
create ease in numerous areas of the negotiation stage, e.g. allocation of employees, strategy 
for the newly integrated firm etc. It will also create confidence in an easy post-merger 
integration to both acquirer and the target. A large divergence in employee relations indicates 
different styles of top management; it will trigger uncertainties when negotiating about 
integrating human resources at different levels, from junior staff members to top management 
team. Moreover, a bad employee relation shows a disconnection between firm leadership and 
members of staff. When the firm management is less supported by its employees, there will be 
more pressure on the deal process and, as a result, the deal is more likely to be aborted.    
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Overall, extending Deng et al. (2013)’s findings regarding M&A completion likelihood, I show 
ATCD to be a more significant determinants of in deal completion likelihood than acquirer 
CSR, at both a statistical and an economic level. A higher ATCD is associated with a lower 
likelihood of completing a deal, as well as a higher chance that the deal is withdrawn. The 2012 
PwC survey establishes the impacts of environmental, social and governance factors on 
mergers and acquisitions, with the cost and difficulty of bringing a target up to the buyer’s 
standard, and the ease of post-acquisition integration being regarded as significant 
considerations in the deal process (i.e. pre-acquisition negotiations). A large difference in their 
attitudes regarding CSR engagements implies divergence in business strategies and corporate 
culture, which becomes an impediment in completing a deal. It provides implications that while 
achieving profitability is the core motive of a merger, the management should also pay attention 
to corporate culture besides financial statements, in order to understand cultural fit at due 
diligence stage and reduce further uncertainties and risks. 
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    Table 3.8: Impact of ATCD on M&A completion likelihood 
 
The sample consists of 842 U.S. acquisitions between 1992 and 2012. I obtain the initial sample of acquisitions from Thomson Financial's Security Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum database. 
My final sample includes all acquisitions subject to the following selection criteria: (1) the deal value disclosed in SDC is greater than $1 million, (2) the acquirer controls less than 10% of the 
target's shares prior to the announcement and owns greater than 50% of the target's shares after the transaction, (3) both the acquirer and the target are publicly traded and have stock return and 
financial data available from Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat, respectively, (4) both the acquirer and the target are covered by the KLD Research & Analytics, Inc. 
(KLD) STATS database. 
Firms are divided into high, medium and low corporate social responsibility (CSR) firms according to the sample tertiles of CSR. All variables are defined in the Appendix. The symbols *, **, 
and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
Impact of CSR difference on deal completion (Logit) 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9)   
                          
  Full sample dy/dx 
Sample where acquirer CSR > target 
CSR dy/dx Sample where acquirer CSR<target CSR dy/dx 
CSR measure:                         
CSR difference 
(absolute value) 
 -0.2733 
(0.060) 
 -3.209** 
(4.103) 
 -5.352*** 
(8.096) -0.865 
1.109 
(0.487) 
 -2.698 
(2.066) 
 -6.539** 
(4.894) -0.906 
 -4.198** 
(4.529) 
 -8.578* 
(3.504) 
 -3.085 
(0.315) -0.538 
                          
Characteristics of 
Acquirer and deal                         
Acquirer CSR 
    
3.988*** 
(7.592) 0.086     
5.131* 
(2.941) 0.076     
7.117* 
(2.888) 0.065 
Financial leverage 
  
 -0.281 
(0.091) 
 -0.154 
(0.027) -0.013   
0.075 
(0.003) 
0.349 
(0.063) 0.021   
 -2.828* 
(2.717) 
 -2.741 
(2.417) -0.453 
Relative size 
  
 -0.004 
(0.013) 
 -0.005 
(0.023) 0.000   
 -0.005 
(0.014) 
 -0.001 
(0.000) 0.000   
 -0.076 
(1.486) 
 -0.074 
(1.393) -0.005 
Deal relative size 
  
 -2.513*** 
(7.322) 
 -2.451*** 
(6.834) -0.439   
 -3.106** 
(5.355) 
 -2.6644* 
(3.651) -0.461   
 -1.587 
(1.019) 
 -1.604 
(0.963) -0.191 
Market to book 
  
0.014 
(0.492) 
0.014 
(0.489) 0.001   
0.002 
(0.004) 
0.006 
(0.050) 0.000   
0.064 
(0.300) 
0.021 
(0.036) 0.001 
ROA 
  
 -5.136** 
(4.353) 
 -5.306** 
(4.556) -0.863   
 -0.261 
(0.007) 
 -0.421 
(0.016) -0.036   
 -14.287*** 
(7.782) 
 -14.223*** 
(7.487) -0.935 
Market Cap 
  
0.158 
(1.760) 
0.183 
(2.326) 0.014   
0.047 
(0.071) 
0.035 
(0.037) 0.002   
0.39* 
(3.370) 
0.443*** 
(4.114) 0.022 
Runup 
  
 -0.022 
(0.813) 
 -0.019 
(0.685) -0.002   
 -0.001 
(0.001) 
 -0.002 
(0.013) 0.000   
 -0.046 
(0.488) 
 -0.031 
(0.254) -0.002 
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Acquirer information 
asymmetry   
 -1.569 
(0.004) 
5.088 
(0.041) 0.087   
7.763 
(0.049) 
6.425 
(0.032) 0.076   
21.351 
(0.209) 
37.567 
(0.582) 0.065 
Target information 
asymmetry   
0.715 
(0.002) 
 -1.254 
(0.006) -0.164   
30.351 
(1.082) 
32.122 
(1.174) 0.076   
 -30.821 
(1.742) 
 -37.759 
(2.476) -0.935 
Intra-industry dummy 
  
 -0.134 
(0.181) 
 -0.178 
(0.313) -0.015   
 -0.183 
(0.159) 
 -0.189 
(0.167) -0.014   
 -0.58 
(1.236) 
 -0.604 
(1.303) -0.048 
Hostile dummy 
  
 -2.189*** 
(20.831) 
 -2.243*** 
(21.333) -0.387   
 -2.233*** 
(10.305) 
 -2.202*** 
(9.927) -0.351   
 -2.991*** 
(13.407) 
 -3.040*** 
(13.936) -0.527 
                          
Sample size 842 504 504   449 264 264   351 217 217   
pseudo R-square 0.0001 0.086 0.100   0.001 0.096 0.106   0.012 0.139 0.151   
Log likelihood -341.197 -177.881 -177.881   -170.865 -89.285 -89.285   -148.977 -75.465 -75.465   
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Table 3.9: Impacts of ATCD (CSR dimensions) on deal completion likelihood 
The sample consists of 504 U.S. acquisitions between 1992 and 2012. I obtain the initial sample of acquisitions from 
Thomson Financial's Security Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum database. My final sample includes all acquisitions subject 
to the following selection criteria: (1) the deal value disclosed in SDC is greater than $1 million, (2) the acquirer controls 
less than 10% of the target's shares prior to the announcement and owns greater than 50% of the target's shares after the 
transaction, (3) both the acquirer and the target are publicly traded and have stock return and financial data available from 
Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat, respectively, (4) both the acquirer and the target are covered 
by the KLD Research & Analytics, Inc. (KLD) STATS database. 
CSR measures are further classified as in six dimensions as to record any specific CSR impact on M&A deal completion 
likelihood. They are Community, Diversity, Employee relations, Environment, Product and Corporate governance. All 
variables are defined in the Appendix. The symbols *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively.  
Impacts of ATCD (CSR dimensions) on deal completion (Logit) 
  (1) 
Marginal 
effect (1): 
dy/dx 
(2) 
Marginal 
effect (2): 
dy/dx 
(3) 
Marginal 
effect (3): 
dy/dx 
    Sample where 
acquirer 
CSR > target 
CSR 
Sample where 
acquirer CSR 
< target CSR   Full Sample 
CSR measure:             
Community 
difference 
(absolute value) 
0.645 
(0.433) 0.039 
0.666 
(0.277) 0.031 
1.569 
(0.566) 0.044 
Diversity 
difference 
(absolute value) 
-0.233 
(0.123) -0.067 
-0.213 
(0.063) -0.014 
0.843 
(0.298) 0.031 
Employee 
relations 
difference 
(absolute value) 
-1.523* 
(2.641) -0.019 
-3.172** 
(5.889) -0.561 
-0.280 
(0.024) -0.017 
Environment 
difference 
(absolute value) 
-0.911 
(0.859) -0.049 
-1.821 
(1.848) -0.237 
3.017 
(1.285) 0.053 
Product difference 
(absolute value) 
-1.258 
(2.263) -0.034 
-1.334 
(1.262) -0.145 
-0.964 
(0.416) -0.079 
Corporate 
governance 
difference 
(absolute value) 
-0.609 
(0.452) -0.058 
-1.397 
(0.947) -0.156 
1.422 
(0.693) 0.042 
        
Characteristics of 
Acquirer and deal       
Acquirer CSR 3.270** 
(4.399) 0.086 
4.151* 
(2.735) 0.065 
10.834** 
(6.031) 0.056 
Financial leverage -0.298 
(0.095) -0.066 
0.126 
(0.007) 0.007 
-2.905 
(2.552) -0.465 
Relative size 0.002 
(0.007) 0.071 
0.007 
(0.028) 0.000 
-0.092 
(2.007) -0.005 
Deal relative size -2.695*** 
(7.839) -0.102 
-3.418** 
(5.535) -0.617 
-1.916 
(1.209) -0.232 
Market to book 0.015 
(0.517) 0.071 
0.006 
(0.046) 0.000 
0.044 
(0.120) 0.002 
ROA -5.394** 
(4.850) -0.689 
-0.722 
(0.044) -0.061 
-15.642*** 
(8.405) -0.944 
Market Cap 0.204 
(2.512) 0.015 
0.170 
(0.655) 0.010 
0.281 
(1.146) 0.013 
Runup -0.021 
(0.720) -0.002 
0.000 
(0.000) 0.000 
-0.031 
(0.170) -0.002 
Acquirer 
information 
asymmetry 
0.434 
(0.000) 0.029 
8.632 
(0.050) 0.066 
29.368 
(0.356) 0.056 
Target 
information 
asymmetry 
-0.259 
(0.000) -0.023 
34.088 
(1.226) 0.066 
-37.998 
(2.377) -0.944 
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Intra_industry 
dummy 
-0.157 
(0.243) -0.013 
-0.097 
(0.041) -0.006 
-0.699 
(1.672) -0.051 
Hostile dummy -2.107*** 
(19.392) -0.351 
-1.917*** 
(6.698) -0.258 
-3.318*** 
(15.318) -0.566 
        
Sample size 504  264  217  
pseudo R-square 0.100  0.129  0.168  
Log likelihood -177.881  -89.285  -75.465  
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3.7. Robustness tests 
3.7.1. Industry based impacts on KLD ratings 
For the purpose of ensuring the accuracy and consistency of the results, I perform robustness 
checks by adjusting the CSR score per industry and conduct analysis on adjusted CSR scores. 
CSR scores, as the most important independent variable in my research, are reviewed and 
assigned by KLD analytics on a yearly basis. Though it is the most widely used source for CSR 
ratings, the agent does not take into consideration any industry based impact when assigning a 
score to a firm. This may cause a bias amongst firms in different industries, e.g. it may not be 
at an equivalent ease for a paper mill to have an equivalent CSR score with a bank due to 
industry effects. To control for industry effect in my analysis, I factor industry effects out of 
CSR scores and repeat all estimations. To establish the CSR score sans industry effects, I 
subtract the mean industry CSR score in each calendar year (Table 3.10) from the raw CSR 
score of firms in the respective industry. This normalization mitigates any industry based 
impact on CSR ratings. 
 After adjusting acquirers’ and target’s CSR scores for industry effects, I obtain a new set of 
aggregated strength (AGGS), aggregated concerns (AGGC) and CSR scores (the difference 
between AGGS and AGGC) for acquirers and targets. This enables me to remove industry 
effects when calculating a new series of AGGS difference, AGGC difference and CSR 
difference. Comparing with pre-adjustment CSR scores, the post-adjustment scores (acquirer 
CSR and target CSR) become higher since all the average industry CSR scores are negative (as 
seen in Table 3.10). This is common when calculating (AGGS-AGGC) scores in the literature 
(see e.g. Mattingly and Berman, 2006). Therefore, the industry adjusted CSR scores are more 
reliable after compensating for the industry effect, e.g. the first and second highest CSR scores 
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are in the financial industry (SIC code 60-69) and Wholesale Trade and Retail Trade industry 
(SIC code 50-59), though the scores are negative (Table 3.10). The CSR scores for acquirers 
and targets are more evenly distributed across all industries after adjustment, while the 
difference tends to approximate a normal distribution when compared with pre-adjustment CSR 
scores.   
The main results of this chapter are based on both raw CSR scores (as per previous sections) 
and industry-adjusted CSR scores (as per this section) suggesting that they apply across all 
industries. As all results based on adjusted CSR scores are qualitatively similar to raw CSR 
scores, I do not report the industry adjusted CSR-based results. 
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Table 3.10: Industry CSR Score by year and industry (Strength, Concern and CSR score) 
 
A year-based industry CSR score is calculated by taking the average CSR scores for firms in a specified industry in each calendar year. This mean industry CSR score is then subtracted from 
each of the firms’ raw CSR to make sure that any industry based impact on CSR rating is mitigated. 
   
Industry 
(First two 
digits of 
the SIC 
code) 
Agriculture, Forestry, 
&Fisheries (01-09) 
Mineral Industries & 
Construction (10-17) Manufacturing (20-39) 
Transportation, 
Communications & Utilities 
(40-49) 
Wholesale Trade & Retail 
Trade (50-59) Financial Industry      (60-69) Service Industries (70-89) 
Year 
CSR 
Str 
CSR 
Con 
CSR 
Score 
CSR 
Str 
CSR 
Con 
CSR 
Score 
CSR 
Str 
CSR 
Con 
CSR 
Score 
CSR 
Str 
CSR 
Con 
CSR 
Score 
CSR 
Str 
CSR 
Con 
CSR 
Score 
CSR 
Str 
CSR 
Con 
CSR 
Score 
CSR 
Str 
CSR 
Con 
CSR 
Score 
1991 NA NA NA 0.027  0.040  -0.014  0.043  0.036  0.007  0.043  0.035  0.008  0.034  0.018  0.016  0.052  0.023  0.029  0.026  0.032  -0.006  
1992 NA NA NA 0.034  0.040  -0.006  0.049  0.051  -0.001  0.053  0.044  0.009  0.045  0.020  0.025  0.057  0.038  0.019  0.050  0.045  0.004  
1993 NA NA NA 0.037  0.066  -0.029  0.055  0.068  -0.014  0.059  0.057  0.002  0.052  0.038  0.014  0.064  0.049  0.015  0.049  0.047  0.002  
1994 0.056  0.028  0.028  0.042  0.093  -0.051  0.058  0.078  -0.020  0.063  0.070  -0.008  0.057  0.051  0.006  0.062  0.051  0.011  0.048  0.070  -0.022  
1995 0.061  0.028  0.033  0.048  0.103  -0.055  0.068  0.076  -0.008  0.058  0.072  -0.014  0.072  0.040  0.032  0.070  0.054  0.015  0.043  0.068  -0.024  
1996 NA NA NA 0.048  0.066  -0.018  0.071  0.058  0.013  0.055  0.049  0.007  0.066  0.035  0.032  0.064  0.039  0.025  0.035  0.046  -0.011  
1997 NA NA NA 0.063  0.086  -0.023  0.075  0.076  -0.001  0.060  0.064  -0.005  0.065  0.045  0.019  0.068  0.063  0.005  0.043  0.076  -0.033  
1998 NA NA NA 0.064  0.099  -0.035  0.076  0.077  0.000  0.058  0.073  -0.015  0.061  0.051  0.009  0.074  0.071  0.003  0.045  0.065  -0.020  
1999 NA NA NA 0.060  0.088  -0.028  0.081  0.082  -0.002  0.062  0.076  -0.013  0.055  0.049  0.007  0.078  0.076  0.002  0.049  0.057  -0.007  
2000 NA NA NA 0.052  0.083  -0.031  0.080  0.082  -0.002  0.074  0.085  -0.011  0.059  0.058  0.001  0.075  0.085  -0.010  0.050  0.062  -0.012  
2001 0.000  0.099  -0.099  0.045  0.093  -0.047  0.060  0.068  -0.008  0.050  0.072  -0.021  0.043  0.053  -0.010  0.042  0.052  -0.010  0.025  0.039  -0.014  
2002 0.000  0.123  -0.123  0.035  0.090  -0.055  0.064  0.078  -0.014  0.056  0.085  -0.030  0.043  0.054  -0.011  0.044  0.062  -0.018  0.028  0.051  -0.024  
2003 0.000  0.080  -0.080  0.022  0.059  -0.037  0.031  0.053  -0.022  0.035  0.066  -0.031  0.023  0.046  -0.023  0.035  0.041  -0.006  0.020  0.043  -0.023  
2004 0.003  0.113  -0.110  0.021  0.072  -0.051  0.035  0.072  -0.037  0.030  0.074  -0.044  0.028  0.068  -0.040  0.037  0.057  -0.020  0.024  0.059  -0.035  
2005 0.004  0.133  -0.129  0.017  0.082  -0.066  0.038  0.070  -0.031  0.031  0.080  -0.048  0.030  0.064  -0.034  0.029  0.051  -0.022  0.023  0.052  -0.029  
2006 0.016  0.145  -0.129  0.019  0.091  -0.072  0.041  0.077  -0.036  0.032  0.089  -0.058  0.033  0.074  -0.040  0.034  0.053  -0.019  0.027  0.061  -0.034  
2007 0.021  0.145  -0.124  0.021  0.095  -0.073  0.043  0.076  -0.033  0.032  0.090  -0.058  0.034  0.075  -0.042  0.031  0.053  -0.021  0.025  0.060  -0.035  
2008 0.016  0.109  -0.093  0.026  0.097  -0.071  0.044  0.080  -0.036  0.037  0.102  -0.065  0.036  0.078  -0.042  0.030  0.048  -0.018  0.025  0.065  -0.040  
2009 0.015  0.091  -0.076  0.026  0.100  -0.074  0.042  0.078  -0.036  0.039  0.101  -0.062  0.035  0.079  -0.044  0.030  0.048  -0.019  0.026  0.062  -0.037  
2010 0.052  0.150  -0.097  0.042  0.152  -0.110  0.078  0.118  -0.040  0.090  0.146  -0.056  0.077  0.103  -0.026  0.035  0.099  -0.064  0.039  0.106  -0.067  
2011 0.059  0.200  -0.141  0.042  0.170  -0.128  0.084  0.144  -0.060  0.094  0.147  -0.052  0.081  0.130  -0.049  0.036  0.125  -0.089  0.043  0.138  -0.096  
2012 0.080  0.069  0.011  0.165  0.066  0.099  0.131  0.037  0.094  0.140  0.045  0.095  0.096  0.032  0.064  0.127  0.020  0.106  0.077  0.033  0.045  
Average 0.027  0.108  -0.081  0.044  0.088  -0.044  0.061  0.074  -0.013  0.057  0.078  -0.021  0.051  0.057  -0.006  0.053  0.057  -0.004  0.037  0.061  -0.023  
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3.7.2. Intra-industry and Cross-industry deals 
Previously, when investigating the impact of ATCD on M&As, I include an intra-industry 
dummy to control for any potential industry-level effects on the M&A completion likelihood. 
In a horizontal integration where the firm acquires its target from the same industry, the deal 
completion process is significantly less complicated and will likely result in higher completion 
likelihood. In this section, I extend my investigation regarding CSR differences by comparing 
its effect on intra- and cross- industry subsamples: intra-industry subsample if both acquirer 
and target are in the same industry (if the bidder's and the target's primary 3-digit SIC code 
coincides) and cross-industry subsample if the acquirer and the target belong to different 
industries (if the bidder's and the target's primary 3-digit SIC code do not coincide). 
The main explanatory variable, CSR difference, as shown in Table 3.11, remains significantly 
negative in affecting the deal completion likelihood in both the intra-industry subsample and 
the cross-industry subsample. A 10% unit increase in ATCD is associated with a 8.86% 
increase in intra-industry deal completion likelihood, while this number declines to 7.81% in 
cross-industry subsample. In terms of the strength of the significance level, intra-industry deals 
attach more importance to between-firm CSR difference that acts as an indicator for 
compatibility of firms’ soft attributes, e.g. cultural aspects. Intra-industry integration is more 
about integrating the target into an acquirer’s own management as it acquirers or mergers 
production units which are highly similar, e.g. a firm acquirers its competitors in the same 
industry to create monopoly. Contrary to intra-industry deals, a cross-industry deal aims more 
on complementing the supply chain of a firm, which therefore has less strict requirements on 
corporate soft attributes.  Building on this rationale, concerning the ease of pre- and/or post-
integration process, between-firm CSR difference plays a more important role in intra-industry 
deals.  
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Unlike previous literature pointing out a consistent positive relation between acquirer CSR and 
deal completion likelihood (Deng et al., 2013), I notice that the impact of acquirer CSR 
disappears in the cross-industry deal sample in this research. 
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Table 3.11: Impacts of CSR difference on deal completion likelihood: intra-industry and cross-industry subsamples 
The two subsamples consist of 266 and 123 U.S. acquisitions between 1992 and 2012 respectively. I obtain the initial sample 
of acquisitions from Thomson Financial's Security Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum database. My final sample includes 
all acquisitions subject to the following selection criteria: (1) the deal value disclosed in SDC is greater than $1 million, (2) 
the acquirer controls less than 10% of the target's shares prior to the announcement and owns greater than 50% of the target's 
shares after the transaction, (3) both the acquirer and the target are publicly traded and have stock return and financial data 
available from Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat, respectively, (4) both the acquirer and the 
target are covered by the KLD Research & Analytics, Inc. (KLD) STATS database. The two subsamples are built upon full 
sample deals: intra-industry subsample if the acquirer and the target are in the same industry (if the bidder's and the target's 
primary 3-digit SIC code coincides) and the cross-industry subsample if the acquirer and the target belong to different 
industries (if the bidder's and the target's primary 3-digit SIC code do not coincide). All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
The symbols *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Impacts of CSR difference on deal completion (Logit) 
  
Intra-industry deals 
Marginal effect: 
dy/dx 
Cross-industry 
deals 
Marginal effect: 
dy/dx 
  
  
CSR measure:         
CSR difference 
(absolute value) 
 -6.577** 
(4.2583) -0.886 
 -4.403* 
(2.958) -0.781 
          
Characteristics of 
Acquirer and deal         
Acquirer CSR 4.522** 
(4.0975) 0.101 
3.219 
(2.427) 0.059 
Financial leverage 0.906 
(0.4474) 0.058 
 -2.525 
(2.527) -0.389 
Relative size  -0.027 
(0.1794) -0.002 
0.002 
(0.001) 0.000 
Deal relative size  -1.752 
(1.9852) -0.294 
 -3.194** 
(4.413) -0.554 
Market to book 0.013 
(0.244) 0.001 
0.058 
(0.858) 0.003 
ROA  -4.617 
(2.401) -0.818 
 -12.927** 
(4.256) -0.938 
Market Cap 0.187 
(1.395) 0.016 
0.179 
(0.768) 0.010 
Runup  -0.012 
(0.170) -0.001 
 -0.029 
(0.732) -0.002 
Acquirer information 
asymmetry 
7.466 
(0.061) 0.102 
 -8.207 
(0.025) -0.934 
Target information 
asymmetry 
 -4.708 
(0.064) -0.824 
15.365 
(0.228) 0.062 
Hostile dummy  -1.971*** 
(9.327) -0.347 
 -2.807*** 
(12.155) -0.459 
          
Sample size 266   123   
pseudo R-square 0.0878   0.132   
Log likelihood -99.7335   -39.322   
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3.8.Summary 
This work investigates the impacts of ATCD on the likelihood of M&A events. I conclude that 
more M&A deals are initiated between an acquirer and a target with higher CSR proximity. A 
10% unit reduction on the acquirer-target CSR proximity results in a 3.67% decrease on an 
M&A’s initialization likelihood. In other words, the higher the ATCD, the lower the M&A 
likelihood, especially when the CSR divergence is centred in employee relations, environment 
and product dimensions.  
The results from deal initiations show that the closer the acquirer-target CSR proximity, the 
higher the likelihood of deal completion. The probability of completing a deal is reduced by 
8.65% if between-firm CSR difference increases by a 10% unit. Thus two firms with close CSR 
scores are more likely to merge given that such similarity brings about familiarity and trust in 
cultural and managerial aspects between them, thereby contributing to lower operating frictions 
in the deal process. I also find that the impact of acquirer CSR on deal completion disappears 
in the cross-industry sample, which was reported previously as consistently holding across the 
full sample (Deng et al., 2013). 
My findings are consistent with the 2012 PwC survey on deal initiation and completion. The 
industry has already recognized the importance of CSR engagements in a business environment, 
especially for the purposes of enhancing the reputation and brand of a firm. Apart from that, 
practitioners could further utilise CSR engagements as a means of communication, as well as 
a tool to understand a contracting party in addition to financial indicators. Connected to this 
increased importance of CSR engagements in corporate activities, future research could 
explore this relation to other areas of the market for corporate control. 
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4. THE IMPACT OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY ON M&A PREMIUM 
AND WEALTH CREATION 
4.1.Introduction 
The fundamental role of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) is to strengthen shareholder’s 
wealth and maximize firm value by creating value through operating and financial synergies, 
increased market power, tax considerations (through the change of capital structure) and 
diversifications. The question of whether M&As are value-enhancing or value-destroying has 
been studied over the past 40 years but yet there is no unanimous consensus upon this question. 
A majority of the extant literature suggests that, at best, acquiring shareholders do not lose 
around announcement time, while targets are more inclined to higher returns than acquirers 
(Travlos, 1987, Fuller et al., 2002). According to Moeller et al. (2005), acquiring firm 
shareholders suffer a 12 percent loss per dollar on average around the acquisition date. It means 
that acquiring firms lose $240 billion in total over the four-year period between 1998 and 2001.  
Most of these researches aim to identify linkages between various acquirer-, target- and deal-
characteristics and announcement time abnormal returns (CARs). These quantitative (harder) 
measures are proved to have certain impacts on acquiring CARs. For instance, the negative 
relationship between acquirer size and announcement period abnormal return has been 
identified by Moeller et al. (2004) and Gorton et al. (2009). On the target size side, research 
find that small size targets tend to provide positive abnormal returns to acquirers (Hackbarth 
and Morellec, 2008).  
More recent as well as ongoing researches have been paying more attention to qualitative 
(softer) factors impacting CARs. Masulis et al. (2007) identify two clear ways through which 
corporate governance mechanisms affect the profitability of a firm’s acquisition activities. 
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Aktas et al. (2011) and Deng et al. (2013) reveal linkages between target CSR and acquirer 
CSR and acquisition returns.  
In the paper titled ‘Do financial markets care about SRI? Evidence from mergers and 
acquisitions’ by Aktas et al. (2011), a positive relation between acquirer announcement time 
returns and the level of the target’s Intangible Value Assessment (IVA) ratings is identified. 
This result has been indicative and suggestive since in past literature acquirers are shown to 
earn at best zero return at the merger announcement time. Further to these findings, they also 
propose a ‘learning hypothesis’ to explain that ‘positive announcement returns imply that the 
acquirer learns from the target’s SRI practices’. Another paper in this area on CSR – Acquirer 
return by Deng et al. (2013), investigates whether CSR is value enhancing for acquiring firm 
shareholders through studying acquirers with different ratings from KLD Research & Analytics 
(KLD). They identified a positive relation between acquirer CSR and merger announcement 
returns, announcement returns on the value-weighted portfolio of the acquirer and the target, 
and increases in post-merger long-term operating performance. They also find that higher CSR 
acquirers take less time to complete a deal and the deal is more likely to complete. 
In this study, I will examine the contradictory predictions regarding the association between 
CSR and M&A wealth creation: M&A premium, combined CARs at deal announcement and 
acquirer long run stock returns. Results reveal that as the CSR difference between the acquirer 
and target increases, the combined entity is better off: the target receives a higher premium and 
the announcement effect to the combined entity increases. Specifically, a 10% unit increase in 
ATCD will increase the general premium paid by 3.29% and CCAR (-1, 1) by 0.589%. It 
portrays acquiring managers’ confidence in realizing more synergistic gains in such larger 
ATCD combinations as well as the market’s. This is explained as a mutual ‘learning effect’ 
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between an acquirer and a target (Aktas et al., 2011). In a longer term after deal announcement, 
I identigy a strong positive relation between ATCD and the two-year cumulative returns of the 
acquirer. This further showcases that the market is confident about the post-merger 
performance of high ATCD combinations, and the level of confidence is even stronger two 
years after the deal.  
This research offers important contributions to ongoing research in M&A wealth creation and 
responsible investments (RI) as well as to practitioners in such areas. First, to the best of my 
knowledge, this study is the first to investigate acquirer-target qualitative measure differentials 
in influencing acquisition premiums and combined entity CARs. Previously Aktas et al. (2011) 
and Deng et al. (2013) both discussed CSR impacts on M&A returns from a target or an 
acquirer only perspective. I argue that CSR difference between an acquirer and a target may be 
even more important as ATCD represents the differences between the acquirer and the target 
in the deal process. This is interpreted in signalling theory as the receiver of the signal making 
a difference as to how much the signal could be understood. I fill the gap in the literature with 
regards to signalling theory in this chapter 6 . Second, it provides a new and innovative 
perspective when considering M&A benefits in due diligence. In addition to acquirer- and 
target- features, features of acquirer-target difference may create synergistic gains as well. It is 
my understanding this is revealing for both academic researchers and practitioners. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Background information regarding 
M&A wealth creation and the ‘learning effect’ will be introduced in section 4.2, alongside the 
development of hypotheses based on those. Section 4.3 describes the data, provides summary 
                                                 
6 See section 1.1 for a detailed discussion and relevant references on signalling theory. 
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statistics for the variables of interest, and outline the empirical methodology. Section 4.4 
specifies the control variables and the correlation matrix and section 4.5 presents research 
models on the impacts of ATCD on acquisition premiums and combined cumulative abnormal 
returns. I present and discuss the empirical results in section 4.5. Section 4.6 summarizes and 
concludes the paper. 
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4.2.Background and development of hypotheses 
4.2.1. M&A wealth creation and ‘learning effect’ 
There has been a large amount of research into the wealth creation effect of M&As. 
Determinants that have been identified as acquirers financial indicators, acquirers corporate 
governance aspects, size of the deal and market sentiment. There is little research that measures 
acquirer or target qualitative aspects and investigates their impact on the deal wealth creation 
and long run performance. 
Moeller et al. (2004) identify the existence of a size effect in acquirer announcement returns. 
This size effect suggests that there is a negative relation between acquirer returns and the size 
of the target - approximately two percentage higher returns for small acquirers. This has been 
attributed to managerial hubris, which suggests that the management of large firms pays higher 
acquisition premiums. Later Moeller et al. (2005) supported this result with new evidence, 
again finding that large firms destroy shareholder value with 1.55 percent lower in the 
announcement period abnormal returns than comparable transactions made by small firms for 
a sample between 1980 and 2001.  
This negative relation between acquirer returns and deal size has been further studied by Gorton 
et al. (2009) who demonstrate a negative relationship too and present a dual explanation. Firstly, 
since managerial bonuses and compensations are frequently related to the size of the deal, 
managers are more inclined to be motivated by large size deals and this has been exacerbated 
by the classic agency conflicts. Second, takeover targets intentionally to make themselves more 
attractive in order to obtain a better price, by positioning themselves as commanding a large 
market share and being big entities. This is because a firm with a larger market share has a 
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stronger pricing power and market power, which helps the target to maximize their negotiating 
position.  
Relative target size has also been found to play a role in influencing acquirer returns. Hackbarth 
and Morellec (2008) find that a larger target size (the larger the size of a deal) or relative size 
to the acquirer (the larger the size of a deal to the acquirer’s size) will result in a lower post-
merger stock price of the acquiring firm. Frick and Torres (2002) report an average 39 percent 
annual total return of high-tech firms who acquire targets whose size is roughly 1 percent of 
their market value. Given the above evidence related to target size and target relative size 
impacting acquisition returns, I will control for both those variables in further research (see 
below sections) on M&A wealth effects. 
Given that corporate governance is highly correlated with firm value and firm investment 
opportunities, it is worth investigating that how or through which channel corporate governance 
mechanisms can influence wealth effects of such corporate acquisitions. A major consideration 
in answering this question is the trigger of agency problem. Masulis et al. (2007) identify two 
clear ways through which corporate governance mechanism affect the profitability of a firm’s 
acquisition activities. Their methodology controls for CEO quality and uses both GIM7 and 
BCF8 indices as explanatory variables. However, all acquirers are large listed firms with stock 
prices on CRSP in my sample and all deal values are above $1 million. Moreover, in order to 
be included in the final sample, all acquirers and targets are large listed firms since KLD scores 
only large U.S. listed firms and a few Canadians. Given that all firms in my sample are large 
                                                 
7 A broad-based governance index constructed by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick. 
8 The E-index by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell. 
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listed U.S. firms, I assume that their corporate governance should be at a very reasonable level. 
For this reason, we don’t control for corporate governance. 
Assessing whether SRI enhances or destroys value, Aktas et al. (2011) identify a positive 
association between acquirer announcement time gains and the level of the target’s social and 
environmental risk management. They utilize Innovest’s Intangible Value Assessment (IVA) 
ratings as a measure of a firm’s ability to deal with social and environmental risks. They 
conclude that social and ethical engagements add value for firms by revealing that stock market 
rewards the acquirer for making socially and environmentally responsible investments. To 
explain their sets of findings, they investigate changes of acquirers IVA ratings following 
acquisitions. An increase in environmental and social performance following the acquisition of 
SRI-aware targets has been documented. It helps to complement the hypothesis of acquirer 
learning from the target’s SRI practices and experience (Aktas et al., 2011). 
In the following year, Deng et al. (2013) extended the sample coverage by employing KLD 
social rating and this results in a final sample of 1556 successful acquisitions made by 801 
firms. Using this larger sample, they expanded the research on acquirer CSR engagements’ 
influence on acquisitions’ wealth effects and acquisitions’ completion likelihood. In 
comparison to low CSR acquirers, acquisitions by high CSR acquirers result in: greater 
announcement time stock returns for the acquiring firm; value-weighted portfolios of both 
firms increasing in long-term operating performance and stock returns; both a higher likelihood 
and a shorter duration for deal completion. Their results support the shareholder maximization 
view outlined by shareholder theory.  
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As shown in the above two papers, acquirer returns are positively correlated with both acquirer 
CSR and target CSR; I will control for both acquirer and target standalone CSR as well as 
ATCD in announcement time return studies.  
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4.2.2. Development of Hypotheses 
Extending from Aktas et al. (2011)’s learning effect which describes acquirers’ improvements 
in social ratings after acquiring a good CSR target, it suggests that the market encourages social 
and ethical engagements. When an acquirer and its target have contrasting CSR images, there 
will be a mutual learning potential and therefore a greater potential contribution to both the 
industry and society as a whole. Though the integration process might experience more 
difficulties as it requires more negotiations between the two firms, the generally higher 
synergistic gains will be the reward for such an innovative combination. This is defined as 
‘knowledge transfer’ by Vaara et al. (2012). Their study elucidates various impacts of national 
and organizational cultural differences on international acquisitions. They find that both 
organizational and national cultural differences are positively associated with knowledge 
transfer. 
Except for the paper by Aktas et al. (2011), there is little research conducted into the 
investigation of a potential learning effect in the field of M&As. By using the difference 
between an acquirer and its target, this research will study the linkage between ATCD and 
premium, announcement time return and long run return as well as extend research on the 
‘learning effect’. 
As discussed, organizational cultural differences are positively linked with knowledge transfer 
and learning effects. On expectation of such lifting effects and associated synergistic gains, 
acquiring managers are inclined to pay a higher acquisition premium as it is a positive function 
of the expected synergy. Hypothesis I conjectures a positive association between ATCD and 
acquisition premiums: 
The higher the ATCD, the higher the acquisition premium.  
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Acquiring managers show their confidence in the performance of the combined entity by 
projecting a higher payable premium at the announcement time. It delivers a signal to the 
market participants: a higher difference in acquirer-target current business strategies/culture 
will benefit the combined entity by encouraging a mutual learning between the contracting 
parties, though the integration process may not be easy. Abnormal returns will be awarded to 
those firms who would make steps toward business innovations. If the market agrees with the 
acquiring mangers on this, I expect to observe a higher combined announcement cumulative 
abnormal return. Hence, Hypothesis II conjecture is:  
The higher the ATCD, the higher the combined announcement time abnormal return of an 
acquirer and a target. 
While CSR is argued to impact on announcement time returns of an acquiring firm, it has also 
been identified to have financial effects in the long run (Oikonomou et al., 2014). In addition 
to studying announcement time returns, investigations on the long run acquiring firm 
performance provide key, additional insights towards the understanding of strategic 
implications of CSR impacts on post-merger integration. By refining our understanding of the 
long run acquisition wealth effects, we can better identify the impacts of CSR on corporate 
investment decisions. 
In addition to providing more useful information to corporate management as well as the 
market, studying acquiring firm long run performance also provides help in justifying the study 
of premium and announcement time returns, by answering whether the premium payment will 
pay off and the existence of synergistic gains for the acquirer. The information users could use 
the research results to make more informed decisions in further business scenarios. In 
Hypotheses I and II, I have conjectured a positive relation between ATCD and acquisition 
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premiums and announcement time combined abnormal returns of an acquirer and a target. It is 
clearly demonstrated that the market shows a positive attitude towards mergers of two firms of 
contrasting CSR image for a mutual learning effect which contributes to the society as a whole. 
Further to Hypotheses I and II, I expect to see a positive relation between ATCD and long run 
acquirer returns, which leads to Hypothesis III: 
The higher the ATCD, the higher the long run stock return of an acquirer. 
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4.3.Data, summary statistics and specification of control variables 
Sample selection procedures in this chapter are similar to the previous chapter. Due to the 
purpose of the research in this chapter I use only the deal sample, with the non-deal sample 
being excluded. The sample selection criteria and sample construction procedures have been 
outlined in the previous chapter, but for the convenience of readers, I will reemphasise data 
sources, summary statistics and empirical methodology in a following part. 
The initial sample of M&A deals comes from Thomson Financial SDC and consists of both 
completed and withdrawn deals between 1992 and 2012. As described in previous chapters, I 
follow conventional data criteria of M&A research (Fuller et al., 2002, Harford, 2005, Deng et 
al., 2013). Detailed sample selection criteria and procedures are specified in Section 3.4.  
Premiums, acquirer announcement time returns (CAR (-1, 1)), target announcement time return 
(CAR (-1, 1)) and acquirer one year and two-year stock return data are extracted from databases 
only for the use of this chapter. Deal premiums data are from Thomson Financial SDC, whereas 
raw data of returns are from CRSP. For the convenience of readers, in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, I 
will present summary statistics for the data on acquisition returns, along with other deal 
statistics. Table 4.1 presents the distribution of sampled M&As according to acquirer industry 
and year. For visualization of this table by year, please take a look at Figure 3.e as identical 
deals are included in this chapter. Table 4.2 presents summary statistics for all variables for 
further research in this chapter. 
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Table 4.1: Sample distribution by Year and Industry 
 
The sample consists of 842 completed and withdrawn U.S. and Canadian M&A deals between 1992 and 2012. The initial sample of M&A 
deals comes from Thomson Financial SDC, whilst the final sample includes all deals that meet the following selection criteria: (1) acquirers 
and targets are both publicly traded firms in the U.S. or Canada, (2) the deal value is at least $1 million, (3) the acquirer owns less than 10% 
of target shares prior to the acquisition announcement and more than 50% after the transaction, (4) deal type does not include spin-offs, 
recapitalizations, self-tender offers, repurchases, minority stake purchases, acquisitions of remaining interest, exchange offers or 
privatizations, (5) both acquirers and targets are covered by the KLD Research & Analytics, Inc. (KLD) STATS database, (6) both 
acquirers’ and targets’ data are available from the Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) as well as Standard & Poor’s Compustat 
North America database. 
 
Acquirer 
Industry 
(First two 
digits of the 
SIC code) 
Agriculture, 
Forestry, 
&Fisheries 
(01-09) 
Mineral 
Industries & 
Construction  
(10-17) 
Manufacturing  
(20-39) 
Transportation, 
Communications 
& Utilities  
(40-49) 
Wholesale 
Trade & 
Retail 
Trade 
(50-59) 
Financial 
Industry      
(60-69) 
Service 
Industries 
(70-89) Total 
1992   1  1 1  3 
1993  1 1 3    5 
1994   5 3  1 1 10 
1995   5 1  4 1 11 
1996  2 4 7   1 14 
1997  1 5 4  7  17 
1998  3 10 3 2 11 1 30 
1999  3 11 12  2  28 
2000 1 1 8 3  5 1 19 
2001  2 6   4  12 
2002   4 2 1 1  8 
2003  1 5 1  5 4 16 
2004  6 25 4 3 35 19 92 
2005  5 37 10 4 15 8 79 
2006 1 9 34 8 7 26 21 106 
2007  7 32 4 11 28 17 99 
2008  7 23 9 4 8 15 66 
2009  5 27 4 1 7 7 51 
2010  5 37 7 3 10 13 75 
2011  4 17 6 2 12 6 47 
2012  2 26 5 3 14 4 54 
Total 2 64 323 96 42 196 119 842 
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Table 4.2: Summary statistics 
 
The sample consists of 842 completed and withdrawn U.S. and Canadian M&A deals between 1992 and 2012. The initial sample of M&A 
deals comes from Thomson Financial SDC and consists of both completed and withdrawn deals between 1992 and 2012. This sample is 
partitioned into two subsamples (Large ATCD and Small ATCD) based on the sample median of the variable between-firm CSR 
difference. This table provides summary statistics for the full sample and those two subsamples, as well as tests of difference of key 
variables between large and small ATCD subsamples. 
 
Variable 
Full Sample 
(N=842) 
Subsample of Large 
CSR Distance: A 
(N=422) 
Subsample of Small 
CSR Distance: B 
(N=420) 
Test of Difference 
(A-B) 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
CSR difference measure                 
CSR Distance 0.088 0.063 0.146 0.118 0.030 0.029 0.116*** 0.089*** 
                  
Acquirer Characteristics                 
CSR -0.025 -0.033 -0.011 -0.026 -0.038 -0.033 0.027*** 0.007 
Collateral 0.236 0.141 0.241 0.140 0.231 0.142 0.009 -0.002 
Financial leverage 0.257 0.223 0.254 0.218 0.261 0.231 -0.007 -0.014 
ROA 0.047 0.044 0.054 0.050 0.040 0.037 0.014** 0.013*** 
Market cap 8.830 8.704 9.158 9.180 8.503 8.330 0.656*** 0.851*** 
Market to book 3.510 2.435 3.422 2.533 3.598 2.332 -0.176 0.201* 
Runup -1.236 -0.362 -1.164 -0.367 -1.315 -0.355 0.152 -0.013 
Acquirer information 
asymmetry 0.018 0.016 0.017 0.015 0.018 0.016  -0.002** -0.001 
Hightec (dummy) 0.444 0.000 0.467 0.000 0.421 0.000 0.045 0.000 
                  
Target Characteristics                 
CSR -0.044 -0.042 -0.046 -0.056 -0.042 -0.036 -0.004  -0.052** 
Collateral 0.247 0.133 0.237 0.137 0.258 0.131 -0.020 0.006 
Financial leverage 0.281 0.227 0.272 0.209 0.289 0.242 -0.017  -0.033** 
ROA 0.010 0.027 0.011 0.029 0.009 0.025 0.002 0.005 
Market cap 7.076 6.967 7.183 7.055 6.968 6.855 0.215** 0.200 
Market to book 2.689 2.116 2.491 2.143 2.890 2.097 -0.398 0.046 
Target information 
asymmetry 0.024 0.021 0.024 0.021 0.024 0.021 0.000 0.000 
Hightec (dummy) 0.444 0.000 0.479 0.000 0.410 0.000 0.069** 0.000** 
                  
Deal Characteristics                 
Relative deal size 0.280 0.242 0.267 0.214 0.294 0.270  -0.027*  -0.056** 
Intra-industry (dummy) 0.545 1.000 0.526 1.000 0.564 1.000 -0.038 0.000 
Hostile (dummy) 0.045 0.000 0.045 0.000 0.045 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Percentage of stock 
payment 0.429 0.391 0.390 0.218 0.467 0.476  -0.077***  -0.258*** 
         
 
 119 
 
4.4.Specification of control variables and the correlation matrix 
In both the general literature review and the background introduction part, I have extensively 
discussed the extant literature with regards to acquisition premiums and acquisition wealth 
effects. I select documented acquirer-, target-, and deal- characteristics as control variables in 
the research framework, in order to control for the influence of these identified independent 
variables on the dependent variable9.  
Before moving forward to present the results, it would be worth presenting Table 4.3, a 
correlation matrix of all dependent and independent variables to demonstrate that correlation 
between any two variables. There are 12 pairs of correlation coefficients that exceed 30%, but 
are below 50%. They are acquirer collateral-acquirer financial leverage (31.9%), target 
collateral-acquirer financial leverage (37.9%), acquirer financial leverage-target collateral 
(33.0%), acquirer market capitalization-acquirer information asymmetry  (-40.4%), acquirer 
market capitalization-target market capitalization (45.8%), acquirer market capitalization-
relative deal size (-48.9%), acquirer information asymmetry-target information asymmetry 
(48.9%), target ROA-target information asymmetry (-34.8%), target information asymmetry-
target market capitalization (-37.2%), target market capitalization-relative deal size (30.8%), 
target market capitalization-percentage of stock payment(30.9%), relative deal size- percentage 
of stock payment (30.1%). There are two correlation coefficients above 50%: acquirer 
collateral-target collateral (80.8%), and acquirer hightec dummy-target hightec dummy 
(77.4%).  
                                                 
9 Please read general literature review section and background section in this chapter for specification of control 
variables. 
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For the nature of this research, the two highly correlated pairs have to be included in one 
regression for completeness and accuracy purposes. As mentioned in section 3.4.4, in order to 
detect multicollinearity issues, following Belsley et al. (1980), I conduct collinearity 
diagnostics for each regression analysis in this chapter to ensure there is no potential 
multicollinearity problem. I apply their methods in SAS (COLLIN function) when conducting 
each regression analysis as outlined by Freund and Littell (1986). Essentially, this method is 
about calculating ‘the condition indices’ in SAS using COLLIN function. Belsey et al. (1980) 
suggest that, when this number is around 10, weak dependencies might be starting to affect the 
regression estimates. When this number is larger than 100, the estimates might have a fair 
amount of numerical error. In my regressions, the condition indices are well below 10 (the 
maximum number is 9.38), which implies multicollinearity is not a problem. 
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Table 4.3: Pearson correlation coefficients 
This correlation matrix aims to demonstrate Pearson correlation coefficients between any two variables in my sample. There are 12 pairs of correlation coefficients that exceed 30%, but are below 50%. There are two pairs of correlation coefficient that 
above 50%: acquirer collateral-target collateral (80.8%), and acquirer hightec dummy-target hightec dummy (77.4%). In order to ensure completeness of the control variable list, acquirer and target collateral, and acquirer and target hightec variables are all 
included in the research models.  
  
CSR 
Differen
ce 
A_ 
CSR 
A_ 
Collater
al 
A_ 
leverage 
A_ 
ROA 
A_ 
Market 
cap 
A_ 
Market 
to book 
A_ 
Runup A_IA 
A_ 
Hightec 
(dummy) 
T_ 
CSR 
T_ 
Collateral 
T_ 
leverage 
T_ 
ROA 
T_ 
Market 
cap 
T_ 
Market 
to book T_IA 
T_ 
Hightec 
(dummy) 
Relative 
deal size 
Intra-
indust
ry(du
mmy) 
Hostile 
(dummy
) 
% of 
stock 
paym
ent 
CSR Difference 1.000                                           
A_CSR 0.397 1.000                                         
A_Collateral -0.033 -0.163 1.000                                       
A_Financial 
leverage -0.061 -0.066 0.319 1.000                                     
A_ROA 0.116 0.092 -0.010 -0.258 1.000                                   
A_Market cap 0.278 0.178 -0.066 -0.164 0.278 1.000                                 
A_Market to 
book 0.002 0.032 -0.057 0.086 0.197 0.136 1.000                               
A_Runup 0.005 0.013 0.010 -0.073 0.079 0.043 0.054 1.000                             
Acquirer 
information 
asymmetry -0.129 -0.131 0.044 0.068 -0.258 -0.404 0.020 -0.034 1.000                           
A_Hightec 
(dummy) 0.133 0.216 -0.272 -0.166 0.074 0.155 0.127 -0.076 0.118 1.000                         
T_CSR   0.164                 1.000                       
T_Collateral -0.067 -0.169 0.808 0.330 0.003 -0.109 -0.072 0.024 0.054 -0.251 -0.080 1.000                     
T_Financial 
leverage 0.003 -0.052 0.245 0.246 -0.028 0.046 -0.013 0.005 -0.006 -0.078 0.037 0.379 1.000                   
T_ROA 0.001 -0.083 0.021 0.017 0.127 0.026 0.035 -0.019 -0.228 -0.099 0.013 0.059 -0.181 1.000                 
T_Market cap 0.051 -0.017 0.142 0.060 0.071 0.458 0.048 0.063 -0.103 -0.051 0.012 0.164 -0.181 0.202 1.000               
T_Market to 
book -0.083 -0.014 -0.021 0.002 0.042 0.072 0.111 0.019 -0.023 0.095 -0.002 0.013 -0.038 0.111 0.129 1.000             
Target 
information 
asymmetry -0.001 0.023 -0.059 -0.070 -0.088 -0.070 0.016 -0.008 0.489 0.230 -0.004 -0.117 0.032 -0.348 -0.372 -0.036 1.000           
T_Hightec 
(dummy) 0.136 0.188 -0.245 -0.152 0.060 0.165 0.107 -0.095 0.111 0.774 0.011 -0.236 -0.091 -0.107 -0.086 0.076 0.246 1.000         
Relative deal 
size -0.141 -0.181 0.217 0.214 -0.173 -0.489 -0.076 0.013 0.249 -0.177 -0.027 0.247 0.021 0.138 0.308 0.031 -0.168 -0.169 1.000       
Intra-industry 
(dummy) -0.106 -0.004 0.142 0.059 -0.029 -0.120 -0.002 -0.046 0.097 -0.038 -0.015 0.138 0.049 -0.104 0.027 -0.080 0.002 -0.023 0.123 1.000     
Hostile 
(dummy) -0.052 -0.038 0.087 0.031 0.007 -0.002 0.035 0.018 0.002 -0.045 -0.056 0.081 -0.008 0.022 0.115 0.004 -0.047 -0.079 0.091 0.026 1.000   
Percentage of 
stock payment -0.177 -0.095 -0.011 0.034 -0.222 -0.119 -0.015 0.097 0.146 -0.231 0.054 0.044 0.026 0.015 0.309 0.038 -0.055 -0.259 0.301 0.104 -0.022 1.000 
 122 
 
4.5.Research models 
Research models are presented in this section to demonstrate the control variables and the types 
of regressions estimated. The reasons for the inclusion of control variables are discussed in 
section 2 (General Literature Review) and section 4.2 (Background). 
With regards to Hypothesis I, I specify the following OLS regression model I on analysing the 
relationship between ATCD and the acquisition premium. 
Model I: Impact of ATCD on acquisition premium  
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 (%) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹+𝛽2𝐴𝐶𝑂𝐿𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐿 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑅𝑂𝐸 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄 +
                                  𝛽5𝐴𝐼𝐴 + 𝛽6𝑇𝐶𝑂𝐿𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐿 + 𝛽7𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐸 + 𝛽8𝑇𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄+𝛽9𝑇𝑀𝐾𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑃 +
                                  𝛽10𝑇𝐼𝐴 + 𝛽11𝑇𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇𝐸𝐶 + 𝛽12𝐷𝑅𝐸𝐿𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽13%𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾 +
                                  𝛽14𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐷 + 𝛽15𝐻𝑂𝑆𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐸+𝛽16𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 +
                                  𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                                                           
where CSRDIFF refers to ATCD, ACOLLATERAL and TCOLLATERAL refer to acquirer 
and target collateral respectively, AROE and TROE refer to acquirer and target return on equity 
ratio respectively, ATOBINQ and TTOBINQ refer to acquirer and target Tobin q ratio 
respectively, AIA and TIA refers to acquirer information asymmetry and target information 
asymmetry respectively, TMKTCAP refers to target market capitalization, THIGHTEC refers 
to whether the target is a hightec firm, DRELSIZE refers to relative deal size, INTRAIND 
refers to intra-industry dummy, HOSTILE refers to hostile deal dummy, %STOCK refers to 
percentage of stock as payment method, and COMP refers to competition dummy. 
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The Premium 4 weeks prior to the announcement date is calculated as the premium of the offer 
price to the target’s closing stock price 4 weeks prior to the original announcement date. All 
premium data comes from Thomson Financial SDC and stock price data comes from CRSP. 
The premium is expressed as a percentage: 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 (%)
=  
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑 𝑝𝑒𝑟  𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 –  𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 4 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 4 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 
 × 100 
. 
Premium is winsorised between 0% to 200% as unrealisticly large premiums may be results of 
inaccurate recording on the database and will therefore lead to inaccurate of regression results. 
To test Hypothesis II, I develop OLS regression model II on the acquirer-target market value 
combined 3-day CAR (CCAR (-1, 1)) around the announcement time. 
Model II: Impact of ATCD on acquirer-target market value combined 3-day CAR (CCAR (-1, 
1)) around the announcement time:  
𝐶𝐶𝐴𝑅 (−1,1) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹+𝛽2𝐴𝐶𝑆𝑅 + 𝛽3𝐴𝐶𝑂𝐿𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐿 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑀𝐵 +
𝛽6𝐴𝑀𝐾𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑃 + 𝛽7𝐴𝐼𝐴 + 𝛽8𝐴𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇𝐸𝐶+𝛽9𝑇𝐶𝑆𝑅 + 𝛽10𝑇𝐶𝑂𝐿𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐿 + 𝛽11𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐴 +
𝛽12𝑇𝑀𝐵 + 𝛽13𝑇𝑀𝐾𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑃 + 𝛽14𝑇𝐼𝐴 + 𝛽15𝑇𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇𝐸𝐶+𝛽16𝐷𝑅𝐸𝐿𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽17𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐷 +
𝛽18𝐻𝑂𝑆𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐸 + 𝛽19%𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                     
where CSRDIFF refers to ATCD, ACSR and TCSR refers to acquirer and target CSR 
respectively, ACOLLATERAL refers to acquirer collateral, AROA refers to acquirer return on 
asset ratio, AMB refers to acquirer market to book ratio, AMKTCAP refers to acquirer market 
capitalization, AHIGHTEC refers to whether the acquirer is a hightec firm, DRELSIZE refers 
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to relative deal size, INTRAIND refers to the intra-industry dummy, HOSTILE refers to the 
hostile deal dummy, %STOCK refer to the percentage of stock as payment method, and AIA 
and TIA refers to acquirer information asymmetry and target information asymmetry 
respectively. 
To test for Hypothesis III, I apply OLS model III on acquirer one-year and two-year stock 
returns after the merger announcement date. In order to compare the magnitude of ATCD’s 
impact on announcement time returns and long run return, I keep all control variables the same 
with in Model II. 
Model III: Impact of ATCD on acquirer one-year and two-year stock return:  
Acquirer one (two) − year return = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹+𝛽2𝐴𝐶𝑆𝑅 + 𝛽3𝐴𝐶𝑂𝐿𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐿 +
𝛽4𝐴𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑀𝐵 + 𝛽6𝐴𝑀𝐾𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑃 + 𝛽7𝐴𝐼𝐴 + 𝛽8𝐴𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇𝐸𝐶+𝛽9𝑇𝐶𝑆𝑅 +
𝛽10𝑇𝐶𝑂𝐿𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐿 + 𝛽11𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽12𝑇𝑀𝐵 + 𝛽13𝑇𝑀𝐾𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑃 + 𝛽14𝑇𝐼𝐴 +
𝛽15𝑇𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇𝐸𝐶+𝛽16𝐷𝑅𝐸𝐿𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽17𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐷 + 𝛽18𝐻𝑂𝑆𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐸 + 𝛽19%𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾 +
𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                     
where CSRDIFF refers to ATCD, ACSR and TCSR refers to the acquirer and the target CSR 
respectively, ACOLLATERAL refers to acquirer collateral, AROA refers to acquirer return on 
asset ratio, AMB refers to acquirer market to book ratio, AMKTCAP refers to acquirer market 
capitalization, AHIGHTEC refers to whether the acquirer is a hightec firm, DRELSIZE refers 
to the relative deal size, INTRAIND refers to the intra-industry dummy, HOSTILE refers to 
the hostile deal dummy, %STOCK refer to the percentage of stock as payment method, and 
AIA and TIA refers to acquirer information asymmetry and target information asymmetry 
respectively. 
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4.6.Empirical results 
In this section, I will investigate the association between ATCD and acquisition wealth effects. 
I will start from OLS regressions with acquisition premium and acquirer-target market value 
combined 3-day CAR (CCAR) as dependent variables respectively. To further study the 
sources of wealth that have been created in the deal process, I will tabulate acquirer CAR 
(ACAR) and CCAR for three subsamples and compare: the subsample where acquirer CSR is 
higher than target, the subsample where acquirer CSR is comparable with the target’s and the 
subsample where acquirer CSR is lower than the target’s.  
4.6.1. Acquisition premium 
As acquisition premium is the amount of money paid on top of the market value of a target, 
acquiring managers clearly expect important performance enhancing synergies from the 
combined entity if they pay a large premium to acquire a firm (Krishnan et al, 2007). The 
synergy comes from either an acquiring firm having an opportunity to learn from a target 
(acquirer learning view) or a bad CSR target being discipline and improved by an acquirer 
(target disciplined view). Both of these two scenarios will result in a synergy gain in the 
combined entity. In this section, I will 1) explore an association between ATCD and acquisition 
premium and 2) distinguish between acquirer learning view and target disciplined view. 
For the full sample, in controlling for all known the acquirer, the target and the deal 
characteristics, I recognize that ATCD plays a positive role in influencing acquisition premium. 
Regression results (Table 4.4) show that acquirers pay a higher acquisition premiums when 
their target takes very different actions in social and ethical engagements from them. A 10% 
unit increase in ATCD will increase the general premium paid by 3.29%. When breaking down 
CSR engagements to 6 dimensions (Community, Diversity, Employee relations, Environment, 
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Product and Corporate governance), this association between acquirer-target CSR engagement 
difference remains strongly positive in Community, Employee relations, Environment and 
Product dimensions. A 10% unit increase in ATCD of the above dimensions results in a 2.69%, 
2.28%, 2.33% and 1.43% increase of the acquisition premium respectively. 
To further explore the aforementioned acquirer learning view and target discipline view in 
explaining this positive linkage, I create two subsamples where the acquirer CSR is higher than 
the target CSR and where the acquirer CSR is less than the target CSR. In the first subsample 
where the acquirer possesses a position in disciplining target regarding CSR engagements, the 
positive association holds and becomes even stronger than in the full sample. There is a 3.44% 
increase in premium as a result of a 10% unit increase in ATCD as an overall result. In breaking 
down dimensions, CSR difference in Employee relations, Environment and Product 
dimensions is accompanied by a 2.85%, 2.84% and 2.1% increase in premium respectively. 
However, when it comes to the subsample where the acquirer CSR is less than the target CSR, 
ATCD loses its impacts on the acquisition premium. 
I believe this positive linkage between ATCD and the acquisition premium is highly related to 
a mutual ‘learning effect’ in the context of corporate social responsibility involvements. Often 
the potential synergies from acquisitions are based on integrating the intangible assets of the 
two firms. Hence managers search for means to create synergies that can be implemented 
relatively easily and are visible to investors. As social and ethical engagements are largely 
advertised on social media to improve firm image, integration of two firms with different CSR 
engagements portrays a clear and direct signal to the market that there will be an improvement 
in the intangible assets of the combined entity (e.g. firm image).  
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Subsample results suggest that the target discipline view can explain the strongly positive 
relation and the mutual ‘learning effect’. Inefficient management of resources will lead to an 
increased likelihood of the target being acquired and disciplined by a more efficient 
management. In the context of corporate social responsibility, an acquirer would more likely 
pay more premium to acquire a target with better potential to create more synergies (e.g. a 
higher ATCD indicates a larger improvement in firm image and thus a higher synergy).  This 
is because an acquirer is at a stronger position than a target in influencing the business strategies 
of the combined entity. The combined entity is more likely to operate with an improved CSR 
image when the acquiring firm has a better CSR than the target.  
The coefficients of the control variables presented in Table 4.4 are mostly consistent with the 
extant literature. I observe that acquirers pay higher premium to targets with higher Tobin Q 
and smaller sized firm in terms of market capitalization. It indicates that acquiring managers 
think larger deals will less likely deliver the assumed synergy gain as they are too big to succeed, 
as pointed out also by Alexandridis et al (2012). Targets with higher information asymmetry 
are paid higher premium because it is more difficult to examine the true value of such targets. 
Whether a target is a hightec firm does not seem to influence an acquirer’s decision on the 
premium paid. The percentage of stock payment is negatively related to the acquisition 
premium. The intra-industry dummy has some minor influence on premium payment: when 
acquiring a firm from the same industry, more premiums are paid since familiarity with the 
industry increases a manager’s confidence in the anticipated synergistic gains. The competition 
dummy has a strongly positive influence on premiums: competition in M&As will result in 
paying higher premium to targets. 
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To summarize, there exists a positive relation between ATCD and acquisition premium as this 
kind of combination is expected to realize more synergies for the combined entity, e.g. 
improvements in a firm’s intangible assets. This is more likely to be explained from the point 
of view of the target being disciplined by the market for corporate control. I see that acquiring 
managers expect an important synergy from acquiring a target firm with very different CSR 
image. To assess whether the market accepts this target discipline view or not, I will proceed 
to look at market reactions (announcement time combined cumulative abnormal return) to high 
ATCD combinations. 
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Table 4.4: Impacts of ATCD on acquisition Premium 
The sample consists of 789 U.S. acquisitions between 1992 and 2012. I obtain the initial sample of acquisitions from Thomson 
Financial's Security Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum database.  
Regression specifications (1)-(3) present OLS regression results for the full sample, while columns (4)-(6) and columns (7)-
(9) present results for the subsample where acquirer CSR is better than target CSR and the subsample where acquirer CSR is 
worse than target CSR respectively. 
All variables are defined in the Appendix. The symbols *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively.  
 
   
Acquisition Premium (OLS)   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
      
  Full sample Sample where acquirer CSR > target CSR Sample where acquirer CSR<target CSR 
CSR difference 
measure 
(absolute): 
                  
CSR difference 30.823** 
(2.42) 
32.936** 
(1.98) 
  24.354 
(1.52) 
34.375* 
(1.71) 
  19.129 
(1.17) 
19.670 
(0.98) 
  
Community     26.856** 
(2.55) 
    24.541 
(1.62) 
    14.441 
(1.28) 
Diversity     0.155 
(0.03) 
    0.385 
(0.07) 
     -8.633 
(-1.28) 
Employee 
relations 
    22.763** 
(2.41) 
    28.540** 
(2.34) 
    11.11 
(1.04) 
Environment     23.252** 
(2.49) 
    28.375** 
(2.14) 
    2.643 
(0.29) 
Product     14.340* 
(1.89) 
    21.008* 
(1.91) 
    15.546 
(1.61) 
Corporate 
governance 
     -12.053 
(-1.63) 
     -15.769 
(-1.46) 
    1.644 
(0.18) 
                    
Acquirer 
Characteristics 
                  
Collateral  -3.001 
(-0.46) 
 -4.463 
(-0.65) 
 -6.625 
(-1.00) 
0.819 
(0.08) 
 -1.888 
(-0.18) 
 -1.905 
(-0.19) 
 -18.258* 
(-1.90) 
 -18.349* 
(-1.73) 
 -22.163** 
(-1.97) 
ROE  -0.355** 
(-2.48) 
 -0.706** 
(-2.41) 
 -0.628** 
(-2.35) 
0.286 
(0.13) 
 -1.849 
(-0.55) 
 -2.415 
(-0.70) 
 -0.302*** 
(-3.07) 
 -0.687** 
(-2.20) 
 -0.698** 
(-2.12) 
Tobin Q 1.660*** 
(4.45) 
1.424*** 
(3.48) 
1.696*** 
(4.07) 
1.230** 
(2.26) 
0.966 
(1.54) 
1.314** 
(2.18) 
1.954*** 
(3.49) 
1.648** 
(2.54) 
1.943*** 
(3.06) 
Acquirer 
information 
asymmetry 
  29.338 
(0.14) 
166.795 
(0.84) 
  69.048 
(0.23) 
256.889 
(0.94) 
  523.210 
(1.56) 
585.434* 
(1.73) 
                    
Target 
Characteristics 
                  
Collateral 2.455 
(0.35) 
5.521 
(0.73) 
5.764 
(0.76) 
 -0.400 
(-0.04) 
4.271 
(0.33) 
5.081 
(0.41) 
15.013 
(1.56) 
15.651 
(1.48) 
19.915* 
(1.66) 
ROE  -1.355 
(-0.53) 
 -2.671 
(-0.51) 
 -3.821 
(-0.86) 
1.954 
(1.38) 
3.437 
(1.41) 
1.371 
(0.73) 
 -2.864** 
(-2.41) 
 -5.325 
(-1.31) 
 -4.732 
(-1.18) 
Tobin Q 0.393*** 
(2.58) 
0.350** 
(2.35) 
0.292** 
(2.24) 
0.696*** 
(3.92) 
0.527*** 
(3.92) 
0.448*** 
(3.56) 
 -3.085*** 
(-3.65) 
 -3.237*** 
(-2.62) 
 -3.676*** 
(-3.01) 
Market cap  -4.609*** 
(-4.83) 
 -3.421*** 
(-3.06) 
 -5.222*** 
(-4.25) 
 -5.434*** 
(-3.98) 
 -4.692*** 
(-2.98) 
 -6.788*** 
(-4.00) 
 -2.542** 
(-2.10) 
 -0.975 
(-0.69) 
 -2.002 
(-1.24) 
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Target 
information 
asymmetry 
  464.183*** 
(2.78) 
376.083** 
(2.57) 
  569.584** 
(2.48) 
428.659** 
(2.29) 
  62.666 
(0.31) 
63.015 
(0.32) 
Hightec dummy 4.352* 
(1.78) 
2.391 
(0.84) 
2.571 
(0.92) 
2.868 
(0.79) 
 -1.162 
(-0.29) 
 -0.729 
(-0.18) 
5.163 
(1.46) 
3.972 
(0.94) 
4.972 
(1.15) 
                    
Deal 
Characteristics 
                  
Relative size  -0.098 
(-0.71) 
 -0.126 
(-0.78) 
 -0.269 
(-1.40) 
 -0.171 
(-1.42) 
 -0.230 
(-1.44) 
 -0.450*** 
(-2.98) 
 -0.004 
(-0.02) 
 -0.089 
(-0.44) 
0.036 
(0.22) 
% of stock 
payment 
 -7.824*** 
(-2.82) 
 -8.743*** 
(-2.71) 
 -5.944* 
(-1.90) 
 -8.401** 
(-2.09) 
 -12.396*** 
(-2.66) 
 -6.751 
(-1.48) 
 -7.882** 
(-2.11) 
 -10.109** 
(-2.43) 
 -8.420** 
(-2.07) 
Intra- industry 
dummy 
3.810* 
(1.73) 
3.670 
(1.43) 
4.565* 
(1.80) 
4.631 
(1.46) 
3.780 
(1.01) 
5.066 
(1.40) 
1.707 
(0.57) 
1.704 
(0.47) 
2.197 
(0.58) 
Hostile dummy 8.215 
(1.52) 
6.036 
(0.90) 
7.355 
(1.17) 
0.862 
(0.12) 
 -0.151 
(-0.02) 
2.764 
(0.35) 
14.020* 
(1.73) 
14.122 
(1.34) 
13.602 
(1.30) 
Competition 
dummy 
10.851** 
(2.26) 
13.067* 
(1.95) 
12.613** 
(2.00) 
21.527*** 
(2.85) 
26.907*** 
(2.84) 
24.375*** 
(2.89) 
0.341 
(0.08) 
 -6.490 
(-0.99) 
 -5.825 
(-0.88) 
                    
Sample size 789 608 608 423 326 326 327 249 249 
Adj. R-square 0.1011 0.1374 0.189 0.1166 0.1774 0.2413 0.0836 0.085 0.091 
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4.6.2. Combined cumulative abnormal returns (CCAR (-1, 1)) 
In the previous section, a positive relation between ATCD and the acquisition premium was 
identified. It indicates that acquiring managers anticipate greater synergistic gains when there 
are more intangible assets to be exploited regarding CSR between an acquirer and a target, 
especially when the acquirer has potential disciplinary power over its target. In this section I 
will explain the market’s opinion on this mutual ‘learning effect’ (Aktas et al., 2011): the 
market appreciates synergistic gains if the relation between ATCD and CCAR (-1, 1) is positive. 
In contrast it could be hypothesized that the market discourages collaboration between firms 
with closer CSR engagement levels as it results in a reduction of the mutual ‘learning effect’ 
and fewer opportunities for future improvements regarding corporate social ethical cultures.  
I measure abnormal returns for both acquirers and targets by estimating the market model from 
200 trading days of return data ending 11 days before the merger announcement date. The 
CRSP value-weighted return is employed as a proxy for the market return. I take three-day 
cumulative daily abnormal stock returns to obtain the cumulative abnormal return CAR (-1, 1) 
for both acquirers and targets, from one day preceding the merger announcement to one day 
after the merger announcement. CCAR (-1, 1) for the merged firm (combined cumulative 
abnormal return) is constructed by taking the market value weighted sum of the acquirer CAR 
(-1, 1) and the target CAR (-1, 1). Detailed calculation of CARs is presented in Appendix C. 
Table 4.5 presents estimates from multivariate OLS regressions using the value weighted 
combined CAR (-1, 1) as the dependent variable and ATCD as a key independent variable. I 
find that the coefficient estimates of ATCD are positive and significant at 5% level for the full 
sample (column (1)). A 10% unit increase in ATCD results in the 0.589% increase in CCAR 
(-1, 1). Even after controlling for various firm- and deal-specific characteristics including 
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acquirer and target stand-alone CSR score, the combined entity with the larger between-firm 
CSR difference realizes higher 3-day combined CARs (column (2)). This result is consistent 
with the market’s appreciation of a mutual ‘learning effect’.  
Columns (3) and (4) and columns (5) and (6) regressions show the impacts of ATCD on 
combined return two subsamples respectively. The positive significant relation in the full 
sample remains significant in both subsamples where the acquirer’s CSR is better than the 
target’s CSR and where the acquirer’s CSR is worse than the target’s CSR. The figure becomes 
more significant economically and statistically for the subsample where acquirer’s CSR is 
better; in this case the impact of a 10% unit increase in between-firm CSR difference on CCAR 
(-1, 1) rises from 0.524% full sample to 1.380%. This is also true for the larger premium paid 
when the acquirer’s CSR is better than the target’s CSR. It suggests that the market expects a 
greater mutual ‘learning effect’ benefit for the target than for its acquirer on social/ethical 
aspects. 
Acquirer standalone CSR score, identified as having a positive relation with the acquirer’s 
CAR (-1, 1) (Deng et al., 2013), presents a strong positive relation with combined CAR (-1, 1) 
in the subsample where the acquirer’s CSR is worse than the target’s. The means of payment 
in an M&A deal is one of the most important determinants of M&As’ wealth effects. A high 
percentage of stock payment is interpreted as a reflection of an overvaluation of the acquirer’s 
stock and is correspondingly associated with a decrease in the acquirer’s stock price. In Table 
4.5 regressions (1) to (6), the percentage of stock is strongly negatively related to the combined 
CAR (-1, 1) at the 1% level. Standard errors are all heteroscedasticity adjusted for coefficients 
estimation of Table 4.5.  
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Entering a contact with a firm with different CSR strategies is a big and impactful corporate 
decision as it carries a higher level of future uncertainties and risks with regards to post merger 
integration and delivering profit and benefits. As mentioned in chapter 3, two firms with greater 
ATCD are less likely to complete a deal because cultural difference and incompatibility have 
been widely reported to lead to merger failure and as a cause for poor merger performance. Not 
only regarded as an impediment in the deal process and results, a greater ATCD is also 
associated with future risk and uncertainties. In particular, the questions associated with 
integration outcomes are many because there could be so many uncertainties and unpredictable 
outcomes, both bad and good. On the other hand, uncertainties and risks also imply more 
opportunities. For instance, greater ATCD implies the existence of huge potential to learn from 
a contracting partner, from general CSR strategy to building a healthier firm image. 
As culture is as fundamental to an organization as personality is to the individual, cultural 
differences are therefore considered unmodified and incompatible between two firms. We have 
all encountered examples of successful acquisitions between two firms with different CSR 
images. An example is L’Oréal acquired the Body Shop. The Body Shop presents a firm culture 
which considers the ethics of its products (e.g. the Body Shop opposes animal testing), whilst 
L’Oréal has done little to promote its social and ethical culture. It indicates that the degree of 
culture fit will create ease for a deal but it does not necessarily mean that two firms with 
different CSR strategies will not be successful. Nevertheless, when two culturally different 
firms reach the deal stage,  it conveys the impression of ‘a genuine deal’ to the market after the 
deal buyer and seller both understand the cultural gap between them and still make a decision 
of merge. In order to create ‘the best outcome’, it will take more effort and time to bring a 
target up to the trade buyer’s standard and make two culturally different firms compatible and 
profitable. The market recognise risks in this process and encourage a premium to such 
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combinations. In this study, after controlling for various factors affecting merger returns, 
ATCD shows significant positive impacts on combined CAR (-1,1),  
To summarise, the market encourages two firms with large differences in CSR engagements to 
collaborate. Such combinations with a higher level of future uncertainties and risk are receiving 
a higher acquisition premium and a higher combined CAR (-1, 1). Though the negotiation and 
integration might be more difficult and time consuming, the financial market anticipates that 
there will be a mutual ‘learning effect’ between an acquirer and its target; therefore, such 
combination could achieve a higher social and ethical reward. 
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Table 4.5: Impacts of ATCD on acquirer-target market value combined 3-day CAR 
The sample consists of 556 U.S. acquisitions between 1992 and 2012. I obtain the initial sample of acquisitions from Thomson 
Financial's Security Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum database.  
Regression specifications (1)-(2) present OLS regression results for the full sample, while columns (3)-(4) and columns (5)-
(6) present results for the subsample where the acquirer’s CSR is better than the target’s CSR and the subsample where acquirer 
CSR is worse than target CSR respectively. 
All variables are defined in the Appendix. The symbols *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively.  
 
  Combined CAR (-1,1) (OLS)   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
Full sample 
Sample where acquirer CSR > 
target CSR 
Sample where acquirer 
CSR<target CSR 
CSR measure:             
CSR difference 
(absolute) 
5.89** 
(1.98) 
5.235* 
(1.67) 
7.459** 
(2.03) 
13.800** 
(2.42) 
2.15 
(0.38) 
10.199* 
(1.64) 
              
Acquirer 
Characteristics             
CSR 
  
0.312 
(0.12)   
 -8.404 
(-1.23)   
11.544* 
(1.82) 
Collateral 4.263** 
(2.45) 
4.224** 
(2.42) 
2.54 
(1.2) 
2.556 
(1.20) 
7.743** 
(2.28) 
8.217** 
(2.47) 
ROA  -4.509 
(-0.86) 
 -4.448 
(-0.85) 
 -5.782 
(-0.79) 
 -5.585 
(-0.75) 
 -2.291 
(-0.37) 
 -2.719 
(-0.44) 
Market to book  -0.034 
(-0.43) 
 -0.036 
(-0.45) 
 -0.065 
(-0.77) 
 -0.07 
(-0.84) 
0.219** 
(2.47) 
0.199** 
(2.29) 
Market cap  -0.488** 
(-2.02) 
 -0.479** 
(-1.97) 
 -0.155 
(-0.44) 
 -0.092 
(-0.26) 
 -0.685** 
(-2.08) 
 -0.595* 
(-1.79) 
Acquirer information 
asymmetry 
 -12.748 
(-0.30) 
 -14.478 
(-0.34) 
38.78 
(0.56) 
39.218 
(0.57) 
 -31.428 
(-0.42) 
 -0.222 
(-0.00) 
Hightec dummy  -0.082 
(-0.1) 
 -0.061 
(-0.07) 
0.533 
(0.41) 
0.712 
(0.54) 
 -0.962 
(-0.89) 
 -1.035 
(-0.98) 
              
Target Characteristics             
CSR 
  
 -3.14 
(-0.83)         
Collateral  -5.254*** 
(-2.97) 
 -5.278*** 
(-3.09) 
 -1.361 
(-0.57) 
 -1.877 
(-0.79) 
 -9.485*** 
(-2.91) 
 -9.436*** 
(-2.93) 
ROA 0.178 
(0.11) 
0.225 
(0.17) 
1.709 
(1.16) 
1.794 
(1.21) 
2.582 
(1.00) 
3.312 
(1.28) 
Market to book  -0.051 
(-1.22) 
 -0.05 
(-1.46) 
 -0.03 
(-0.91) 
 -0.031 
(-0.95) 
 -0.124*** 
(-2.68) 
 -0.144*** 
(-3.05) 
Market cap  -0.504* 
(-1.68) 
 -0.503** 
(-1.99) 
 -1.038*** 
(-2.75) 
 -1.041*** 
(-2.79) 
0.006 
(0.02) 
0.007 
(0.02) 
Target information 
asymmetry 
 -2.056 
(-0.08) 
 -1.561 
(-0.05) 
 -26.096 
(-0.58) 
 -27.03 
(-0.61) 
45.808 
(1.18) 
35.976 
(0.92) 
Hightec dummy  -1.058 
(-1.34) 
 -1.074 
(-1.30) 
 -1.97 
(-1.53) 
 -2.079 
(-1.61) 
 -0.363 
(-0.36) 
 -0.46 
(-0.47) 
              
Deal Characteristics             
Relative deal size 12.007*** 
(5.82) 
11.936*** 
(5.22) 
13.115*** 
(3.84) 
12.907*** 
(3.81) 
9.009** 
(2.48) 
8.804*** 
(2.40) 
Intra- industry dummy 0.033 
(0.06) 
0.025 
(0.05) 
0.314 
(0.43) 
0.336 
(0.46) 
0.33 
(0.41) 
0.265 
(0.33) 
Hostile dummy 1.834 
(1.37) 
1.804 
(1.46) 
1.015 
(0.53) 
0.898 
(0.47) 
2.279 
(1.3) 
2.13 
(1.16) 
% of stock payment  -4.58*** 
(-6.42) 
 -4.523*** 
(-5.99) 
 -4.325*** 
(-3.64) 
 -4.319*** 
(-3.70) 
 -4.064*** 
(-4.29) 
 -4.251*** 
(-4.41) 
              
Sample size 556 556 303 303 225 225 
R-square 0.225 0.226 0.261 0.267 0.214 0.225 
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4.6.3. Acquirer’s long run returns: one year and two years after the deal announcement 
In previous sections, I have explained the findings with regards to the acquisition premium and 
combined cumulative abnormal returns (CCAR (-1, 1)). Positive relations are reported for both 
situations: higher ATCD leads to higher premium and higher announcement time combined 
return of an acquirer and a target. I will, in this section, extend the research period to one year 
and two years after the deal announcement and report the impacts of ATCD on long run 
acquirer returns. 
Long run returns are calculated as cumulative monthly returns for 12/24 months, starting from 
the next calendar month since the deal announcement. For instance, for the deal announced on 
Feb 7th, 2007, the two year return starts to cumulate from March 2007 for 24 month. All raw 
monthly returns are extracted from CRSP. 
Results are reported in Table 4.6. The sample size is reduced from 842 acquisition deals to 579 
(one year returns) /560 (two years returns) for two reasons: firstly, there are missing returns for 
particular CUSIPs from CRSP; secondly, a few deals announced in late 2012 are not included 
in the final sample since there is no corresponding return data available by the time of the data 
extraction (July, 2014). For one year period since deal announcement, there’s not a clear 
conclusion on the relation between ACTD and acquirer’s cumulative returns. Though there is 
a weakly positive relation, it is not significant enough to reach a consensus. Over a two year 
period, this relation becomes statistically strong and economically significant: the market 
awards higher ATCD combinations with higher acquirer returns. Specifically, a 10% unit 
increase in ATCD results in a 0.348% increase in two-year acquirer’s returns. 
It portrays that the market has seen and been satisfied with the post-merger performance of 
such combinations on a continuous basis over a two year period after the deal announcement. 
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This could be due to a significant increase in the acquirer’s social and financial performance 
or the synergies from the deal. As it takes time to integrate and creating operating synergies, 
the economic magnitude becomes much more significant for the two year period than one year 
after the deal announcement.  
  
 138 
 
Table 4.6: Impacts of ATCD on long run acquirer returns 
The sample consists of 579/565 U.S. acquisitions between 1992 and 2012. I obtain the initial sample of acquisitions from 
Thomson Financial's Security Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum database.  
Regression specification (1) is the OLS regression with acquirer one year returns as dependent variable, while column (2) is 
results for acquirer two year returns as dependent variable. 
All variables are defined in the Appendix. The symbols *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively.  
 
  Acquirer Long Run Return (OLS)   
  (1)  (2)   
  One Year Return Two Year Return 
CSR measure:             
CSR difference 
(absolute) 
0.264 
(0.46) 
3.488** 
(2.54) 
  
  
-0.051 
(-0.09) 
 -0.349 
(-0.35) 
 0.013 
(0.63) 
 -0.102 
(-1.13) 
 -27.259* 
(-1.71) 
 -0.045 
(-0.11) 
  
  
 0.370 
(0.56) 
0.983** 
(2.24) 
 -0.019** 
(-2.29) 
 0.192* 
(1.93) 
 
40.133*** 
(2.86) 
 -0.180 
(-0.44) 
  
  
1.119 
(1.33) 
0.095 
(0.47) 
-0.080 
(-0.21) 
 -0.456* 
(-1.68) 
  
565 
0.060 
     
Acquirer Characteristics    
Collateral -0.167 
(-0.61) 
ROA  -0.034 
(-0.06) 
Market to book  -0.002 
(-0.24) 
Market cap  0.036 
(0.82) 
Acquirer information 
asymmetry 
 -3.458 
(-0.43) 
Hightec dummy  -0.136 
(-0.85) 
     
Target Characteristics    
Collateral  0.716** 
(2.02) 
ROA 0.512** 
(2.04) 
Market to book  -0.014 
(-1.67) 
Market cap  0.022 
(0.44) 
Target information 
asymmetry 
 10.124** 
(2.07) 
Hightec dummy  -0.129 
(-0.80) 
     
Deal Characteristics    
Relative deal size 0.832* 
(1.91) 
Intra- industry dummy -0.073 
(-0.71) 
Hostile dummy -0.416*** 
(-2.71) 
% of stock payment  -0.440*** 
(-2.97) 
     
Sample size 
579 
0.074 
R-square 
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4.7. Conclusion 
This chapter investigates the impacts of ATCD on the M&A wealth creation process. I uncover 
a positive relation between ATCD and the acquisition premium, which suggests that acquiring 
managers expect more potential synergistic gains from the integration of two firms with very 
contrasting CSR images. This is consistent with a ‘target discipline view’ when the acquirer’s 
CSR is better than the target’s CSR and the acquirer has potentially more disciplinary power 
over its target. Moreover, the financial market encourages collaboration of such combinations 
by awarding them higher announcement time cumulative abnormal returns, since this results 
in increased in mutual learning potential and a greater potential contribution to both the 
industry and society as a whole. Over a longer term (two years after the deal announcement), 
the market becomes more confident in higher ATCD combinations, compared to one year after 
the deal announcement. Specifically, a 10% unit increase in ATCD will result in an 0.348% 
increase in two-year acquirer returns. 
Though ongoing discussion suggests that organizational and/ or geographical cultural 
differences have a negative impact on M&A performance (Stahl and Voigt, 2004), my research 
provides some refreshing idea from the perspective of synergistic gains. It not only reflects 
market encouragement of the collaboration between firms with different strategies/ cultures but 
also points out a way to improve synergistic gains and performance for those combinations.  
When there are large cultural and operational differences between an acquirer and a target, it 
is naturally more difficult for them to move forward in the negotiating process. If a deal is 
completed and announced in this situation, it is very likely that the expected synergistic gain is 
higher-than-average, which is the motive for such deals. 
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This work provides new insights into why CSR engagements are material and how it is related 
to the value creation process. I also determine key areas where further research is required to 
both continue and substantiate my work, such as the impacts of ATCD on long term returns of 
the combined entity. 
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5. THE IMPACT OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY ON THE M&A 
METHOD OF PAYMENT 
5.1.Introduction 
This chapter examines whether ATCD influences the decision making of an acquisition’s 
method of payment. Existing literature has shown that various interfirm differences impact the 
acquisition integration outcomes as well as post acquisition performance (Stahl and Sitkin, 
2010). Interfirm difference results from the difference in firm ability, benevolence, integrity, 
and value congruence perceptions areas; they are proposed to converge into a generalized trust 
judgment or result in a state of ambivalence, depending on whether the trustworthiness 
attributions are consistent or conflicting. As discussed in previous chapters, CSR engagements 
portray a firm’s preferences in terms of business ethics, business strategies and culture aspects. 
Two firms that behave very differently in terms of social and ethical aspects are expected to 
experience a tough integration stage. According to Vaara et al. (2012), cultural differences at 
the organizational level are positively associated with social conflict. Owing to this, acquiring 
shareholders are less likely to want to share ownership of the combined entity with selling 
shareholders who hold different perspectives on business operations. Cash or a higher 
percentage of cash may well be chosen as the merger currency since stock payment will result 
in loss of ownership and control. 
An appropriate method of payment can help improve investment performance and hence it is 
crucial for the benefit of both acquiring and selling shareholders. It provides various 
implications to the market on how top management views the value of their firm, and the 
expected synergies from an M&A. For instance, the way firms pay delivers a candid assessment 
of a firm’s stock price. Stock payment signals overvalued stock in the market in general. There 
are many factors to be taken into consideration when an offer has been put forward, such as 
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signalling effects to the market, the target’s willingness to sell and payment preference, tax 
implications, and transaction costs if new debt is issued and the impact on the capital structure. 
First, the payment method of choice is a major signalling effect from management. More cash 
is preferred over stock to signal a greater level of confidence in realizing the benefits of an 
acquisition. This is because acquiring shareholders believe their stock will eventually be worth 
more after synergies are realized from the deal. I identified a positive linkage between ATCD 
and the acquisition premium in the previous chapter. It provides evidence of acquiring 
managers’ confidence in synergistic gains and this confidence is confirmed by the market’s 
response via a higher announcement time abnormal return of the combined entity. Hence, I 
suppose that more cash will be utilized as merger currency when ATCD becomes larger.  
Second, stock payment will lead to a dilution of the acquiring shareholder’s power and loss of 
controlling power of the combined entity, irrespective of whether there is new stock issuance 
or not. Higher percentages of cash payment will therefore be favoured when acquiring 
shareholders want to keep control of the new combined entity and maintain their leading power 
in business strategies, operations and firm culture. When selling shareholders behave very 
differently from acquiring shareholders in terms of social and ethical engagements, buying 
shareholders may want to maintain a dominant position by buying stock by cash since CSR 
differences may be deemed as impediments in business operations. 
Lastly, two firms with close CSR scores share more similarities in business ethics and this 
helps communication of trustworthiness (Kasper-Fuehrer and Ashkanasy, 2001). This valuable 
inter-organizational trust can facilitate integration in the field of organizational sciences 
(Fulmer and Gelfand, 2012). Accordingly, more stock is used as merger currency to signal the 
willingness to share future uncertainties and business risks when ATCD is small.  
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Accordingly, I examine the linkage between the choice of payment method and ATCD, using 
a sample that covers 842 M&A deals in North America from 1992 to 2012. Due to the nature 
of the KLD database, all target firms that have been included in the final sample are large listed 
firms in North America. A decision of exchanging stock will result in selling shareholders share 
ownership of an acquiring firm. Consequently, acquiring shareholders must be very careful 
with the choice of payment method to maximize shareholder returns and firm value as well as 
to maintain control of the acquiring firm. 
Preliminary findings show that firms who acquire a target with a similar CSR score are inclined 
to use the highest percentage of stock as acquisition currency. This supports the hypothesis that 
similarities and information transparency both foster mutual trust in sharing post-acquisition 
integration risks and future operating risks. Acquiring shareholders thus do not have to worry 
about the reduction of their control by paying a higher percentage of cash. 
Given the existence of this trend in univariate analysis, I further investigate the economic and 
statistical magnitude of this association between ATCD and the method of payment. After 
controlling for various acquirer-, target-, and deal characteristics, OLS regressions suggest that 
a lower percentage of stock is used as merger currency when ATCD is higher. A 10% unit 
increase in ATCD results in a 5% decrease in stock payment.  
More specifically, I define the ‘Stock-deal’ dummy as 1 if the percentage of stock payment is 
greater than 70% and 0 if the percentage of stock payment is less than 30% and use logit 
regression to investigate the marginal effect of ATCD on the ‘Stock-deal’ likelihood. Any deals 
with stock payment percentage between 30% and 70% are withdrawn from the sample. It 
reduces the sample size from 842 to 696. Results illustrate that a 10% unit increase in CSR 
difference reduces the ‘stock-deal’ likelihood by 3%. 
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This study complements the extant literature on M&A methods of payment in several ways. 
First, it makes it clear that CSR influences the choice of payment method in various ways, as 
being one of the most important soft qualitative attributes of a firm. Second, it complements 
recent evidence that inter-organization trust and corporate governance both impact the market 
for corporate control. Finally it raises the importance of CSR in influencing M&A wealth 
creation post-integration and therefore the need for practitioners to be aware of it. There is 
more to consider than financial indicators alone when making an acquisition decision.  
The reminder of this chapter is structured as follows: section 2 provides the theoretical 
framework on which this empirical work is based and the hypotheses are developed. 
Characteristics of the data, control variables and construction of research models are introduced 
in section 3. I present empirical results of various analyses in section 4 and section 5 provides 
the robustness tests that have been performed. Section 6 present a summary of my findings and 
the conclusions that are drawn from them. 
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5.2.Background and development of hypotheses 
5.2.1. Method of payment: the existing evidence 
During the past decade, there has been extensive M&A research regarding various aspects of 
M&As, e.g. takeover target prediction, method of payment, wealth effects and post-acquisition 
integration. Despite the large number of research efforts attempting to elucidate M&A 
determinants and indications, evidence still remains largely inconclusive. The subjects of 
“method of payment” and “wealth effects” attracts most attention from the academic 
community. 
Method of payment has been documented as a determinant in explaining acquiring shareholder 
returns. During the largest merger wave in the late 1990s, a positive correlation between stock 
price levels and M&A activities was observed. The majority of deals in the fifth merger wave 
chose equity as the mode of payment, and most of these equities are overpriced in comparison 
to their historical price. Under an inefficient market, assets often deviate from their underlying 
economic value, as it had been during the Internet bubble in the late 1990s, in which period 
stock market valuation were very high. Under this circumstance, overvalued firms are very 
likely to undertake M&As in order to take advantage of their overvalued equities, while 
undervalued firms or relatively less overvalued firms are more likely to become M&A targets 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). This is because acquiring firms are motivated by the opportunity 
to use overvalued assets as M&A currency in exchange for undervalued or less overvalued 
hard assets, as long as the acquirer is more highly valued than the target (Dong et al., 2006). 
This phenomenon brings us to the current situation, where overvalued bidders tend to use stock 
as method of payment as long as the targets’ equity is less overvalued (Ang and Cheng, 2003). 
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For public targets, both the method of payment itself and the signalling effect it brings will 
influence the acquirer’s returns. If a manager believes their stock price is overvalued, he will 
choose to issue stock to finance the transaction; under the assumption of information 
asymmetries, the firm will profit from such stock issuance(Myers and Majluf, 1984). However, 
over time, investors learn from the market and attempt to react to such stock issuance by selling 
their stock which will result in a fall of stock price. Applying this concept to the M&A market, 
I would observe a share price fall of acquiring firms’ right after the deal announcement because 
it signals to the market that the acquiring firm is overvalued. Therefore, some firms tend to 
choose cash as method of payment to signal their value to the market (Myers and Majluf, 1984), 
simply because investors treat stock-financing firms as overvalued ones (Shleifer and Vishny, 
2003, Esty and Megginson, 2003, Heron and Lie, 2002, Linn and Switzer, 2001, Walker, 2000). 
Another cause for the decreased share price of acquirers around merger announcements is that 
the acquirer’s announcement period gain associated with stock payment usually disappears 
within three to five years of the M&A (Black et al., 2007, Agrawal et al., 1999, Rau and 
Vermaelen, 1998, Loughran and Vijh, 1997), implying that shareholders will realize the 
greatest profit only if they sell their shares at the announcement time. Moeller et al. (2007) also 
find consistent evidence to support the equity signalling theory, showing that abnormal returns 
to acquirers are negatively related with stock offers something not true for cash offers. 
Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) suggest that if there is uncertainty of a bidder’s value, then the 
bidder makes a cash offer, and if there is uncertainty on a target’s value, stock bids are used as 
stock spreads the risk of overpayment. 
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5.2.2. Development of hypotheses 
In accordance with the previous discussion and research literature, I posit that ATCD implies 
ideological differences between two transacting parties, in terms of business strategies, 
operations, and cultural aspects. these ideological differences are well documented to have a 
negative impact on post-acquisition integration. The larger the ideological gap between an 
acquirer and a target, the more difficult the integration process will be. This is because in order 
to seamlessly integrate two firms into one, agreement in various aspects, e.g. business strategies, 
have to be reached and documented properly. Therefore, in order to minimize hassles in 
negotiating with shareholders of a contracting party and to simplify the integration process, an 
acquiring firm may choose to ‘cash out’ the target shareholders. The most straightforward 
method would be to have cash as merger currency.   
ATCD is likely to be a component in the decision making process of an acquisition’s payment 
method. Owing to its critical impacts on various aspects of the market for corporate control, 
the acquisition method of payment is one of the most important areas for academic studies in 
the M&A area and has become one of the most comprehensively explored research areas. 
Given the value of M&A transactions, the payment method and related financing decisions can 
have significant impacts on an acquirer’s ownership structure, financial leverage, subsequent 
financing decisions, and most importantly post-acquisition integration. The ownership 
structure can also have serious corporate control, future risk bearing, tax and post-acquisition 
integration implications for shareholders and stakeholders of both the buying firm and the 
selling firm. For instance, the usage of stock as an acquisition currency shows the mutual trust 
between an acquirer and a target with both agreeing to share future operating risks and 
operating performance between them. Stock payment could also convey the willingness of both 
to integrate corporate soft attributes into their own management. In this paper, I will examine 
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the impacts of ATCD on M&A payment methods on two aspects, the percentage and the 
likelihood of stock payment. 
I posit that, in a stock-for-stock exchange, the acquirer and the target show confidence in post-
acquisition operations since they agree to share future risks, benefits and uncertainties. For 
instance, if the acquirer derives a purchase price based on the realization of synergistic gains 
and those gains are not achieved, it is quite possible that the market will devalue its shares. If 
the seller’s shareholders now own some of those shares, the value of the payment to them will 
decline. Furthermore, as a result of a buyer-seller stock swap, the management of the selling 
firm would be enrolled into the buyer’s board. Thus, they would prefer to avoid stock as an 
acquisition currency so as to minimize the risk of failure during the post- acquisition integration; 
this could be inferred by the difference in corporate culture (CSR difference). Accordingly, I 
develop hypothesis I (H1) and hypothesis II (H2) as:  
H1: The higher the ATCD, the lower the percentage of stock as acquisition currency. 
H2: The higher the ATCD, the lower the likelihood of a ‘stock’ deal where over 70% of merger 
currency are in the form of stock. 
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5.3.Data, control variables and research methodology 
5.3.1. Data 
The initial sample of M&A deals comes from Thomson Financial SDC and consists of both 
completed and withdrawn deals between 1992 and 2012. As described in previous chapters, I 
follow conventional data criteria of M&A research (Fuller et al., 2002, Harford, 2005, Deng et 
al., 2013). Detailed sample selection criteria and procedures are specified in Section 3.4. 
Method of payment data are extracted from databases only for the use of this chapter; for the 
convenience of the readers, in Tables 5.1 and 5.2, I will present summary statistics for method 
of payment data, along with other deal statistics. In addition to features that have been discussed 
in previous chapters, the features regarding method of payment are very revealing and 
interesting: the payment method (variable ‘percentage of stock payment’ and ‘stock deal 
dummy’) varies from cash heavy to stock heavy as an adjustment for future uncertainties. The 
acquisition currency is more likely to be cash/has a higher percentage of cash versus stock, 
when there is a wider gap between acquirer CSR and target CSR. 
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Table 5.1: Sample distribution by Year and Industry 
 
The sample consists of 842 completed and withdrawn U.S. and Canadian M&A deals between 1992 and 2012. The initial sample of M&A 
deals comes from Thomson Financial SDC, whilst the final sample includes all deals that meets the following selection criteria: (1) 
acquirers and targets are both publicly traded firms in the U.S. or Canada, (2) the deal value is at least $1 million, (3) the acquirer owns less 
than 10% of target shares prior to the acquisition announcement and more than 50% after the transaction, (4) deal type does not include 
spin-offs, recapitalizations, self-tender offers, repurchases, minority stake purchases, acquisitions of remaining interest, exchange offers or 
privatizations, (5) both acquirers and targets are covered by the KLD Research & Analytics, Inc. (KLD) STATS database, (6) both 
acquirers’ and targets’ data are available from the Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) as well as Standard & Poor’s Compustat 
North America database. 
 
Acquirer 
Industry 
(First two 
digits of the 
SIC code) 
Agriculture, 
Forestry, 
&Fisheries 
(01-09) 
Mineral 
Industries & 
Construction  
(10-17) 
Manufacturing  
(20-39) 
Transportation, 
Communications 
& Utilities  
(40-49) 
Wholesale 
Trade & 
Retail 
Trade 
(50-59) 
Financial 
Industry      
(60-69) 
Service 
Industries 
(70-89) Total 
1992   1  1 1  3 
1993  1 1 3    5 
1994   5 3  1 1 10 
1995   5 1  4 1 11 
1996  2 4 7   1 14 
1997  1 5 4  7  17 
1998  3 10 3 2 11 1 30 
1999  3 11 12  2  28 
2000 1 1 8 3  5 1 19 
2001  2 6   4  12 
2002   4 2 1 1  8 
2003  1 5 1  5 4 16 
2004  6 25 4 3 35 19 92 
2005  5 37 10 4 15 8 79 
2006 1 9 34 8 7 26 21 106 
2007  7 32 4 11 28 17 99 
2008  7 23 9 4 8 15 66 
2009  5 27 4 1 7 7 51 
2010  5 37 7 3 10 13 75 
2011  4 17 6 2 12 6 47 
2012  2 26 5 3 14 4 54 
Total 2 64 323 96 42 196 119 842 
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Table 5.2: Summary statistics 
 
The sample consists of 842 completed and withdrawn U.S. and Canadian M&A deals between 1992 and 2012. The initial sample of M&A 
deals comes from Thomson Financial SDC and consists of both completed and withdrawn deals between 1992 and 2012. This sample is 
partitioned into two subsamples (Large ATCD and Small ATCD) based on the sample median of the variable between-firm CSR 
difference. This table provides summary statistics for the full sample and those two subsamples, as well as tests of difference of key 
variables between large and small ATCD subsamples. 
 
Variable 
Full Sample 
(N=842) 
Subsample of Large 
CSR Distance: A 
(N=422) 
Subsample of Small 
CSR Distance: B 
(N=420) 
Test of Difference 
(A-B) 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
CSR difference measure                 
CSR Distance 0.088 0.063 0.146 0.118 0.030 0.029 0.116*** 0.089*** 
                  
Acquirer Characteristics                 
CSR -0.025 -0.033 -0.011 -0.026 -0.038 -0.033 0.027*** 0.007 
Collateral 0.236 0.141 0.241 0.140 0.231 0.142 0.009 -0.002 
Financial leverage 0.257 0.223 0.254 0.218 0.261 0.231 -0.007 -0.014 
ROA 0.047 0.044 0.054 0.050 0.040 0.037 0.014** 0.013*** 
Market cap 8.830 8.704 9.158 9.180 8.503 8.330 0.656*** 0.851*** 
Market to book 3.510 2.435 3.422 2.533 3.598 2.332 -0.176 0.201* 
Runup -1.236 -0.362 -1.164 -0.367 -1.315 -0.355 0.152 -0.013 
Acquirer information 
asymmetry 0.018 0.016 0.017 0.015 0.018 0.016  -0.002** -0.001 
Hightec (dummy) 0.444 0.000 0.467 0.000 0.421 0.000 0.045 0.000 
                  
Target Characteristics                 
CSR -0.044 -0.042 -0.046 -0.056 -0.042 -0.036 -0.004  -0.052** 
Collateral 0.247 0.133 0.237 0.137 0.258 0.131 -0.020 0.006 
Financial leverage 0.281 0.227 0.272 0.209 0.289 0.242 -0.017  -0.033** 
ROA 0.010 0.027 0.011 0.029 0.009 0.025 0.002 0.005 
Market cap 7.076 6.967 7.183 7.055 6.968 6.855 0.215** 0.200 
Market to book 2.689 2.116 2.491 2.143 2.890 2.097 -0.398 0.046 
Target information 
asymmetry 0.024 0.021 0.024 0.021 0.024 0.021 0.000 0.000 
Hightec (dummy) 0.444 0.000 0.479 0.000 0.410 0.000 0.069** 0.000** 
                  
Deal Characteristics                 
Relative deal size 0.280 0.242 0.267 0.214 0.294 0.270  -0.027*  -0.056** 
Intra-industry (dummy) 0.545 1.000 0.526 1.000 0.564 1.000 -0.038 0.000 
Hostile (dummy) 0.045 0.000 0.045 0.000 0.045 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Percentage of stock 
payment 0.429 0.391 0.390 0.218 0.467 0.476  -0.077***  -0.258*** 
Stock deal (dummy) 0.421 0.000 0.373 0.000 0.471 0.000  -0.098*** 0.000***  
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5.3.2. Control variables 
The type of acquisition payment is highly related to a number of acquirer characteristics which 
are described throughout this section. Most importantly, the ability of the acquirer to obtain 
sufficient cash is crucial to support cash financed deals. Sufficient free cash flow balance by 
acquiring firms will lead to the acquisition deal being financed predominantly by cash. Cash 
payment can also be obtained by corporate debt financing, which requires the acquirer to have 
unused debt capacity. Hovakimian et al. (2001) identify a strong positive influence of a firm’s 
percentage of tangible assets on its debt level since debt holders in firms with fewer tangible 
assets are subject to greater moral hazard risk (Myers, 1977). To measure a firm’s ability to 
obtain cash and to control for a firm’s cash reserves and its debt capacity, following 
Hovakimian et al. (2001), I include dividend payout ratio, collateral and financial leverage ratio 
one year prior to acquisition announcement as control variables in the regression analysis. 
Myers and Majluf (1984) interpret acquisition payment methods as a signal of a bidder’s asset 
valuation by developing a framework based on the existence of asymmetric information. The 
asymmetric information theory posits that the information between a firm’s management and 
market participants is asymmetric. Based on this theory, they conclude that different methods 
of payment employed in M&As signal different types of valuable information to the market 
participants. Specifically, in a world of asymmetric information, the method of payment in an 
acquisition announcement delivers firm valuation information to the public. For instance, if the 
announced method of payment is cash, it conveys the information to the public that the bidder’s 
equity is relatively less overvalued or undervalued; therefore, the bidder management is 
reluctant to use their valuable equity as payment method. In this regard, investors would 
appreciate a cash offer as the signal of bidder stock undervaluation while a stock offer is likely 
to be regarded as bad news regarding the value of the bidding firm’s assets. Therefore, the 
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variable Runup, which refers to buy and hold abnormal return (BHAR) of a bidder’s stock over 
a certain period preceding the acquisition announcement day, and market to book ratio are 
controlled for this reason (Korajczyk et al., 1991, Myers and Majluf, 1984, French and Poterba, 
1991). In this research, Runup is calculated from bidder’s buy and hold cumulative stock 
returns over the 60-day period preceding the acquisition announcement date. 
According to Martin (1996), Hovakimian et al. (2001) and Swieringa and Schauten (2007), a 
bidder with high growth opportunities is prone to pay in stock since they require cash for future 
investments. The payment method is also considered to be influenced significantly by the 
bidders’ pre-acquisition financial situation (Deangelo and Masulis, 1980, Faccio and Masulis, 
2005). Although Martin (1996) finds the relation is insignificant, return on asset (ROA) ratio 
of acquirer one year preceding the acquisition is controlled for in regression analysis.  
Whether a bidder is public or private is also a significant factor (Chang, 1998, Bradley and 
Sundaram, 2004, Faccio et al., 2006), though it does not concern this work since my sample 
consists of only publicly traded acquirers and targets. The fact that larger firms have better 
access to debt financing leads to cash payment becoming more feasible for large acquirers 
(Hovakimian et al., 2001). Consequently, acquirer market capitalization is controlled for its 
potential impacts on the M&A payment decision. 
With regards to deal characteristics, I control for relative deal size, intra-industry dummy, 
hostile dummy and target high-tech dummy. These are all previously identified influential 
variables of the acquisition method of payment. It has been proved that the larger the size of 
the deal, the more likely it is to be paid by stock because a large amount of cash is difficult to 
obtain (Martin, 1996, Moeller et al., 2004). A target is more prone to accept stock as acquisition 
currency when there is an established certainty regarding an acquirer’s future earnings and 
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equity value. Ceteris paribus, the selling firm is more prone to exchanging stock with the buyer 
in an intra-industry acquisition, where they are well acquainted in terms of their industry risks 
and prospects. Therefore, I create an intra-industry dummy to capture the conglomerate merger 
effect. It is defined as 1 if both acquirer and target are in the same industry, requiring them to 
have the same first three-digit primary SIC code, and 0 otherwise. 
A number of studies have proved that information asymmetry between the acquirer and the 
target has an impact on the choice of payment. It is assumed that acquirers are more likely to 
pay by stock when their stock is overvalued, or pay by cash if their stock is undervalued 
(Travlos, 1987, Hansen, 1987, Fishman, 1989, Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1990, Eckbo and 
Thorburn, 2000, Eckbo et al., 1990, Linn and Switzer, 2001, Shleifer and Vishny, 2003, 
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004). However, Cornett and De (1991) reach the opposite 
conclusion regarding the impact of asymmetric information on the choice of payment method. 
They show that the investors will adjust their investments by referring to the payment signal. 
Therefore I control for two information asymmetry variables: acquirer information asymmetry 
and target information asymmetry.  
Shareholders in the buying firm will partly lose their control of the firm if an acquirer chooses 
to pay by stock since newly issued stock will dilute the bidding firm shareholders’ stake (Stulz, 
1988, Eckbo et al., 1990, Faccio and Masulis, 2005). Faccio and Masulis (2005) find evidence 
that, for UK M&As, managerial control is not considered to be a serious concern at low levels 
(below 20%) and very high levels of voting power (above 60%). For values between 20% and 
60%, voting power becomes a more important concern. It suggests that if the voting rights are 
dispersed, shareholders do not care about the right of control, and when voting rights are highly 
concentrated, blockholders do not fear loss of control. In the case of a manager or director 
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holding an intermediate ownership of a company (20%-60%), they are less likely to choose 
stock-swaps because they do not want to risk losing ownership of the firm, especially when the 
target ownership is concentrated. Utilizing a sample of 846 completed acquisitions of public 
and private firms by NYSE and AMEX listed buyers, Martin (1996) states a similar finding 
that an intermediate range of shareholdings by buyer managers reduces stock financing, while 
higher buyer stock ownership leads to more stock financing. This is the first payment method 
study that includes privately held targets. 
Whilst previous research presents an obvious impact of managerial control on the choice of 
payment method, my sample consists of the largest U.S. firms, and as such managerial 
ownership would be very dispersed and not concentrated in those firms. Hence, I don’t include 
managerial ownership as a variable in the regression analysis since the increase in explanatory 
power is not expected to offset the lost in the degree of freedom.  
To better understand the cross-sectional variation of ATCD on various aspects of the market 
for corporate control, I conduct multivariate regressions on ATCD-the main explanatory 
variable. When investigating my major hypotheses on the impacts of CSR difference on 
method of payment in this chapter, I control for a number of previously identified influential 
variables to account for the effects of those well-known influential factors on the acquisition 
method of payment. Palepu (1986) suggests that inefficient management will lead to an 
increased likelihood of being acquired since the market for corporate control provides a 
mechanism to discipline those managers who fail to maximize a firm’s market value. 
Accordingly, I include ROE and ROA to capture management efficiency (Dong et al., 2006). 
Apart from replacing an incompetent managerial team, Hasbrouck (1985) suggests that a 
takeover bid of a low Tobin Q firm is an attempt to acquire valuable resources at a cost below 
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that of de novo investment. As long as q is less than 1, which means that market value is less 
than the replacement cost, any agent desiring to enter the industry would prefer acquisition 
over a de novo investment. Both ROE and Tobin Q demonstrate that a better managerial 
competency, as well as a more outstanding operating performance, increases the M&A 
completion likelihood. 
In order to account for the fact that high leverage will lead to a decreased likelihood of 
acquisition since there are far fewer financial resources available, I control for the target’s 
financial leverage (Palepu, 1986). However, his results show an ambiguous impact from 
financial leverage. Nevertheless, another proxy for a firm’s financial reserves, collateral, is 
identified to be positively associated with the M&A completion likelihood (Palepu, 1986). I 
include both financial leverage and collateral in my study. 
Dong et al. (2006) find that higher target valuation is associated with a less combative offer, in 
terms of a lower probability of hostility, a lower probability of a tender offer and a higher 
probability of offer success. Price-to-book ratio is employed in their research, whereas I use 
market-to-book ratio, the information asymmetry variable (Moeller et al., 2007, Officer et al., 
2009) and the runup variable. Information asymmetry is defined as the idiosyncratic volatility 
of the stock. It is computed as the standard deviation of the residuals from the Fama-French 
Three-factor (excess of the risk-free rate) (FF 3-Factor) model of daily returns within 250 
trading days preceding the acquisition announcement day. Research shows that the size of a 
target firm will be negatively related to the likelihood of an acquisition (Rodrigues and 
Stevenson, 2013), therefore I include target size, relative deal size and relative size into 
regressions in order to control for the size effect (Moeller et al., 2004, Alexandridis et al., 2013). 
I measure relative size by using a ratio of the target’s total assets over the acquirer’s total assets 
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(Moeller et al., 2004). Following on from Barnes (1990), I include the intra-industry dummy 
to control for industry effects. The intra-industry dummy equals 1 if the primary 3-digit 
acquirer’s SIC code coincides with the 3-digit target’s SIC code.  
Before moving forward to the regression analysis stage, I present in Table 5.3, a correlation 
matrix of all dependent and independent variables to demonstrate that correlations between any 
two variables are within the threshold level. There are 12 pairs of correlation coefficients that 
exceed 30%, but are below 50%. They are acquirer collateral-acquirer financial leverage 
(31.9%),  acquirer financial leverage-target collateral (33.0%), acquirer market capitalization-
acquirer information asymmetry  (-40.4%), acquirer market capitalization-relative deal size (-
48.9%), acquirer information asymmetry-target information asymmetry (48.9%), target ROA-
target information asymmetry (-34.8%), target information asymmetry-target market 
capitalization (-37.2%), target market capitalization-relative deal size (30.8%), target market 
capitalization-percentage of stock payment(30.9%), target market capitalization-stock deal 
dummy (33.7%), relative deal size- percentage of stock payment (30.1%), and relative deal 
size-stock deal dummy(30.9%). There are two pairs of correlation coefficient that above 50%, 
which are very high: acquirer collateral-target collateral (80.8%), and acquirer hightec dummy-
target hightec dummy (77.4%).  
As I mentioned in section 3.4.4, I don’t include pairs of high correlation coefficient (over 50%) 
in one regression framework as to avoid any multicollinearity issues. In order to further ensure 
there are no multicollinearity issues, following Belsley et al. (1980), I conduct collinearity 
diagnostics for each analysis in this chapter to detect any potential multicollinearity problems 
and to ensure the accuracy of this research. I apply their methods in SAS (the COLLIN function) 
when conducting each regression analysis as outlined by Freund and Littell (1986). Essentially, 
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this method is about calculating ‘the condition indices’ in SAS using COLLIN function. Belsey 
et al. (1980) suggest that, when this number is around 10, weak dependencies might be starting 
to affect the regression estimates. When this number is larger than 100, the estimates might 
have a fair amount of numerical error. In my regressions, the condition indices are well below 
10 (the maximum number is 9.38), which implies multicollinearity is not a problem. 
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Table 5.3: Pearson correlation coefficients 
This correlation matrix aims to present the Pearson correlation coefficients between any two variables in my sample. There are 12 pairs of correlation coefficients that exceed 30%, but are below 50%. There are two pairs of correlation coefficient that are 
above 50% which are highly correlated: acquirer collateral-target collateral (80.8%), and acquirer hightec dummy-target hightec dummy (77.4%). In order to ensure completeness of the control variable list, acquirer and target collateral, and acquirer and 
target hightec variables are all included in the research models.  
  
CSR 
Distance 
A_ 
CSR 
A_ 
Collater
al 
A_ 
leverage 
A_ 
ROA 
A_ 
Market 
cap 
A_ 
Market 
to book 
A_ 
Runup A_IA 
A_ 
Hightec 
(dummy
) 
T_ 
CSR 
T_ 
Collater
al 
T_ 
levera
ge 
T_ 
ROA 
T_ 
Market 
cap 
T_ 
Market 
to book T_IA 
T_ 
Hightec 
(dummy
) 
Relati
ve 
deal 
size 
Intra-
indust
ry(du
mmy) 
Hostile 
(dummy
) 
% of 
stock 
paym
ent 
Stock  
deal 
(dummy) 
CSR Distance 1.000                                             
A_CSR 0.397 1.000                                           
A_Collateral -0.033 -0.163 1.000                                         
A_Financial 
leverage -0.061 -0.066 0.319 1.000                                       
A_ROA 0.116 0.092 -0.010 -0.258 1.000                                     
A_Market cap 0.278 0.178 -0.066 -0.164 0.278 1.000                                   
A_Market to 
book 0.002 0.032 -0.057 0.086 0.197 0.136 1.000                                 
A_Runup 0.005 0.013 0.010 -0.073 0.079 0.043 0.054 1.000                               
Acquirer 
information 
asymmetry -0.129 -0.131 0.044 0.068 -0.258 -0.404 0.020 -0.034 1.000                             
A_Hightec 
(dummy) 0.133 0.216 -0.272 -0.166 0.074 0.155 0.127 -0.076 0.118 1.000                           
T_CSR   0.164                 1.000                         
T_Collateral -0.067 -0.169 0.808 0.330 0.003 -0.109 -0.072 0.024 0.054 -0.251 -0.080 1.000                       
T_Financial 
leverage 0.003 -0.052 0.245 0.246 -0.028 0.046 -0.013 0.005 -0.006 -0.078 0.037 0.379 1.000                     
T_ROA 0.001 -0.083 0.021 0.017 0.127 0.026 0.035 -0.019 -0.228 -0.099 0.013 0.059 -0.181 1.000                   
T_Market cap 0.051 -0.017 0.142 0.060 0.071 0.458 0.048 0.063 -0.103 -0.051 0.012 0.164 -0.181 0.202 1.000                 
T_Market to 
book -0.083 -0.014 -0.021 0.002 0.042 0.072 0.111 0.019 -0.023 0.095 -0.002 0.013 -0.038 0.111 0.129 1.000               
Target 
information 
asymmetry -0.001 0.023 -0.059 -0.070 -0.088 -0.070 0.016 -0.008 0.489 0.230 -0.004 -0.117 0.032 -0.348 -0.372 -0.036 1.000             
T_Hightec 
(dummy) 0.136 0.188 -0.245 -0.152 0.060 0.165 0.107 -0.095 0.111 0.774 0.011 -0.236 -0.091 -0.107 -0.086 0.076 0.246 1.000           
Relative deal 
size -0.141 -0.181 0.217 0.214 -0.173 -0.489 -0.076 0.013 0.249 -0.177 -0.027 0.247 0.021 0.138 0.308 0.031 -0.168 -0.169 1.000         
Intra-industry 
(dummy) -0.106 -0.004 0.142 0.059 -0.029 -0.120 -0.002 -0.046 0.097 -0.038 -0.015 0.138 0.049 -0.104 0.027 -0.080 0.002 -0.023 0.123 1.000       
Hostile 
(dummy) -0.052 -0.038 0.087 0.031 0.007 -0.002 0.035 0.018 0.002 -0.045 -0.056 0.081 -0.008 0.022 0.115 0.004 -0.047 -0.079 0.091 0.026 1.000     
Percentage of 
stock payment -0.177 -0.095 -0.011 0.034 -0.222 -0.119 -0.015 0.097 0.146 -0.231 0.054 0.044 0.026 0.015 0.309 0.038 -0.055 -0.259 0.301 0.104 -0.022 1.000   
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Stock deal 
(dummy) -0.181 -0.102 -0.017 0.030 -0.212 -0.105 -0.024 0.130 0.132 -0.250 0.051 0.037 0.021 0.011 0.337 0.041 -0.057 -0.284 0.309 0.101 -0.010 0.986 1.000 
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5.3.3. Research models 
I specify the two research models on testing aforementioned hypotheses. Model I employs the 
OLS regression to test for the associations between ATCD and the percentage of stock as means 
of payment, while Model II uses the Logistic regression to measure the impacts of CSR 
difference on the likelihood of a stock deal (when percentage of stock payment is over 70%). 
Model I: Association between ATCD and the percentage of stock as means of payment 
% of stock = β0 + β1CSRDIFF + β2ACOLLATERAL + β3ALEVERAGE + β4AMB +
β5AROA + β6ADIVPAY + β7AMKTCAP + β8ARUNUP + β9DRELSIZE + β10INTRAIND +
β11HOSTILE + β12THIGHTEC + β13AIA + β14TIA + εit                  
where TCSR and ACSR refer to the target CSR score and the acquirer CSR score respectively, 
TROE refers to the target returns on equity ratio, TTOBINQ refers to the target Tobin-q ratio, 
TCOLLATERAL refers to the target collateral, TLEVERAGE refers to the target financial 
leverage, TMKTCAP refers to the target market capitalization, TSIZE refers to the target firm 
size, RELSIZE refers to the ratio of target size over acquirer size, TIA refers to the target 
information asymmetry and INTRAIND refers to the intra-industry dummy. 
Model II: Impact of ATCD on likelihood of stock as merger currency 
Log odds (stock) = β0 + β1CSRDIFF + β2ACOLLATERAL + β3ALEVERAGE + β4AMB +
β5AROA + β6ADIVPAY + β7AMKTCAP + β8ARUNUP + β9DRELSIZE + β10INTRAIND +
β11HOSTILE + β12THIGHTEC + β13AIA + β14TIA + εit                                                            
where CSRDIFF refers to ATCD, ACSR refers to the acquirer CSR, ALEVERAGE refers to 
the acquirer leverage, RELSIZE refers to the ratio of target size over acquirer size, DRELSIZE 
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refers to the relative deal size, AMB refers to the acquirer market to book ratio, AROA refers 
to the acquirer return on asset ratio, AMKTCAP refers to the acquirer market capitalization, 
ARUNUP refers to the buy and hold abnormal returns (BHAR) of the acquirer stock over 60 
days preceding the acquisition announcement day, AIA and TIA refers to the acquirer 
information asymmetry and the target information asymmetry respectively, INTRAIND refers 
to the intra-industry dummy and HOSTILE refers to the hostile deal dummy. 
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5.4.Results 
5.4.1. Univariate tests 
Before conducting multivariate regression tests, I perform univariate tests to examine for the 
trends in the relation between ATCD and the usage of stock as merger currency. The full 
sample is partitioned into nine subsamples according to the order of the acquirer and the target 
CSR scores. The figure of stock payment percentage reaches the highest level when the 
acquirer CSR is comparable with the target CSR (Table 5.4 Panel 2). This subgroup also sees 
the greatest number of stock deals (when the percentage of stock payment is over 70%), which 
is almost the sum of the figures of remaining two subgroups. For the sample’s breakdown see 
Table 5.4. 
Section 3.6.2 specifies the logic and method to partition 842 deals into 9 subsamples: ‘high 
CSR acquirer-high CSR target’, ‘high CSR acquirer-medium CSR target’, ‘high CSR acquirer-
low CSR target’, etc. I further arrange them into 3 panels (Table 5.4) where acquirer CSR is 
better than target CSR, acquirer CSR is comparable with target CSR and acquirer CSR is worse 
than target CSR according to their CSR scores’ position, respectively. For instance, acquirer 
CSR may not be higher in terms of number than the target CSR in the subgroup where I claim 
the acquirer CSR is better than the target CSR, but its relative position  must be at least one tier 
higher than the target’s relative position.    
In Table 5.4, I report figures of ‘stock payment percentage’, ‘stock-deal dummy’ and the 
number of stock deals for the nine subsamples and mean and median for the three organized 
subgroups: (a) acquirer CSR is better than target CSR, (b) acquirer CSR is comparable with 
target CSR and (c) acquirer CSR is worse than target CSR. Stock payment percentage is 
obtained from the SDC database; it represents the percentage of stock being used as merger 
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currency. I use this percentage number to define the ‘stock-deal dummy’ as 1 if the percentage 
of stock payment is greater than 70% and 0 if it is less than 30%.  
There are two reasons for taking 30% and 70% as cut off points for stock-deal dummy. Firstly, 
it keeps 120 more deals in the sample than put 0% and 100% stock as cut off point, which 
means sample size will be further reduced from 696 (30% and 70% as cut off points) to 576 
(0% and 100% stock as cut off point ). This is almost a loss of 20% of the deals from the full 
sample. In order to ensure completeness and accuracy, I choose to define stock-dummy as 1 if 
over 70% of deal value are paid in the form of stock. Further, to provide the audience the ful 
picture, in the section of robustness tests (section 5.5), I re run the regressions with stock-deal 
defined as 1 for 100% payment of stock. Secondly, when a deal is paid with 70% of stock, the 
acquirer will have a dominant position in the board of the target. 50% - 60% of stock might not 
be enough to achieve a strong power in the board because there might be other large 
shareholders.  
Subgroup (b) experiences both the highest mean (45.2%) and median (42.6%) of the percentage 
of stock payment. ‘Stock-deal dummy’ average is also higher than subgroups (a)’s and (c)’s: 
11.5% higher than subgroup (a) and 2.2% higher than subgroup (c). Moreover, (b) has 
considerably more stock deals (97) than subgroups (a) and (c), which have 55 and 58 deals 
respectively. Comparison of (a) and (c), which both have a greater between-firm CSR 
difference than (b), shows that the percentage of stock payment is significantly higher for (a) 
than (c), with stock payment accounting for 44.4% and 36.4% of the deal value respectively.  
The overall trend shown in Table 5.4 is that firms who acquire a target with a comparable CSR 
score are inclined to use the highest percentage of stock as acquisition currency. This supports 
the hypothesis that similarities and information transparency both foster mutual trust in sharing 
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post-acquisition integration risk and future operating risk. This is consistent with and continues 
the story in previous chapter on the M&A likelihood: smaller ATCD increase M&A likelihood 
and encourages a higher percentage of stock as merger currency, as a result of the increased 
level of mutual trust between the two contracting parties. 
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Table 5.4: ATCD and usage of stock as merger currency 
Acquirers are sorted and partitioned into 3 subgroups according to the order of acquirer CSR scores, acquirers that fall into the 
first (top) tertile are defined as ‘high CSR acquirer’, the second (medium) tertile acquirers are ‘medium CSR acquirer’ and the 
third (bottom) tertile acquirers are ‘low CSR acquirer’. Targets are categorized into ‘high CSR target’, ‘medium CSR target’ 
and ‘low CSR target’ analogously. The ‘high CSR acquirer’ group is then partitioned into three subsamples according to target 
CSR scores, i.e. ‘high CSR acquirer- high CSR target’, ‘high CSR acquirer-medium CSR target’ and ‘high CSR acquirer- 
low CSR target’. By applying the same partitioning method to ‘medium CSR acquirer’ and ‘low CSR acquirer’, I obtain 9 
subsamples indicating various acquirers-targets combinations based on CSR scores. I use three subgroups to describe three 
possible scenarios: acquirer CSR is better than target CSR, acquirer CSR is comparable with target CSR and acquirer CSR is 
worse than target CSR, in terms of the position of their CSR scores respectively. 
 
Panel 1: Stock payments where (a) Acquirer CSR  is better than Target CSR  
  
Subsample 1: High 
CSR Acquirer and 
Medium CSR target               
(N=87) 
Subsample 2: High 
CSR Acquirer and 
Low CSR target                      
(N=73) 
Subsample 3: Medium 
CSR Acquirer and Low 
CSR target            
 (N=83)   
 
Mean  Median Mean  Median Mean  Median Mean  Median 
Stockpercent 0.373 0.000 0.233 0.000 0.485 0.463 0.364 0.154 
Stock_dummy 0.355 0.000 0.183 0.000 0.486 0.000 0.341 0.000 
No. of stock deals 20 7 28 55 
 
 
Panel 2: Stock payments where (b) Acquirer CSR  is comparable with Target CSR  
  
Subsample 4: High 
CSR Acquirer and 
High CSR Target                     
(N=121) 
Subsample 5: Medium 
CSR Acquirer and 
Medium CSR target                                     
(N=108) 
Subsample 6: Low 
CSR Acquirer and 
Low CSR target                       
(N=129)   
 
     Mean  Median Mean       Median 
   
Mean  Median Mean  
          
Median 
Stockpercent 0.503 0.523 0.417 0.329 0.436 0.425 0.452 0.426 
Stock_dummy 0.524 1.000 0.395 0.000 0.448 0.000 0.456 0.333 
No. of stock deals 38 26 33 97 
 
Panel 3: Stock payments where (c) Acquirer CSR  is worse than Target CSR 
  
Subsample 7: Medium 
CSR Acquirer and High 
CSR target              
 (N=90) 
Subsample 8: Low 
CSR Acquirer and 
High CSR target                       
(N=71) 
Subsample 9: Low 
CSR Acquirer and 
Medium CSR target            
(N=80)   
 
Mean  Median Mean  Median Mean  Median Mean  Median 
Stockpercent 0.563 0.634 0.350 0.000 0.419 0.341 0.444 0.325 
Stock_dummy 0.567 1.000 0.322 0.000 0.412 0.000 0.434 0.333 
No. of stock deals 30 10 18 58 
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5.4.2. Cross-sectional Multivariate Regression Analysis (OLS analysis) 
To better understand the cross-sectional variation in the acquisition method of payment, I 
present estimates from multivariate regressions using the stock payment percentage (Table 5.5: 
OLS analysis) and ‘stock-deal dummy’ (Table 5.6: Logistic analysis) as dependent variables, 
respectively. The study on the determinants of the acquisition payment method shows a linkage 
with the previous two chapters on M&A likelihood and announcement time abnormal returns. 
In this section, I will comprehensively discuss the identified determinants of the acquisition 
payment method and how I construct these variables in order to control for their impact on the 
method of payment. Then I will present the regression analysis on the impacts of ATCD on the 
M&A method of payment. 
To investigate the impacts of ATCD on the acquisition method of payment, I conduct 
multivariate OLS regressions using the percentage of stock payment as dependent variable and 
between-firm CSR difference as a key independent variable. I then break down CSR difference 
to six individual dimensions to further elucidate CSR impacts on merger currency. Results are 
reported in Table 5.5, for the full sample and two subsamples where acquirer CSR is better 
than target CSR and where acquirer CSR is worse than target CSR. The key variable ‘ATCD’ 
reports the absolute CSR difference between an acquirer and its target in terms of corporate 
social responsibility, however it does not distinguish between the two possible scenarios: an 
acquirer is less socially responsible than its target and an acquirer behaves better regarding 
social aspects. Repeating the full sample OLS analysis for the described subsamples helps to 
resolve this problem. 
Regression specifications (1)-(3) present a strongly significant (at the 1% level) negative 
relation between ATCD and the percentage of stock payment for the full sample. Even after 
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controlling for various deal- and firm- characteristics, a higher level of ATCD still leads to a 
statistically and economically significant lower level of the stock payment percentage. More 
specifically, a 10% unit increase in CSR difference is associated with a 5.04% reduction in the 
percentage of stock payment. In terms of the large monetary value of an M&A deal, a 5.04% 
increase in percentage of stock payment could involve the redistribution of millions of dollars. 
Regression (4) reports the acquirer- target individual CSR difference in six dimension influence 
the percentage of stock payment to various levels. As expected, there are strong negative 
associations between diversity, employee relations, product and corporate governance 
difference and the percentage of stock payment. As stock payment indicates that target 
shareholders will sit on the board of the combined entity, divergence in these areas will lead to 
a decreased level of willingness to cooperate with people holding very different ideas in 
business strategies and operations. Surprisingly, CSR difference in community dimension is 
positively connected with the percentage of stock payment.  
Columns (5) and (6) present the results from the re-estimations of OLS regressions on stock 
payment for the subsample where an acquirer behaves better than its target regarding corporate 
social aspects. The main explanatory variable remains the same: the absolute value of ATCD. 
As this subsample contains only deals where bidder CSR score is higher than target CSR score, 
the main explanatory variable ‘ATCD’ could be interpreted as the higher the CSR difference, 
the better an acquirer is at CSR engagements, when compared with its target. The OLS 
univariate regression shows a significant (at the 1% level) negative relation between ATCD 
and the percentage of stock payment. The economical magnitude remains the same after adding 
control variables in the regression. As shown in regression (7), diversity, employee relations 
and environment dimensions are strongly influencing the decision of merger currency. Results 
in this subsample show a stronger level in terms of both economical and statistical aspects: a 
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10% unit increase in CSR engagements results in a 6.66% decrease in using stock as acquisition 
currency.  
For the other subsample where the target’s CSR is better than the acquirer’s, univariate 
regression presents an even larger decrease in stock payment percentage in association with an 
expansion in between-firm CSR difference, compared with estimates from the full sample and 
better CSR acquirer subsample. It confirms a strongly negative relation between ATCD and 
stock percentage at the 1% significance level. As seen in univariate regressions, with the 10% 
unit increase in CSR difference, 9.13% of stock is substituted by cash. However, it becomes 
insignificant after controlling for acquirer-, deal-, and information asymmetry- characteristics. 
Individual CSR dimensions of product and corporate governance are strongly negatively 
connected with stock payment, while environment and community dimensions are positively 
connected. 
Collateral and return on asset ratio are strongly negatively related to the stock payment 
percentage. This is consistent with previous research, which posits that a higher level of 
collateral and a better operating performance imply a better ability to issue corporate debt, 
thereby raising cash (Hovakimian et al., 2001, Fuller et al., 2002). Though financial leverage 
should be positively related to stock payment in view of residual debt capacity, this relation in 
my sample is proved to be statistically negative. This is probably explained by my sample 
including only U.S. largest firms which are supposed to have a relatively higher level of cash 
reserves from previously issued debt. Acquirer stock price run-up, in combination with acquirer 
information asymmetry influences the usage of stock positively (Fuller et al., 2002, Eckbo and 
Thorburn, 2000, Officer et al., 2009).  An acquirer would prefer to pay with stock if its stock 
price is overvalued or runs up 60 days preceding an acquisition announcement (Moeller et al., 
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2007), because they could take advantage of the increased stock price. A bidder has great 
incentives to pay cash due to its ease of use, provided that they have sufficient unused debt 
capacity or liquid assets. Moreover, the use of cash also ‘allows the bidder to avoid the 
significant costs of obtaining shareholder approval of pre-emptive rights exemptions and stock 
authorizations and the higher regulatory costs of stock offers’ (Fuller et al., 2002). However, a 
high value deal, which would require a large unused debt capacity to finance the deal in cash, 
would typically use an increased percentage of stock payment, despite the potential 
undervaluation of the stock price (Fuller et al., 2002). In my sample, estimates of relative deal 
size variable are consistent with Fuller et al. (2002)’s findings, presenting a persistently 
significant and positive sign throughout the full sample and the two subsamples. 
T-statistics reported in the table are calculated using standard errors adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity. 
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Table 5.5: Impacts of ATCD on the percentage of stock payment (OLS regression) 
The sample consists of 696 U.S. acquisitions between 1992 and 2012. I obtain the initial sample of acquisitions from Thomson Financial's Security Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum database. 
‘Stock-deal’ dummy is defined as 1 if the percentage of stock payment is greater than 70% and 0 if the percentage of stock payment is less than 30%. Therefore, any deals with stock payment 
percentage between 30% and 70% are withdrawn from the sample. It reduces the sample size from 842 to 696. 
Regression specifications (1)-(4) present Logistic regression results for the full sample, while columns (5)-(7) and column (8)-(10) present results for the subsample where acquirer CSR is better 
than target CSR and the subsample where acquirer CSR is worse than target CSR respectively. 
All variables are defined in the Appendix. The symbols *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
  Percentage of stock payment (OLS)       
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
  Full sample Sample where acquirer CSR > target CSR Sample where acquirer CSR<target CSR 
CSR difference 
measure (absolute): 
                    
ATCD  -0.872*** 
(-7.12) 
 -0.504*** 
(-3.23) 
 -0.499*** 
(-3.21) 
   -0.824*** 
(-6.09) 
 -0.666*** 
(-4.03) 
   -0.913*** 
(-3.09) 
0.372 
(0.81) 
  
Community       0.189** 
(1.98) 
    0.101 
(0.94) 
    0.403** 
(2.21) 
Diversity        -0.182*** 
(-2.87) 
     -0.251*** 
(-3.54) 
    0.039 
(0.30) 
Employee relations        -0.286***      
(-2.90) 
     -0.371*** 
(-3.18) 
     -0.271 
(-1.61) 
Environment        -0.090 
(-0.84) 
     -0.38*** 
(-3.08) 
    0.455** 
(2.30) 
Product        -0.200** 
(-2.34) 
     -0.151 
(-1.49) 
     -0.302** 
(-2.06) 
Corporate governance        -0.173* 
(-1.81) 
    0.074 
(0.59) 
     -0.375** 
(-2.50) 
                      
Acquirer 
Characteristics  
                    
Collateral    -0.218*** 
(-3.27) 
 -0.207*** 
(-3.2) 
 -0.196*** 
(-2.93) 
   -0.260*** 
(-2.9) 
 -0.212*** 
(-2.69) 
   -0.201* 
(-1.75) 
 -0.299** 
(-2.54) 
Financial leverage    -0.331*** 
(-2.94) 
 -0.354*** 
(-3.15) 
 -0.344*** 
(-2.97) 
   -0.375*** 
(-3.12) 
 -0.413*** 
(-2.93) 
   -0.39* 
(-1.76) 
 -0.223 
(-1.09) 
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Market to book   0.001 
(0.26) 
0.002 
(0.84) 
0.000 
(-0.04) 
   -0.001 
(0.29) 
 -0.000 
(-0.01) 
  0.003 
(0.42) 
 -0.001 
(-0.06) 
ROA    -0.889*** 
(-3.47) 
 -0.941*** 
(-3.81) 
 -0.927*** 
(-4.11) 
   -0.710*** 
(-2.75) 
 -0.7*** 
(-3.00) 
   -1.775*** 
(-3.9) 
 -1.514*** 
(-2.99) 
Dividend payout ratio   0.018*** 
(2.73) 
0.017*** 
(2.71) 
0.017* 
(1.89) 
  0.005 
(0.78) 
0.006 
(0.44) 
  0.025*** 
(2.63) 
0.023* 
(1.70) 
Market cap   0.035*** 
(2.59) 
0.026** 
(2.09) 
0.048*** 
(3.66) 
  0.065*** 
(3.87) 
0.086*** 
(5.27) 
  0.012 
(0.57) 
0.016 
(0.68) 
Runup   0.003*** 
(3.2) 
0.003*** 
(3.28) 
0.003* 
(1.80) 
  0.004*** 
(3.45) 
0.004** 
(2.24) 
  0.003 
(1.17) 
0.003 
(0.91) 
                      
Deal characteristics                     
Deal relative size   0.735*** 
(6.92) 
0.758*** 
(7.57) 
0.643*** 
(6.25) 
  0.802*** 
(5.65) 
0.664*** 
(5.04) 
  0.736*** 
(4.24) 
0.581*** 
(3.42) 
Intra-industry dummy   0.015 
(0.44) 
0.02 
(0.6) 
0.005 
(0.15) 
  0.009 
(0.21) 
 -0.021 
(-0.5) 
  0.005 
(0.09) 
0.001 
(0.02) 
Hostile dummy    -0.134 
(-1.5) 
 -0.128 
(-1.42) 
 -0.116 
(-1.50) 
   -0.218* 
(-1.74) 
 -0.166* 
(-1.73) 
   -0.024 
(-0.19) 
 -0.065 
(-0.53) 
Target hightec dummy    -0.273*** 
(-7.43) 
 -0.264*** 
(-7.37) 
 -0.259*** 
(-7.20) 
   -0.384*** 
(-8.5) 
 -0.383*** 
(-8.68) 
   -0.175*** 
(-2.95) 
 -0.11* 
(-1.79) 
                      
Information asymmetry   
variable 
                    
Acquirer information 
asymmetry 
  4.945* 
(1.82) 
 5.667** 
(2.16) 
  3.907 
(1.19) 
5.961* 
(1.89) 
  5.412 
(1.18) 
5.812 
(1.26) 
Target information 
asymmetry 
  0.157 
(0.11) 
  0.149 
(0.10) 
  0.851 
(0.55) 
0.532 
(0.32) 
   -0.837 
(-0.33) 
 -1.212 
(-0.45) 
                      
Sample size 842 504 511 504 449 264 264 351 217 217 
R-square 0.032 0.289 0.288 0.3255 0.037 0.404 0.4776 0.021 0.234 0.3095 
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5.4.3. Cross-sectional Multivariate Regression Analysis (Logistic analysis) 
In this subsection, I provide further evidence to support the negative relation between ATCD 
and stock payment. I find that, as a result of the reduced level of ease to cooperate in the future, 
more cash us being used as merger currency when an acquirer is very different to its target 
regarding CSR engagements. ‘Stock-deal’ dummy is defined as 1 if the percentage of stock 
payment is greater than 70% and 0 if the percentage of stock payment is less than 30%. 
Therefore, any deals with stock payment percentage between 30% and 70% are withdrawn 
from the sample. It reduces the sample size from 842 to 696. The main results from this 
subsection are consistent with results from the previous OLS regression section. They are 
consistent with results in the first main chapter on M&A likelihood and second main chapter 
on M&A premium and combined abnormal returns. All evidence supports the acquirer-target 
mutual trust view, indicating that acquiring shareholders are not inclined to include target firm 
shareholders into the board of the combined entity when there exists divergence in business 
strategies and operations. 
In Table 5.6, for the full sample, ATCD negatively affects the likelihood of a ‘stock-deal’ at 
the 1% significance level. After controlling for identified acquirer-, deal-, and information 
asymmetry-characteristics, a 10% unit increase in ATCD significantly lowers the likelihood of 
a ‘stock-deal’ by 3.81%. This relation is strongly significant, both statistically and 
economically. In the subsample where acquirer CSR is better than target CSR, this negative 
relation becomes less remarkable; the marginal effect coefficient slumps from 3.81% to 2.98%, 
suggesting that CSR differences impact becomes smaller when an acquirer behaves better than 
its target. In contrary, when a target has more advantage in CSR terms than the acquirer, the 
impact of CSR difference on paying large amounts of stock as acquisition currency becomes 
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ambiguous. Individual CSR dimensions present a strongly negative relation to stock-deal 
likelihood in general. 
Other explanatory variables show similar signs and significance levels, compare with 
discussions of OLS regressions in the previous section.  
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Table 5.6: Impacts of ATCD on ‘stock-deal’ (over 70% stock payment) likelihood (Logit regression) 
The sample consists of 696 U.S. acquisitions between 1992 and 2012. I obtain the initial sample of acquisitions from Thomson Financial's Security Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum database. 
‘Stock-deal’ dummy is defined as 1 if the percentage of stock payment is greater than 70% and 0 if the percentage of stock payment is less than 30%. Therefore, any deals with stock payment percentage 
between 30% and 70% are withdrawn from the sample. It reduces the sample size from 842 to 696. 
Regression specifications (1)-(3) present Logistic regression results for the full sample, while columns (4)-(6) and columns (7)-(9) present results for the subsample where acquirer CSR is better than 
target CSR and the subsample where acquirer CSR is worse than target CSR respectively. 
All variables are defined in the Appendix. The symbols *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
  Stock payment (Logit) 
  (1) (2) Marginal 
effect(2): 
dy/dx 
(3) Marginal 
effect(3): 
dy/dx 
(4) (5) Marginal 
effect(5): 
dy/dx 
(6) Marginal 
effect(6): 
dy/dx 
(7) (8) Marginal 
effect(8): 
dy/dx 
(9) Marginal 
effect(9): 
dy/dx 
  Full sample Sample where acquirer CSR > target CSR Sample where acquirer CSR<target CSR 
CSR difference 
measure 
(absolute): 
                          
 
  
ATCD  -4.990*** 
(21.164) 
 -3.837** 
(5.374) 
-0.381      -5.298*** 
(13.44) 
 -7.8*** 
(10.083) 
-0.298      -4.475** 
(5.78) 
3.861 
(1.106) 
0.511     
Community       1.168 
(2.304) 
0.282       0.253 
(0.039) 
0.054       2.657* 
(3.462) 
0.459 
Diversity        -1.155** 
(3.826) 
-0.225        -2.956*** 
(7.894) 
-0.259        -0.319 
(0.083) 
-0.078 
Employee 
relations 
       -1.982** 
(5.655) 
-0.314        -3.485** 
(5.249) 
-0.266        -2.336* 
(3.074) 
-0.389 
Environment        -0.677 
(0.542) 
-0.146        -4.307** 
(6.472) 
-0.273       4.451** 
(5.149) 
0.520 
Product        -1.363* 
(3.754) 
-0.253        -1.838 
(2.327) 
-0.220        -2.308** 
(4.062) 
-0.387 
Corporate 
governance 
       -1.380* 
(2.811) 
-0.255       0.503 
(0.105) 
0.111        -2.732** 
(4.084) 
-0.413 
  
                                
Acquirer 
Characteristics  
                              
Collateral    -1.701*** 
(8.111) 
-0.288  -1.497** 
(5.765) 
-0.269    -3.127*** 
(8.232) 
-0.28  -1.633 
(1.940) 
-0.208    -1.119 
(1.791) 
-0.244  -1.921** 
(4.296) 
-0.353 
Financial leverage    -2.552*** 
(7.113) 
-0.346  -2.780*** 
(7.210) 
-0.358    -3.653** 
(4.835) 
-0.287  -4.643** 
(5.771) 
-0.274    -3.085** 
(4.445) 
-0.427  -1.614 
(1.037) 
-0.318 
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Market to book    -0.001 
(0.001) 
0  -0.004 
(0.021) 
-0.001    -0.006 
(0.051) 
-0.001  -0.012 
(0.070) 
-0.002   0.092 
(0.583) 
0.023 0.037 
(0.093) 
0.009 
ROA    -6.751*** 
(7.359) 
-0.394  -7.384*** 
(7.769) 
-0.397    -4.739** 
(4.806) 
-0.294  -5.466** 
(5.403) 
-0.277    -17.464*** 
(10.785) 
-0.465  -17.199*** 
(9.887) 
-0.467 
Dividend payout 
ratio 
  0.253 
(1.756) 
0.062 0.248 
(1.378) 
0.061   0.132 
(0.076) 
0.028 0.246 
(0.202) 
0.052   0.392 
(0.843) 
0.098 0.309 
(1.017) 
0.077 
Market cap   0.333*** 
(10.169) 
0.082 0.412*** 
(12.792) 
0.102   0.784*** 
(15.122) 
0.184 1.005*** 
(18.267) 
0.235   0.068 
(0.184) 
0.017 0.083 
(0.201) 
0.021 
Runup   0.19*** 
(12.430) 
0.046 0.185*** 
(11.495) 
0.045   0.146** 
(4.473) 
0.031 0.147** 
(4.096) 
0.030   0.427*** 
(10.151) 
0.106 0.487*** 
(12.117) 
0.119 
                               
Deal 
characteristics 
                              
Deal relative size   5.443*** 
(36.417) 
0.599 4.954*** 
(28.751) 
0.592   9.031*** 
(23.641) 
0.702 8.220*** 
(17.511) 
0.721   3.862*** 
(9.258) 
0.511 2.771** 
(4.400) 
0.467 
Intra-industry 
dummy 
  0.075 
(0.082) 
0.018 0.015 
(0.003) 
0.004   0.211 
(0.223) 
0.046  -0.196 
(0.147) 
-0.038    -0.022 
(0.003) 
-0.005 0.005 
(0.000) 
0.001 
Hostile dummy    -0.795 
(2.150) 
-0.167  -0.687 
(1.509) 
-0.148    -1.731** 
(4.269) 
-0.228  -1.572* 
(3.036) 
-0.204    -0.065 
(0.007) 
-0.016  -0.367 
(0.166) 
-0.089 
Target hightec 
dummy 
   -1.892*** 
(40.712) 
-0.305  -1.872*** 
(37.161) 
-0.305    -3.196*** 
(35.016) 
-0.281  -3.550*** 
(33.685) 
-0.267    -1.204*** 
(7.307) 
-0.258  -0.739 
(2.281) 
-0.172 
                               
Information 
asymmetry   
variable 
                              
Acquirer 
information 
asymmetry 
  40.629* 
(3.677) 
0.605 44.627** 
(3.934) 
0.603   42.743 
(1.633) 
0.702 60.508 
(2.217) 
0.722   24.342 
(0.533) 
0.535 30.524 
(0.810) 
0.533 
Target information 
asymmetry 
  6.531 
(0.318) 
0.603 8.038 
(0.432) 
0.603   12.197 
(0.534) 
0.702 14.141 
(0.490) 
-0.064   3.553 
(0.034) 
0.503 2.088 
(0.011) 
0.409 
                               
Sample size 696 411   411   378 218   218   289 175   175   
pseudo R-square 0.036 0.332   0.3613   0.045 0.439   0.498   0.021 0.298   0.3646   
Log likelihood -473.7015 -277.628   -277.628   -250.1985 -141.572   -141.572   -199.93 -120.4735   -120.4735   
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Table 5.5 (OLS analysis) and Table 5.6 (Logistic analysis) both show that the impacts of ATCD 
on the M&A method of payment are statistically and economically significant. Both the 
percentage and likelihood of stock as acquisition currency decrease as CSR difference 
increases, indicating a mutual reluctance in sharing future uncertainties and operating risks. On 
the one hand, when acquiring a target with a worse CSR performance than its acquirer, the 
buying firm is reluctant to pay with either purely stock or a high percentage of stock, since 
there is a perceived risk of loss in reputation at the announcement time due to integrating the 
target with a different corporate culture into their management post-acquisition.  
On the other hand, the stock payment percentage is impacted by between-firm CSR difference 
when a target performs better than an acquirer in corporate social responsibility terms. This 
could be attributed to an acquirer’s reluctance in improving social engagements since a 
exchange of stock will result in a voting power shift in the board. This power shift in favour of 
a target’s shareholders may cause further proposals regarding improving the CSR of the merged 
firm. An alternate explanation might be that they are both less confident about co-operating 
with a counterpart with different ethical values and corporate culture.  
To sum up, the results in Table 5.4 (Univariate analysis), Table 5.5 (OLS regression analysis) 
and Table 5.6 (Logistic regression analysis) all show that a higher ATCD leads to a significant 
reduction in the stock payment percentage and likelihood. Those corporate soft attributes imply 
ideological differences and information asymmetry, which will cause a shared reduction in 
confidence for sharing future uncertainties.  
This is consistent with previous results on M&A likelihood (section 3.6) and combined returns 
(section 4.6.2). A higher ATCD implies different business strategies, operations and culture, 
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all of which are likely to lead to further operating frictions in the integration process. As a result 
of this, two firms with very different CSR engagements are less likely to merge. When they do, 
acquiring shareholders are more inclined to pay cash to selling shareholders (especially when 
shares of the selling firm are held by shareholders with voting rights who are likely to take 
seats on the board), likely in order to prevent them from sitting on the board of the newly 
combined entity.  
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5.5.Robustness tests 
In order to assure the robustness of the empirical results of the preceding sections, I conduct 
two robustness checks: industry adjusted CSR scores and re-defining ‘stock-deal’ as a dummy. 
The former aims to justify CSR scores by smoothing out any possible industrial effects, while 
the latter restricts a ‘stock-deal’ to those completely paid by stock. 
5.5.1. Industry based impacts on KLD ratings 
CSR scores, the most important independent variable in my research, are reviewed and 
assigned by KLD analytics on a yearly basis. Though it is the most widely used source for CSR 
ratings, the agent does not account for any industry based impact when assigning a score to a 
firm. This may cause a bias amongst firms in different industries, e.g. the industry effect may 
cause disparity in the assigned CSR score of a paper mill and a bank due entirely to the effects 
of their respective industries. For this reason, I calculate an adjusted CSR score based on the 
original KLD ratings10. For the ease of the readers, tables 5.7 provides the calculations of 
annual industry adjusted CSR scores. 
To check the robustness of the findings in this chapter, I replace the original CSR scores with 
the industry-adjusted CSR scores and repeat all tests. The major findings are all consistent to a 
high level: this has been reflected through similar regression coefficients of estimates and 
significant levels. It suggests that the main results apply across all industries. I do not report all 
results and tables from industry-adjusted CSR scores as they are highly identical to those from 
                                                 
10 Please see section 3.7 for the logic and detailed calculations of the industrial adjusted CSR scores. 
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the original CSR scores. Also for this reason, I do not discuss and report the industry adjusted 
CSR-based results extensively. 
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Table 5.7:  Industry CSR Score by year and industry (Strength, Concern and CSR score) 
 
A year-based industry CSR score is calculated by taking the average CSR scores for firms in specified industry in each calendar year. This mean industry CSR score is then subtracted from 
each of the firms’ raw CSR to make sure that any industry based impact on CSR rating is mitigated. 
   
Industry 
(First two 
digits of 
the SIC 
code) 
Agriculture, Forestry, 
&Fisheries (01-09) 
Mineral Industries & 
Construction (10-17) Manufacturing (20-39) 
Transportation, 
Communications & Utilities 
(40-49) 
Wholesale Trade & Retail 
Trade (50-59) Financial Industry      (60-69) Service Industries (70-89) 
Year 
CSR 
Str 
CSR 
Con 
CSR 
Score 
CSR 
Str 
CSR 
Con 
CSR 
Score 
CSR 
Str 
CSR 
Con 
CSR 
Score 
CSR 
Str 
CSR 
Con 
CSR 
Score 
CSR 
Str 
CSR 
Con 
CSR 
Score 
CSR 
Str 
CSR 
Con 
CSR 
Score 
CSR 
Str 
CSR 
Con 
CSR 
Score 
1991 NA NA NA 0.027  0.040  -0.014  0.043  0.036  0.007  0.043  0.035  0.008  0.034  0.018  0.016  0.052  0.023  0.029  0.026  0.032  -0.006  
1992 NA NA NA 0.034  0.040  -0.006  0.049  0.051  -0.001  0.053  0.044  0.009  0.045  0.020  0.025  0.057  0.038  0.019  0.050  0.045  0.004  
1993 NA NA NA 0.037  0.066  -0.029  0.055  0.068  -0.014  0.059  0.057  0.002  0.052  0.038  0.014  0.064  0.049  0.015  0.049  0.047  0.002  
1994 0.056  0.028  0.028  0.042  0.093  -0.051  0.058  0.078  -0.020  0.063  0.070  -0.008  0.057  0.051  0.006  0.062  0.051  0.011  0.048  0.070  -0.022  
1995 0.061  0.028  0.033  0.048  0.103  -0.055  0.068  0.076  -0.008  0.058  0.072  -0.014  0.072  0.040  0.032  0.070  0.054  0.015  0.043  0.068  -0.024  
1996 NA NA NA 0.048  0.066  -0.018  0.071  0.058  0.013  0.055  0.049  0.007  0.066  0.035  0.032  0.064  0.039  0.025  0.035  0.046  -0.011  
1997 NA NA NA 0.063  0.086  -0.023  0.075  0.076  -0.001  0.060  0.064  -0.005  0.065  0.045  0.019  0.068  0.063  0.005  0.043  0.076  -0.033  
1998 NA NA NA 0.064  0.099  -0.035  0.076  0.077  0.000  0.058  0.073  -0.015  0.061  0.051  0.009  0.074  0.071  0.003  0.045  0.065  -0.020  
1999 NA NA NA 0.060  0.088  -0.028  0.081  0.082  -0.002  0.062  0.076  -0.013  0.055  0.049  0.007  0.078  0.076  0.002  0.049  0.057  -0.007  
2000 NA NA NA 0.052  0.083  -0.031  0.080  0.082  -0.002  0.074  0.085  -0.011  0.059  0.058  0.001  0.075  0.085  -0.010  0.050  0.062  -0.012  
2001 0.000  0.099  -0.099  0.045  0.093  -0.047  0.060  0.068  -0.008  0.050  0.072  -0.021  0.043  0.053  -0.010  0.042  0.052  -0.010  0.025  0.039  -0.014  
2002 0.000  0.123  -0.123  0.035  0.090  -0.055  0.064  0.078  -0.014  0.056  0.085  -0.030  0.043  0.054  -0.011  0.044  0.062  -0.018  0.028  0.051  -0.024  
2003 0.000  0.080  -0.080  0.022  0.059  -0.037  0.031  0.053  -0.022  0.035  0.066  -0.031  0.023  0.046  -0.023  0.035  0.041  -0.006  0.020  0.043  -0.023  
2004 0.003  0.113  -0.110  0.021  0.072  -0.051  0.035  0.072  -0.037  0.030  0.074  -0.044  0.028  0.068  -0.040  0.037  0.057  -0.020  0.024  0.059  -0.035  
2005 0.004  0.133  -0.129  0.017  0.082  -0.066  0.038  0.070  -0.031  0.031  0.080  -0.048  0.030  0.064  -0.034  0.029  0.051  -0.022  0.023  0.052  -0.029  
2006 0.016  0.145  -0.129  0.019  0.091  -0.072  0.041  0.077  -0.036  0.032  0.089  -0.058  0.033  0.074  -0.040  0.034  0.053  -0.019  0.027  0.061  -0.034  
2007 0.021  0.145  -0.124  0.021  0.095  -0.073  0.043  0.076  -0.033  0.032  0.090  -0.058  0.034  0.075  -0.042  0.031  0.053  -0.021  0.025  0.060  -0.035  
2008 0.016  0.109  -0.093  0.026  0.097  -0.071  0.044  0.080  -0.036  0.037  0.102  -0.065  0.036  0.078  -0.042  0.030  0.048  -0.018  0.025  0.065  -0.040  
2009 0.015  0.091  -0.076  0.026  0.100  -0.074  0.042  0.078  -0.036  0.039  0.101  -0.062  0.035  0.079  -0.044  0.030  0.048  -0.019  0.026  0.062  -0.037  
2010 0.052  0.150  -0.097  0.042  0.152  -0.110  0.078  0.118  -0.040  0.090  0.146  -0.056  0.077  0.103  -0.026  0.035  0.099  -0.064  0.039  0.106  -0.067  
2011 0.059  0.200  -0.141  0.042  0.170  -0.128  0.084  0.144  -0.060  0.094  0.147  -0.052  0.081  0.130  -0.049  0.036  0.125  -0.089  0.043  0.138  -0.096  
2012 0.080  0.069  0.011  0.165  0.066  0.099  0.131  0.037  0.094  0.140  0.045  0.095  0.096  0.032  0.064  0.127  0.020  0.106  0.077  0.033  0.045  
Average 0.027  0.108  -0.081  0.044  0.088  -0.044  0.061  0.074  -0.013  0.057  0.078  -0.021  0.051  0.057  -0.006  0.053  0.057  -0.004  0.037  0.061  -0.023  
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5.5.2. Method of Payment: Redefining a ‘Stock-deal’ 
In Table 5.6, I report a strongly negative relation between ATCD and the likelihood of a ‘stock-
deal’. The dependent variable ‘stock-deal’ is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the 
percentage of stock payment is over 70% and 0 when stock payment is less than 30% in Table 
5.6. In this section, I test the robustness of this negative relation by restricting the dependent 
variable as an ‘all stock-deal’ dummy, which equals 1 if the deal is completely paid by stock 
and 0 if the deal is a pure cash deal.  
The sample size has been significantly reduced by applying this restriction on the dependent 
dummy. There are 120 deals (from 696 to 576) and 63 deals (from 411 to 348) missing from 
the full sample univariate and multivariate regressions respectively, which are a 17% and 15% 
cut down in percentage respectively. The subsample where acquirer CSR is worse than target 
CSR experiences a larger dropdown (20% and 18% respectively for uni- and multi-variate 
regressions) than the subsample where acquirer CSR is better (12% for both uni- and multi-
variate regressions). I understand this as reflective of a higher degree of reluctance to engage 
in a stock-only deal, when an acquirer is not engaging in CSR activities as its target does.  
The relation between ATCD and the likelihood of an ‘all stock-deal’ remains negative still. A 
10% unit increase in ATCD results in a 3.060% (3.810% in the previous subsection) decrease 
in the likelihood of an ‘all stock-deal’ for the full sample, while this figure is 2.710% (2.980% 
in the previous subsection) for the subsample where the target CSR is better than its acquirer’s. 
Consequently an acquirer that does engage much in CSR activities compared to its target shows 
more reluctance in paying with stock, either because of lack of confidence in absorbing the 
target’s management and corporate culture with regard to CSR or unwillingness to share future 
uncertainties and risks in damaging its social reputation. Sign and significance for other 
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controlling acquirer- and deal- related variables remain similar. In conclusion, robustness check 
results are consistent with the preceding sections and support my hypotheses. 
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Table 5.8: Impacts of ATCD on ‘all stock-deal’ likelihood (Logistic regression) 
The sample consists of 576 U.S. acquisitions between 1992 and 2012. I obtain the initial sample of acquisitions 
from Thomson Financial's Security Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum database.  
‘All Stock-deal’ dummy is defined as 1 if the deal is paid completely by stock and 0 if it is a pure cash deal. 
Therefore, any deals with stock payment percentage between 0% and 100% are withdrawn from the sample. It 
reduces the sample size from 842 to 576. Regression specifications (1)-(2) present Logistic regression results for 
the full sample, while columns (3)-(4) and columns (5)-(6) present results for the subsample where acquirer CSR 
is better than target CSR and the subsample where acquirer CSR is worse than target CSR respectively. All 
variables are defined in theAppendix. The symbols *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
 
                                                                            Stock payment (Logit)   
  
    
  (1) (2) Marginal 
effect (2): 
dy/dx 
(3) (4) Marginal 
effect (4): 
dy/dx 
(5) (6) Marginal 
effect (6): 
dy/dx 
  
full sample 
 Sample where acquirer 
CSR > target CSR 
Sample where acquirer 
CSR<target CSR   
CSR measure:                
CSR difference 
(absolute) 
 -5.929*** 
(20.601) 
 -2.682 
(1.808) 
-0.306 
 -5.172*** 
(10.384) 
 -5.888** 
(4.796) 
-0.271 
 -8.020*** 
(10.546) 
1.122 
(0.055) 
 0.273 
                    
Acquirer 
Characteristics      
  
    
    
  
  
Collateral 
  
 -1.718** 
(5.765) 
-0.256 
  
 -3.260** 
(6.427) 
-0.258   
 -0.801 
(0.655) 
-0.166 
Financial leverage 
  
 -4.191*** 
(12.520) 
-0.333 
  
 -4.330** 
(5.014) 
-0.267   
 -4.777** 
(5.719) 
-0.380 
Market to book 
  
0.035* 
(2.760) 
0.008 
  
0.020 
(0.003) 
0.004   
0.044 
(0.079) 
0.011 
ROA 
  
 -15.700*** 
(18.265) 
-0.340 
  
 -11.433** 
(4.542) 
-0.272   
 -22.165* 
(10.083) 
-0.385 
Dividend payout ratio 
  
0.395 
(2.316) 
0.093 
  
0.020 
(0.003) 
0.004   
0.517 
(0.848) 
0.127 
Market cap 
  
0.297** 
(5.761) 
0.069 
  
0.720*** 
(10.529) 
0.162   
 -0.025 
(0.018) 
-0.006 
Runup 
  
0.209*** 
(11.325) 
0.048 
  
0.175** 
(5.511) 
0.036   
0.460*** 
(7.601) 
0.113 
                    
Deal characteristics                   
Relative deal size 
  
6.029*** 
(32.249) 
0.655 
  
8.972*** 
(19.720) 
0.727   
4.457*** 
(8.053) 
0.597 
Intra-industry dummy 
  
0.099 
(0.104) 
-0.022 
  
0.126 
(0.065) 
0.026   
 -0.225 
(0.235) 
-0.052 
Hostile dummy 
  
 -0.450 
(0.615) 
-0.093 
  
 -1.343 
(2.406) 
-0.183   
0.124 
(0.022) 
0.030 
Target hightec 
dummy   
 -1.815*** 
(27.777) 
-0.263 
  
 -2.970*** 
(25.651) 
-0.253   
 -1.120** 
(4.213) 
-0.215 
                    
Information 
asymmetry   variable     
  
    
    
  
  
Acquirer information 
asymmetry   
41.717* 
(2.911) 
0.660 
  
42.7041 
(1.482) 
0.728   
25.761 
(0.422) 
0.615 
Target information 
asymmetry   
7.413 
(0.321) 
0.659 
  
13.9336 
(0.565) 
0.728   
 -4.986 
(0.048) 
-0.381 
                    
Sample size 576 348   323 192   232 144   
Pseudo R-square 0.045 0.359   0.041 0.418   0.054 0.356   
Log likelihood -364.7265 -146.1895   -197.723 -64.7455   -150.8835 -64.5565   
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5.6. Conclusion 
This paper continues and completes the investigation on the impact of ATCD on M&A events. 
I uncover a negative relation both between ATCD and the percentage of stock as acquisition 
currency, and with the likelihood of employing stock as the main method of payment. 
Specifically, a 10% unit increase in between-firm CSR difference will reduce the stock 
payment percentage by approximately 5%. Whereas, a higher fraction of stock is preferred as 
a merger currency to convey that seller and buyer are willing to share associated future 
uncertainties and profits, especially since a lower ATCD suggests a lower level of ideological 
difference and may result in a higher degree of reliability between contracting parties. From a 
firm’s perspective, collaboration with a contracting agent from a similar ideological domain 
would be the most preferable option; in this situation they are more inclined to use stock as the 
main means of payment.  
Instead of standing as a standalone chapter that elucidates a negative association between 
ATCD and usage of stock as merger currency, this chapter continues and completes the 
research of the previous two main chapters on M&A likelihood, M&A premium and 
announcement time abnormal returns. A higher ATCD indicates the existence of a higher 
ideological difference in business strategies, operations and cultural aspects. Those stand as 
strong impediments in post-acquisition integration, which largely reduce a firm’s interests in 
merging with a contracting party with very different CSR engagements. When they do choose 
a contacting party with a large CSR difference, cash is preferred as merger currency to stock 
in order to prevent target shareholders increased presence in the merged combined entity. 
Associated M&A returns are consistent with current literature findings on the negative linkage 
between stock payment and announcement time abnormal returns (Travlos, 1987, Fuller et al., 
2002). 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
I extend current M&A literature by proposing that acquirer-target CSR difference, as indicative 
of the difference in social and ethical characters of two firms, is a compelling factor in various 
aspects of the market for corporate control. This relation is verified to be a bilateral interaction 
between an acquirer and its target, rather than having the unilateral impact that has previously 
been suggested. It is my conjecture that the reason for this is that CSR implies mutual trust, 
which acts as a mutual pathway to connect contracting parties. At the firm level, mutual trust 
is built on the recognition and acceptance of common business strategies and corporate culture 
contributes to this common aim by attempting to maximize firm value. Therefore, engagements 
in CSR activities are no longer considered just as a symbol of a firm’s character, such as 
conveying an eco-friendly image, but have also become a means of communication in the 
current business environment. 
Overall, in this thesis, I have identified that a higher ATCD will lead to (1) decreased likelihood 
of deal initialization and completion, a 10% unit increase in ATCD leads to a 8.65% decrease 
of the probability of completing a deal. This is interpreted as a decreased magnitude of mutual 
trust between two firms with contrasting CSR image; (2) lower percentage and likelihood of 
stock payment, a 10% unit increase in ATCD results in a 5% decrease of stock payment. As a 
result of decreased mutual trust, less percentage of stock is employed as method of payment as 
a means to reduce the voting share of target shareholders that hold different opinions in the 
board of an acquiring firm; (3) higher payments of premiums, higher announcement time 
combined return of an acquirer and a target, and higher 2-year acquirer returns. When two firms 
with larger ATCD have made the decision of a merger, it is more likely to be a concrete and 
determined decision as it will take more effort to integrate the two firms. Thus, they will not 
bother to merge if they do not foresee a higher certainty of higher synergistic gains. The market 
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appreciates such combinations by awarding them higher announcement time and long run 
returns. 
The existence of a large difference in social and ethical aspects leads to increased uncertainties 
and disagreements concerning strategic issues in the negotiating process. As a result, the level 
of mutual trust is likely reduced between two contracting parties and this will lead to the failure 
of the negotiation and withdrawal of a deal. The announcement of a deal between an acquirer 
and a target with large CSR difference conveys a higher level of expected synergy  because a 
firm would not bother to acquire a target that behaves differently in social and ethical aspects 
and is difficult to integrate unless it foresees a higher-than-average expected synergy. Therefore, 
the acquirer is inclined to pay for the expected synergy via a higher premium. The market 
appreciates the combination of two firms with such contrasting CSR images: the combinations 
with higher ATCD are awarded higher market-value weighted announcement time combined 
returns and acquirers receive a higher return until two years after the announcement.  
As CSR has attracted more interests and attentions from both the academia and the industry, I 
believe there has been and will continue to be an increasingly important impact of CSR on 
various aspects of a firm, e.g. corporate investment decisions and operating strategies. This 
work provides some insights into why CSR engagements are material and how they relate to 
the value creation process. From this perspective, this research would offer insights for both 
firm management and fund managers, by providing additional to publicly available financial 
statements. As a significant relation is identified between ATCD and the merger likelihood, a 
firm’s CSR attributes could be used as a variable to predict the likelihood of a deal happening. 
By attempting to predict these events, a merger arbitrage strategy could be executed for the 
purchase of stock in a predicted target before the acquisition and sell it at a higher price at the 
 188 
 
merger announcement time. Moreover, incorporating CSR into the target prediction model 
enables investment professionals to have a fresh view of M&A arbitrage and design new styles 
of investments. Furthermore, a higher between-firm CSR difference leads to higher acquisition 
premium and higher announcement time return as well as 2-year post merger return. It suggests 
that fund managers could use CSR metrics to make more informed decisions with regards to 
potential investments. For instance, buying share of an acquirer who acquirers a target with 
contrasting CSR image and hold for up to 2 years.  
The practical implications also extend to corporate management, in particular, raising the 
awareness of CSR issues in corporate decision-makings especially when making or taking 
M&A offers. It suggests that firms with different CSR perspectives are more likely to 
experience failures at all stages of a deal. The use of the CSR metrics would allow firms to 
consider these cultural issues at the due diligence stage, rather than at the post-merger 
integration stage only. Empirical results show that it is less likely two firms with higher ATCD 
could merge however, the combined return is higher if they do so. This phenomenon 
demonstrates that there is not a template for ‘the best culture’ and both firms benefit from 
considering the strengths of each culture. However, the ultimate aim of a firm is to create value 
for its shareholders and stakeholders. The focus on business value is essential to positioning 
CSR as well as culture in a way that firm management will understand and support it. By 
understanding the impacts of CSR on firm value and as an important attribute of firm culture, 
management can use CSR as an effective tool for achieving post-merger integration objectives. 
Apart from implications on investment professionals and firm management, I also determine 
key areas where further research is required to both continue and substantiate my work. This 
includes the mechanism through which CSR affects various aspects of M&As. It would be 
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beneficial for investment professionals to further understand how, in a CSR context, an 
acquisition add value to stakeholders and at what stage. Another area is that of the impact of 
CSR on longer-term firm performance and shareholder returns, i.e. post the initial 5-year period. 
It would also be interesting to look into the chronological evolution of CSR impacts on 
corporate actions and other aspects.   
From the point of strategic research, investigations into the link between post-merger 
integration styles and long term firm returns will provide useful insights for scholars both in 
the area of M&As and business strategy. The post-merger integration process has always been 
a complex process and an important determinant of the financial success of a deal. It involves 
combining and rearranging the acquirer’s and the target’s businesses to recognise the potential 
synergies that usually motivates the deal. Research on the interaction of firm’s CSR attributes 
and the integration process will extend post-merger integration literature in a previously 
unconsidered CSR context. This could be further extended to the longer-term M&A wealth 
creation, by investigating the patterns of post-merger integration of firms’ CSR factors and 
long run return of the combined entity.     
In conclusion, CSR has been a very important issue these days concerning various market 
players and  scholars, there remains a lot of issues to be studied and investigated that can benefit 
both researchers in academia and practitioners in industry.
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Appendix A. Variable Definitions 
This appendix provides a detailed description of the construction of all the variables used in 
this thesis. 
 
Variable Definition 
ATCD ATCD=|Acquirer CSR-Target CSR| 
 
Acquisition 
premium 
Premium 4 Weeks Prior to Announcement Date: Premium of offer 
price to target closing stock price 4 weeks prior to the original 
announcement date, expressed as a percentage ((price paid per 
common share – price per share 4 weeks prior to announcement) /  
price per share 4 weeks prior to announcement ) * 100.  Premium is 
winsorised between 0% to 200%. 
 
A_Collateral Ratio of the acquirer's property, plant and equipment (PPE) over 
acquirer book value of total assets, as of the year-end prior to deal 
announcement. Source: Compustat and SDC. 
 
A_Financial 
leverage 
Ratio of acquirer debt in current liabilities, in long term liabilities 
plus value of acquisition transaction over acquirer total assets plus 
value of acquisition transaction, as of the year-end prior to deal 
announcement. Source: Compustat and SDC. 
 
A_ROA Acquirer return on asset ratio: acquirer net income over total assets, 
as of the year-end prior to deal announcement. Source: Compustat 
and SDC. 
 
A_Market value Acquirer price per share times total number of shares outstanding, 
as of the year-end prior to deal announcement. Source: Compustat, 
SDC and CRSP. 
 
A_Market cap Log (Market value). Source: Compustat, SDC and CRSP. 
 
A_Market to book Ratio of market value of acquirer equity (ordinary and preferred) 
over its book value of equity, as of the year-end prior to deal 
announcement. Source: Compustat, SDC and CRSP. 
 
A_Tobin Q Ratio of market value of acquirer equity (ordinary and preferred) 
plus book value of debt over the sum of book value of equity plus 
book value of debt, as of the year-end prior to deal announcement. 
Source: Compustat, SDC and CRSP. 
 
A_Runup Buy and hold abnormal return (BHAR) of the acquirer stock over 
60 days preceding acquisition announcement day. Source: CRSP. 
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Acquirer 
information 
asymmetry 
For each acquirer, information asymmetry is defined as the 
idiosyncratic volatility of their stock. It is computed as the standard 
deviation of the residuals from the Fama-French Three-factor 
(excess of the risk-free rate) (FF 3-Factor) model of daily returns 
within 250 trading days preceding acquisition announcement day. 
Source: CRSP 
 
A_Hightec (dummy) Indicator equals 1 if the acquirer is a high-tech firm. High-tech 
firms are defined as having their hightec dummy equals 1. Source: 
SDC. 
    
T_Collateral Ratio of the target's property, plant and equipment (PPE) over its 
book value of total assets, as of the year-end prior to deal 
announcement. Source: Compustat and SDC. 
 
T_Financial leverage Ratio of target debt in current liabilities, in long term liabilities plus 
value of acquisition transaction over target total assets plus value of 
acquisition transaction, as of the year-end prior to deal 
announcement. Source: Compustat and SDC. 
 
T_ROA Target return on asset ratio: target net income over total assets, as 
of the year-end prior to deal announcement. Source: Compustat and 
SDC. 
 
T_Market value Target price per share times total number of shares outstanding, as 
of the year-end prior to deal announcement. Source: Compustat, 
SDC and CRSP. 
 
T_Market cap Log (Market value). Source: Compustat, SDC and CRSP. 
 
T_Market to book Ratio of market value of target equity (ordinary and preferred) over 
its book value of equity, as of the year-end prior to deal 
announcement. Source: Compustat, SDC and CRSP. 
 
T_Tobin Q Ratio of market value of target equity (ordinary and preferred) plus 
book value of debt over the sum of book value of equity plus book 
value of debt, as of the year-end prior to deal announcement. 
Source: Compustat, SDC and CRSP. 
T_Runup Buy and hold abnormal return (BHAR) of the target stock over 60 
days preceding acquisition announcement day. Source: CRSP. 
Target information 
asymmetry 
For each target, information asymmetry is defined as the 
idiosyncratic volatility of their stock. It is computed as the standard 
deviation of the residuals from the Fama-French Three-factor 
(excess of the risk-free rate) (FF 3-Factor) model of daily returns 
within 250 trading days preceding acquisition announcement day. 
Source: CRSP 
T_Hightec (dummy) Indicator equals 1 if the target is a high-tech firm. High-tech firms 
are defined as having their hightec dummy equals 1. Source: SDC. 
 202 
 
  
    
Deal value Value of the deal, excluding assumed liabilities (in million US$). 
Source: SDC. 
 
Intra-industry 
(dummy) 
Indicator equals 1 if the bidder's and the target's primary 3-digit 
SIC code coincides, and equals 0 otherwise. Source: SDC. 
 
Hostile (dummy) Indicator equals 1 if attitude of the deal is hostile, and equals 0 
otherwise. Source: SDC. 
 
Percentage of stock 
payment 
The percentage of stock used as part of acquisition currency. 
Source: SDC. 
 
Competition The dummy variable competition is 1 if 'number of bidders' is 
larger than 1 and is 0 if ‘number of bidders’ if equal to 1.  Source: 
SDC. 
 
Relative Deal Size Ratio of the price offered for the acquisition transaction (excluding 
assumed liabilities) over the sum of the price offered for the 
acquisition plus the bidder's market capitalization, as of the year-
end prior to deal announcement. Source: Compustat and SDC. 
 
Stock deal (dummy) Indicator equals 1 if percentage of stock payment is over 70%, and 
equals 0 if percentage of stock payment is less than 30%. Source: 
SDC. 
 
All stock deal 
(dummy) 
Indicator equals 1 if percentage of stock payment is 100%, and 
equals 0 if the deal is paid purely by cash. Source: SDC. 
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Appendix B. Linking Thomson Financial SDC, CRSP, Compustat and KLD databases 
This thesis has used data from different databases: Thomson Financial SDC, KLD, CRSP and 
Compustat. For the purpose of this research, I am primarily interested in matching the acquirer 
and the target in each deal with their firm-level social score from KLD, and their stock returns 
(announcement time, one-year and two-year after announcement) and their financial 
(accounting) data.  
This match requires the usage of a table containing Committee on Uniform Security 
Identification Procedures identifier (CUSIP), permanent security identification number 
(PERMNO), and GVKEY. The reason behind this is that data that come from different 
databases have different identifiers to distinguish their individual entries. Thomson Financial 
SDC uses CUSIP to identify firms, KLD uses Ticker and CUSIP, the CRSP uses PERMNO 
and Compustat uses GVKEY as firm identifier.  
The flow of database matching is presented in Figure B.1. Initial sample is taken from Thomson 
Financial SDC, deal acquirers and targets are both matched to KLD for social scores using 
CUSIP and Ticker. This has largely reduced size of the deal sample as KLD only rates large 
listed U.S. (and a few Canadian) firms. The next steps of matching to CRSP and Compustat 
have been difficult. As PERMNO and GVKEY are both required for matching, I have to 
retrieve these from the 6 digit CUSIP. After linking each CUSIP with PERMNO and GVKEY, 
the sample has then been matched to CRSP (announcement time return, idiosyncratic risk and 
long run return) and Compustat (financial data). The calculation of announcement time return 
is shown in Appendix C. 
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Figure 0.a： Linking Thomson Financial SDC, CRSP, Compustat and KLD databases 
 
 
  
Deal sample with KLD, CRSP and Compustat
Final sample with 842 deals
Deal sample with KLD social scores and CRSP stock return
Matched to Compustat on GVKEY
Deal sample with KLD social scores
Retrieve PERMNO and GVKEY for each 
CUSIP
Matched to CRSP on PERMNO
Initial sample from Thomson Financial SDC
Matched to KLD on Ticker and Cusip
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Appendix C. Calculation of Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) 
The standard market model methodology proposed by Brown and Warner (1985) is applied in 
this research to calculate the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs). The CRSP value-
weighted return is employed as a proxy for the market return. I measure abnormal returns for 
both acquirers and targets by estimating the market model from 200 trading days of return data 
ending 11 days before the merger announcement date.  
I take three-day cumulative daily abnormal stock returns to obtain the cumulative abnormal 
return CAR (-1, 1) for both acquirers and targets, from one day preceding the merger 
announcement and one day after the merger announcement. Mathematically, the CARs are 
calculated by subtracting the market model cumulative returns from the cumulative returns of 
the firm: 
CAR𝑖 = ∑ [𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (?̂?𝑖 + ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑚,𝑡
𝑡=𝑒𝑛𝑑
𝑡=𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡
)] 
where CAR𝑖 is the cumulative abnormal return of firm 𝑖 over the 3-day period, 𝑅𝑖 is the return 
of the acquirer/ target over the same period, ?̂?𝑖 and ?̂?𝑖 are the OLS predicted values from the 
estimation period, and 𝑅𝑚 is the value-weighted return of the CRSP index. Start is the first day 
of the event window and end is the last day accordingly.  
CCAR (-1, 1) for the merged firm (combined cumulative abnormal return) is constructed by 
taking the market value weighted sum of the acquirer’s CAR (-1, 1) and the target’s CAR (-1, 
1). 
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Appendix D. Target CSR and the completion likelihood of M&A deals 
I use this section to present results of target CSR on the completion likelihood of the M&A 
deals. The impacts of target CSR on M&A completion likelihood are investigated respectively 
in multivariate frameworks in order to control for known acquirer-, target-, and deal-
characteristics. Table D.1 reports estimates from logistic regressions where the dependent 
variable is either 1 (when a deal is completed) or 0 (when a deal is withdrawn).  
Analyses are conducted on a full sample level and two subsample levels, where acquirer CSR 
is better than target CSR and where target CSR is better than acquirer CSR. The explanatory 
variable ‘CSR difference’ quantifies corporate social engagements difference between an 
acquirer and a target. As I take the absolute value of the difference to show the acquirer-target 
ideological difference of CSR engagements, it does not describe the superiority of an acquirer 
and a target. Analyses of these three samples complement each other to examine the impacts 
of target CSR and between-firm CSR distance on M&A completion likelihood. 
To address how target CSR impacts the completion likelihood of a deal, I specify eleven 
logistic regressions in Table D.1, five regressions for the full sample, three for each of the two 
subsamples (acquirer CSR>target CSR and acquirer CSR<target CSR), all using the target CSR 
score as the main explanatory variable and the M&A completion status as the dependent 
variable. Target CSR scores, as well as acquirer CSR scores, range from -1 to 1. A strongly 
positive relation between the target CSR and the M&A completion likelihood is documented. 
Standard errors are reported as White standard errors by adjusting for heteroscedasticity. 
Pseudo R-square are comparable to those from the relevant CSR and M&A literature (Deng et 
al., 2013, Billett and Qian, 2008), while log likelihood recommends models (5), (8) and (11) 
provide the strongest explanatory power for the full sample and the two subsamples. 
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Regression specifications (1)-(5) are conducted for the full sample (Table D.1). The 
corresponding coefficient estimates in regression specifications (1)-(5) are all positive and 
statistically significant at either the 5% or 1% levels. I first specify a univariate regression on 
the target CSR score in regression (1), which reveals a strongly positive association between 
target CSR and deal completion likelihood. This relation remains significantly positive when I 
increase the number of control variables from regressions (2) to (4). The use of target-related 
control variables, e.g. target ROE, target Tobin Q, target collateral, target financial leverage, 
target market capitalization, target size, relative size, target information asymmetry and intra-
industry dummy, does not alter my findings.  
I do not include acquirer CSR score as a control variable until regression (5) as Deng et al. 
(2013) conclude that acquirer CSR score plays a positive role in influencing the deal 
completion likelihood. Based on that, I control for both acquirer and target CSR scores in 
regression specification (5), which provides an indication of which party has the greatest 
influence on M&A. Regression specification (5) shows that both target CSR and acquirer CSR 
positively and significantly impact the M&A completion likelihood. In terms of the level of 
statistical and economic significance, target CSR surpasses acquirer CSR in both these aspects.  
For the full sample, through regressions (1) to (5), there always exists a strongly positive 
correlation between target CSR engagements and the M&A completion likelihood. My main 
interest is whether a target’s CSR engagements affect the likelihood of completion of an M&A 
deal. To see that, I calculate the marginal effects of logit regression based on model (5) by 
taking the natural log of one plus the mean of each independent variable (Billett and Qian, 
2008). After controlling for potentially influential target- and deal- related variables and 
acquirer CSR, a one unit increase in target CSR score above the sample mean increases the 
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likelihood of M&A completion by 10.5%. As a one unit increase in CSR score is an 
unrealistically large change, it would be more applicable to take a look at a 10% unit move of 
the target CSR score which is related to an approximately 1.05% decrease in the deal 
completion likelihood.  
For the subsample where acquirer CSR is better than target CSR, regression specification (8) 
provides evidence that in such a subsample, better CSR engagements on the target side would 
contribute to a higher completion likelihood. This is reflected by a strongly positive 0.71% 
increase in the M&A completion likelihood in association with every 10% unit increase in the 
target CSR score. In contrast to Deng et al. (2013)’s findings, acquirer CSR has no discernible 
impact on the deal completion likelihood in this subsample. For the subsample where acquirer 
CSR is less than target CSR, the direction of this positive relation remains but is no longer 
robust after controlling for various influential variables. This suggests that target CSR has a 
greater effect on the probability of deal completion than acquirer CSR as a general case in full 
sample. This strongly positive association is dominated by the subsample where acquirer CSR 
is better than target CSR.  
Following on from Rodrigues and Stevenson (2013), the indicator ROE shows that accounting 
profitability over one fiscal year prior to an acquisition announcement, has a positive but 
insignificant relation with the M&A completion likelihood for regression specifications (2)-(5). 
Neither target size variable nor relative size variable shows any significant impacts on the 
M&A completion likelihood. Both acquirers and targets in my sample are publicly traded firms 
with CSR scores from the KLD social database which rates the largest U.S. public firms 
according to their market capitalization. Therefore, the dispersion of target size in my sample 
is not so distinctive as to make the relation statistically significant. Columns (2)-(5) show no 
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relation between the intra-industry dummy and the M&A completion. It helps to clarify that 
CSR proximity is not simply a proxy for intra-industry deals versus cross-industry deals. 
However, in my sample, the majority of deals are intra-industry acquisitions, which Tobin Q 
shows has a statistically significant positive effect on the M&A completion likelihood. 
In conclusion, in addition to Deng et al. (2013)’s findings on a positive association between 
acquirer CSR and deal completion likelihood, I find that there is a more distinct relation 
between target CSR and deal completion likelihood. More importantly, target CSR outweighs 
acquirer CSR in terms of both statistical and economic significance, in revealing the relation 
between CSR and M&A completion likelihood. This may infer that the values of the acquirer 
are more important to the completion of the deal than the values of the target. I accept that all 
acquirers attach certain but different levels of importance to targets’ CSR engagements. This 
level varies with an acquirer’s attitude towards CSR. Furthermore, when the full sample is 
partitioned into two subsamples where the acquirer attributes greater importance to CSR than 
their targets (Acquirer CSR>Target CSR) and attributes less importance to CSR (Acquirer 
CSR<Target CSR), acquirer CSR loses its importance in influencing the deal completion in 
both subsamples, while target CSR shows consistency, especially in cases when acquirer CSR 
is better than target CSR. I surmise that as acquirers are naturally more focused on promoting 
CSR, they attach greater importance to CSR performance during the acquisition process. 
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Table 0.1: Impact of target CSR on M&A completion likelihood 
 
The sample consists of 842 U.S. acquisitions between 1992 and 2012. I obtain the initial sample of acquisition s from Thomson Financial's Security Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum database. My final sample includes all 
acquisitions subject to the following selection criteria: (1) the deal value disclosed in SDC is greater than $1 million, (2) the acquirer controls less than 10% of the target's shares prior to the announcement and owns greater 
than 50% of the target's shares after the transaction, (3) both the acquirer and the target are publicly traded and have stock returns and financial data available from Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and 
Compustat, respectively, (4) both the acquirer and the target are covered by the KLD Research & Analytics, Inc. (KLD) STATS database.  
Firms are divided into high, medium and low corporate social responsibility (CSR) firms according to the sample tertiles of CSR. All variables are defined in the Appendix. The symbols *, **, and *** denote significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  
  Impact of Target CSR on deal completion (Logit) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)   (6) (7) (8)   (9) (10) (11)   
      
  Full sample 
Marginal 
effect (5): 
dy/dx 
Sample where acquirer CSR > 
target CSR 
Marginal 
effect (8): 
dy/dx 
Sample where acquirer 
CSR<target CSR 
Marginal 
effect (11): 
dy/dx 
CSR measure:                             
Target CSR 3.353*** 
(6.942) 
2.623** 
(3.876) 
2.744** 
(4.137) 
4.559*** 
(7.438) 
4.001** 
(5.345) 0.105 
4.545** 
(5.586) 
5.398** 
(4.875) 
4.689* 
(2.933) 0.071 
4.692** 
(3.950) 
4.599 
(1.562) 
0.377 
(0.007) 0.029 
                              
Characteristics of targets                             
Acquirer CSR 
        
2.543* 
(2.932) 0.098     
1.363 
(0.376) 0.052     
5.406 
(2.318) 0.100 
ROE 
  
0.34 
(1.730) 
0.329 
(1.602) 
0.235 
(0.650) 
0.215 
(0.516) 0.019   
0.947 
(1.281) 
0.976 
(1.294) 0.044   
 -0.575 
(1.182) 
 -0.595 
(1.193) -0.068 
Tobin Q 
  
0.054** 
(4.276) 
0.0531** 
(4.265) 
0.051** 
(3.7944) 
0.0541** 
(3.813) 0.005   
0.109 
(2.112) 
0.112 
(1.851) 0.007   
0.519 
(1.527) 
0.457 
(1.190) 0.034 
Collateral 
  
 -1.096*** 
(6.755) 
 -1.003** 
(5.702) 
 -0.862* 
(2.607) 
 -0.628 
(1.303) -0.077   
 -1.909** 
(4.377) 
 -1.831** 
(3.932) -0.254   
0.550 
(0.419) 
0.526 
(0.372) 0.038 
Financial leverage 
  
0.379 
(0.415) 
0.368 
(0.386) 
0.171 
(0.068) 
0.170 
(0.073) 0.015   
1.987 
(1.752) 
1.984 
(1.745) 0.061   
 -0.169 
(0.123) 
 -0.058 
(0.015) -0.005 
Market capitalization 
  
 -0.178 
(1.749) 
 -0.206 
(2.286) 
 -0.184 
(1.213) 
 -0.191 
(1.286) -0.020   
 -0.378 
(1.808) 
 -0.387 
(1.849) -0.031   
 -0.359 
(0.830) 
 -0.185 
(0.203) -0.018 
Target size 
  
 -0.034 
(0.076) 
 -0.022 
(0.029) 
 -0.044 
(0.0815) 
 -0.0285 
(0.034) -0.003   
0.010 
(0.001) 
0.019 
(0.005) 0.001   
0.250 
(0.508) 
0.133 
(0.138) 0.011 
Relative size 
    
0.009 
(0.124) 
0.009 
(0.120) 
0.008 
(0.097) 0.001   
0.021 
(0.339) 
0.021 
(0.339) 0.001   
 -0.007 
(0.018) 
 -0.014 
(0.072) -0.001 
Target information 
asymmetry       
 -3.330 
(0.076) 
 -3.656 
(0.093) -0.716   
48.510* 
(3.224) 
48.510* 
(3.224) 0.072   
 -22.796 
(2.429) 
 -21.309 
(2.050) -0.900 
Intra-industry dummy 
  
0.099 
(0.185) 
0.104 
(0.199) 
0.032 
(0.012) 
 -0.002 
(0.000) 0.000   
0.240 
(0.306) 
0.240 
(0.306) 0.017   
 -0.582 
(1.556) 
 -0.660 
(1.955) -0.077 
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Sample size 842 594 692 521 521   449 273 273   351 222 222   
Pseudo R-square 0.008 0.040 0.039 0.040 0.046   0.012 0.109 0.110   0.012 0.039 0.048   
Log likelihood -341.197 -288.085 -282.261 -194.097 -194.097   -170.865 -100.648 -100.648   -148.977 -80.174 -80.174   
 
               
               
 
